On January 25,
thousands of Egyptians will gather in Tahrir Square and across Egypt to commemorate
the uprising that toppled the Hosni Mubarak dictatorship. They will celebrate
with good reason. When Mubarak, pressured by millions in the streets and
ultimately betrayed by his own top generals, resigned on February 11, 2011, a
military-backed dictatorship that had ruled and largely abused Egypt for more
than half a century came to an end. Most Egyptians were euphoric, and the world
was transfixed by the unexpected power of the Tahrir Square freedom movement.
However, in
the two years since, the transition remains fragile, and Egypt's politics
remain dangerously polarized. In fact, in addition to celebration, there may
also be clashes on January 25. Today Egypt has an elected president, a new constitution,
and will soon hold parliamentary elections. But if Egypt has made halting steps
toward democracy, worrying signs of illiberalism and poor governance are increasingly
apparent. The outcome of the revolution in the Arab world's most populous
country remains uncertain, and the threat of violence looms large.
To
understand where Egypt's revolution might go from here, it is useful to take a sober
accounting of the key lessons that we have learned over the past two years, and
to debunk some myths that stubbornly took root during that time.
The Muslim Brotherhood are not
democrats. Despite some prominent Western journalists and analysts'
continued wishful thinking to the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood -- a secretive,
rigorously disciplined and hierarchical organization -- neither understands nor
sees inherent value in democratic politics. Rather, the Muslim Brotherhood
believes in a narrow majoritarianism and its leaders and supporters often confuse
that with democracy. The Brotherhood believes that 50 percent + 1 equals a free
hand to pursue its agenda. And its agenda is manifestly an illiberal one in
which universal rights are subordinated to religious doctrine.
The manner in which Egypt's new constitution was conceived, written, and
adopted offers the clearest example of the Brotherhood's authoritarian and
majoritarian tendencies. A post-authoritarian state should adopt a consensus
document, but the current constitution was rammed through despite the staunch
objections of non-Islamists. Rather than guaranteeing protections for
minorities and women, the constitution leaves a troublingly broad scope for
violation of their human rights. Looking ahead, as the Brotherhood embarks upon
a legislative agenda, expect laws that will seek to limit media freedoms and constrain
freedom of assembly.
The military remains very powerful. In
November 2011, Egypt's Islamists, which had for months worked closely with the
Mubarak appointed military leadership, protested the proposed "Selmi document"
which was designed to ensure the military's privileges in any new constitution.
However, after President Mohamed Morsi was elected in June 2012 and dismissed
the two top Mubarak era generals in August, Egypt's Islamist dominated
constituent assembly crafted a constitution that explicitly guarantees the
military's power and privileges. The Islamists learned that trying to bring the
military under civilian control was a dangerous task, and the two entities now
have a more collaborative relationship. This gives some of Egypt's
non-Islamists, who erroneously believed that the military represents the last
line of defense against Islamists, migraines. But the more salient factor is
that a military not under direct civilian oversight is simply bad for nurturing
a fledgling democracy.
Sectarianism in Egypt is alive and well.
Attacks on Egyptian Christians were not uncommon in Mubarak's time -- on New
Year's Day in 2011, three and a half weeks before the uprising, a church in
Alexandria was bombed, killing 21 worshipers. But Christians have thus far fared
even worse in post-revolution Egypt. Churches have been burned, Christians have
been attacked and prevented from voting, a Christian man's ear was even cut off
-- and few perpetrators have been arrested, fostering a culture of impunity. In
fact, Christian victims are often blamed for being attacked. In October 2011, for
example, the military attacked a group of Christian protesters, killing 27, and
as the melee was taking place, a state TV presenter requested that "honorable
citizens" report to the scene to protect the soldiers from the marauding
Christians.
Now with Islamists politically ascendant, hardline influential Muslim clerics
have ratcheted up their sectarian invective against Christians. They are
emboldened by the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood and their Salafi extremist junior
partners believe in the primacy of Islamic principles over equal citizenship. While
the Brotherhood, to appease Western skeptics, has issued various blandishments
about its commitment to "equality," its leaders will stand by idly as more
hardline Islamists spew ugly and dangerous rhetoric about Christians. Egyptians
Christians should be concerned. Even if legislation is not overtly prejudiced,
the views of Egypt's leaders will increasingly permeate the country, fanning
existing anti-Christian biases.
The progressive "Muslim Brotherhood
youth" is a myth. In the years leading up to the Egyptian uprising, there
was a prevalent belief that the younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood would
exert a moderating influence on the Muslim Brotherhood, especially if the
movement was granted legal recognition. Many young Islamists are indeed more
moderate, revolutionary, and yes more liberal, than the leadership. However,
these more progressive, democratic young Brothers are outnumbered by adherents
of similar age who remain committed to conservatism. As a result, the "young
brothers" have not had the moderating influence that was expected.
The more
impressive progressive Brothers, like Ibrahim El Houdaiby, have left the
Brotherhood and started their own small political parties, or joined forces
with more established, popular, moderate former members like Abdel Moniem Aboul
Fotouh. Their defections have only reinforced the orthodox conservatism and
authoritarian nature of the movement. On November 22, 2012, when Morsi declared
himself above legal challenges, the Brotherhood ordered its younger members to
gather in support of the president's statement, even before the content of that
statement was known. The young Brothers actually had no idea what Morsi was
going to say. They just knew that they would agree with it.
The silent majority remains the most
potentially potent force in Egypt. To be sure, the Brotherhood is currently
the most powerful and organized political force in the country. It can count on
a bloc of between five and 10 million voters. And these voters have delivered
victory after victory over the last 22 months in referenda as well as parliamentary
and presidential elections. In fact, it is likely that Islamists will win the
upcoming parliamentary elections. However, Egypt has more than 50 million
voters. The biggest bloc is the unaffiliated -- either because they don't care,
don't know enough about politics, or are disillusioned. For example, only 11
million voters approved the Islamist crafted constitution. This of course does
not mean that the other 39 million voters reject it, but if the Brotherhood can
only get one fifth of voters to make their way to a polling station to register
their approval of such an important document, it means they can be beaten.
The prevalence of undecided potential voters means that Egypt's divided
non-Islamists could make electoral progress if they successfully appeal to new
voters beyond their own bloc of five to six million, mostly urban supporters.
However, to date, Egypt's non-Islamist movement remains incoherent. Thus far,
their strategy has been to be the party of "no" and to try to pressure
authorities through street protests. This will not work. Non-Islamists can certainly
win Egyptian elections, but they have to work twice as hard. They have yet to
hone an appealing message, focused on the economy, for example, that would
attract voters in places like Upper Egypt or other rural parts of the country,
where they are particularly weak.
Authorities are adrift on the economy. There
was a strong economic component to the January 25 uprising. Egypt's economy,
like those of many other non-oil Arab states, grew under Mubarak in the last
few years of his rule, but that growth did little for the poor. As recently as
last fall, the Muslim Brotherhood was heralded as "serious" about economic
reform. Given Egypt's deep economic problems -- growth is anemic, the pound is
losing value, structural limitations to growth abound -- this should have been
the government's primary focus. Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood used its
political capital to ram through a constitution and then found it had little
leverage to push through some needed but difficult economic reforms.
Of course, if
the Brotherhood had pursued political consensus, it might have been better
positioned to carry out needed reforms -- for example, on taxation and
subsidies. In addition, were there less polarization and political upheaval,
tourism receipts could well be higher and foreign and domestic investors less
skittish. But the Muslim Brotherhood gambled that it was more important to
cement its political agenda. For a time, Egypt's regional importance will
continue to attract aid -- from the IMF, the United States and, increasingly
from the Gulf -- but room for maneuver on crucial reforms is now much more
limited.
Sinai is a serious security problem. Sinai
is becoming increasingly lawless and poses a potential threat to Egyptian
security and the economy. Since Mubarak's ouster, the gas pipeline in Sinai has
been attacked more than a dozen times. In August 2012, the border police were
attacked and 16 officers were killed, leading to a major shakeup of the security
and military leadership. It is also disturbing that it appears difficult to get
solid information about what is actually happening in Sinai -- who the Sinai
militants are and what are their goals. However, their actions can carry
serious consequences. A single devastating terrorist attack on tourists from
Sinai-based groups could deal a further blow to Egypt's ailing economy.
Despite all
the challenges that post-uprising Egypt faces, Egyptian politics are more alive
than they have been in decades, and Egyptian democracy and pluralism are still
good long term bets. Entrenched interests and many newly empowered political
forces are change resistant -- but it is very unlikely that Egypt will return
to the kind of "stable" authoritarianism of Mubarak. While they are a small
minority, the core group of revolutionary activists agitating for democracy
remains indefatigable. Egypt will probably experience a very bumpy few years,
but these activists will keep pushing those in power to move toward a more
democratic Egypt. Egypt has changed.
