Jon Stewart defends Bassem Youssef (Egypt's Jon Stewart); Destroys Pres. Morsi

Jon Stewart defends Bassem Youssef (Egypt's Jon Stewart); Destroys Pres. Morsi 

أنا لا أفهم هذا الرجل .. أنت رئيس مصر.. أعظم أرض وأعظم شعب في التاريخ المدون، شعبك -سيدي الرئيس- اخترع الحضارة، حتى أن اليونانيين القدماء حين ذهبوا إلى مصر ذهلوا وقالوا: ماذا عندكم هنا؟ علم الهندسة والأساطير؟ عندما تفرغون منهما يمكننا استخدامهما، سيدي الرئيس لقد اخترع المصريون اللغة المكتوبة والورق ومعجون الأسنان، حتى إنهم دفنوا مع قططهم الأليفة، كذلك أصبح الكثيرون يقلدون الطريقة المصرية في الرقص، المصريون هم من بنوا الأهرامات.. ربما يجب عليك أن تأتي بأحد هؤلاء كي يجعل جلدك أكثر سمكاً (جلد إخوانجي تخين).. كل مافعله باسم يوسف هو السخرية من قبعتك وعدم قدرتك على الأداء الديمقراطي، ما الذي يقلقك؟ أنت رئيس مصر، ولديك جيش وأسلحة ودبابات وطائرات، ونحن نعلم ذلك لأن مازال لدينا الفواتير، انصت لي جيدا، محاولة إسكات كوميديان لن تؤهلك كي تصبح رئيس مصر، دعني أقول لك شيئا: مالذي يقلقك سيدي الرئيس؟ خوفك من قوة النقد الساخر على هيبتك؟ انظر إلى.. هذا ما أفعله في الـ 15 عام الماضيين، أنا أعرف باسم شخصيا، وهو صديقي وأخي، وإن كان هناك شيئان يحبهما باسم جدا فهما مصر والإسلام

Baha’i in #egypt

January 2013- Despite the new year, Egyptian Minister of Education Ibrahim Deif reiterated his old comments about the (lack of) acceptance of Baha’i children in Egyptian government schools in an interview with the Egyptian newspaper “Al Akhbar al Yowm”.

The newspaper asked:

ما موقف الوزارة من أبناء من يعتنقون الديانة البهائية, و هل لهم الحق في الالتحاق بمدارسها بعد اعتراف الدستور الجديد بالديانات السماوية الثلاث فقط؟
What is the position of the Ministry regarding the children of Baha’is, and do they have the right to register in government schools after the recognition in the new constitution of only the three monotheistic religions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism)?

The Minister of Education, Ibrahim Deif, replied:

 هناك ديانات ثلاث معترف بها، و لن أعتزف بأي ديانة أجري، والتربية الديانية مادة اساسية و إذا استطاعوا استيفاء شروط الالتحاق بالمدارس فأهلا و سهلا بهم، و من لا يرضي بشروطي فلا مكان له عندي لأن الديانات المعترف بها دستوريا هي الديانات السماوية الثلاث فقط ولم يعترف بسواها
[The monotheistic faiths] are only three recognized religions, and no other faiths are recognized.  Religion is a crucial subject in school, and if [a student] is able to full the conditions of enrollment in government schools, then they are welcome. However, there is no place for anyone who does not accept these conditions because the only constitutionally recognized religions are the monotheistic faiths, and no others.

If readers find the tautologically confusing and meaningless response of the Minister of Education frustrating, then so do many others. Professor Basma Moussa, a Baha’i activist in Egypt, has a response of her own to the Egyptian Minister:

I have a question for the Minister. What are these conditions that are required for a Baha’i child to enroll in a public school, a school that we all used to attend without conditions, a school from which we succeeded and went on to hold prominent positions that serve our dear country, Egypt?  According to the new constitution itself, education is the right of every child, so please tell us, what are your conditions for an education so that Baha’i parents can figure out how to enroll their children in Egyptian schools, school that are built from the taxes that are taken from us, like they are taken from all Egyptians without discrimination. Please respond, thank you.

The Minister of Education’s remarks are an echo of his comments to another newspaper on November 30th, where he claimed “State law in accordance with government procedures only recognizes three religions, and the Baha’i faith is not among them. Thus their children do not have the right to register in government schools.” His new comments add unidentified “conditions” to the enrollment of Baha’i children in school, which is in fact more dangerous than closing the door entirely.

By claiming that there is a vague method for inclusion, the Egyptian government has the ability to discriminate against Baha’i children and the entire Baha’i community while claiming that there is nothing inherently discriminatory about their laws. Just like the new constitution affirms that “Freedom of belief is an inviolable right” while denying the legitimacy of any faith other than Islam, Christianity, or Judaism, the Minister of Education’s comments pave the way for a discriminatory policy against Baha’is that is given constitutional legitimacy.

‫خلفان - تم تهديدى من #الإخوان بعد كشفى عن تجارة الشاطر للمخدرات‬

Egypt book blasts Brotherhood, becomes best-seller

#Egypt Egyptian book blasts Muslim Brotherhood and becomes a best-seller

 

An Egyptian lawyer whose dissenting voice got him thrown out of the Muslim Brotherhood examines what he calls the group's hidden radicalism in a book that has become a best-seller in Cairo.
Tharwat al-Khirbawy's "Secret of the Temple" has been dismissed by Brotherhood leaders as part of a smear campaign.

But its success points to a deep mistrust harboured by some Egyptians towards a once-outlawed movement that has moved to the heart of power since Hosni Mubarak was toppled and its candidate secured the presidency.
In its 12th print run since November, the book is being sold in upmarket shops and on street corners, pointing to a thirst for information about a group whose inner workings remain a mystery months after President Mohamed Mursi came to power.
Expelled from the group a decade ago, Khirbawy says he aims to expose dictatorship and extremism inside the Brotherhood. In the process, he has joined a media war being waged to shape views in Egypt's deeply polarised political landscape.
Asked to comment on the book, one senior Muslim Brotherhood leader dismissed its content as "fallacies". Another said that to comment on such a book would be a waste of time.
"I want to make all people know the reality about the Brotherhood," Khirbawy said in an interview with Reuters.
Khirbawy sees the way he was kicked out of the Brotherhood as an illustration of the group's authoritarian streak.
He was disciplined in 2001 at a "Brotherhood court" for publishing three articles that criticised the group for not engaging with other opposition parties - a criticism still levelled at the Brotherhood today. "The Brotherhood does not know the virtue of differences of opinion," he said.
Demonised for decades by Egypt's military-backed autocracy, the Brotherhood sees such attacks as propaganda concocted by opponents who have struggled to get organised and carve out their place in the new order.
But Khirbawy's arguments resonate among those Egyptians who believe the Brotherhood aims to subvert new freedoms for their own ends to set up a new Islamist autocracy - a view hardened late last year when Mursi unilaterally expanded his powers.
MURSI DEFENDS QUTB
Khirbawy has been extensively interviewed by independent Egyptian media that are broadly critical of the Brotherhood.
In his book, he explores the ideology of Mursi and the small group of leaders at the top of the movement, examining their devotion to Sayyid Qutb, a radical ideologue executed in 1966 for plotting to kill president Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Qutb, a Brotherhood leader, formulated some of the most radical ideas in political Islam. These included the idea that modern-day Muslim societies were living in a pre-Islamic state of ignorance. His most radical work, written while he was in prison, advocated violence to bring about change.
Mursi is on the record as defending Qutb as a thinker "who liberates the mind and touches the heart". In a 2009 talk show appearance posted on YouTube last year, Mursi said Qutb "finds the real vision of Islam that we are looking for".
Among Brotherhood watchers, it is no secret that the Brotherhood's current leadership were heavily influenced by Qutb, who also wrote more broadly on Islam.
But "trying to give the impression that Mursi is a Qutbist is an exaggeration" said Khalil al-Anani, an expert on Islamist movements. "Yes they are influenced by him in terms of the purity of ideas, but not in terms of believing in violence or judging people as non-believers," he said.
Brotherhood spokesman Ahmed Aref said the movement, like all groups, had rules that must be respected, adding that it was not the first time a member had left over the years and spoken out. "The difference this time is the media," he said.
A well-oiled campaign machine and grass-roots support base helped the Brotherhood sweep the first post-Mubarak parliamentary vote at the end of 2011, but the assembly was disbanded in June when Egypt's highest court declared the election rules unconstitutional.
Suspicion that the Brotherhood plans to dominate Egypt means the group may find it harder to win votes as fresh parliamentary elections near.
"They don't have people who can explain themselves in a good way, particularly those who talk to the Egyptian public," said Anani. "There is a huge gap of mistrust."
(Writing by Tom Perry; Editing by Tom Pfeiffer)

#egypt Where Am I Going? #Cartoon

Where Am I Going?

#egypt Danger in the Streets

Danger in the Streets

Egyptian Women Fight Public Sexual Harassment

Lately, women on the streets of Egypt have been under assault -- threatened by looks, by words and by physical attacks. As more Egyptian women claim the freedom and power to enter the public sphere, they are being confronted with a growing wave of public sexual harassment.

AP Photo/Ben Curtis

Protestors demonstrate against sexual attacks on women and the government's failure to investigate them, in downtown Cairo, Egypt on Thursday, November 9, 2006 

The Egyptian Centre for Women's Rights

The Egyptian Centre for Women's Rights' Campaign Poster reads: "Safety for everybody. When you catcall...what do you gain?

This trend gained a sudden worldwide audience in 2006, when amateur videos captured crowds of men surrounding and groping women during a religious festival. These videos were shared on the internet for the world to witness.

Targets are not confined to a specific group. Women of every age and class are targets of obscene behavior, even those who dress modestly in veils.

Experts put forth many explanations -- the explosion of easily available sexual material, lack of education about sex and sexuality and Egypt's economy. Due to the high cost of living, couples are forced to wait to marry until later in life, leading, some say, to rising sexual frustration in a portion of the male population.

Whatever the cause, women are afraid to report the harassment to police, worried that they will be ignored, or worse, blamed for their attacks.

The Egyptian Centre for Women's Rights has declared this "a social cancer." Their campaign against public sexual harassment is fighting to enforce existing laws protecting women, create new legislation, and break the silence around this taboo subject.

I.M.O.W. spoke to Engy Ghozlan, Project Coordinator for the Egyptian Centre for Women's Rights.

How did you become involved in the campaign against sexual harassment?

You hear comments on the street like: "You belong to the house." "You shouldn't be on the street." It took me years to recognize that the depression I was having whenever I walked on the street was because I was not acting, I was just silent.

For me, it was an issue that I'm not going to be a victim of any sexual violence against me anymore. I felt that it's the time to move from being a victim to being one who helps others and helps herself to actually survive everyday on the street. I might not be able to stop it by myself but at least talking about it actually gave me the power to feel that I don't have to feel sad anymore, I know that I am doing something, and this is enough for me until I reach the day I can see legislation that can protect me and other girls on the street.

Does the sexual harassment occur in a variety of settings? It's on the street -- but is it also in homes and schools?

Yes, it happens in houses, it happens in schools and universities, it happens, of course, in the workplace. Girls who have to work in shops or restaurants, the owners use them sexually. They are sure that she can't leave, and she can't go and tell anyone because it is her reputation that she'll be hurting.

Girls sometimes face sexual harassment on the street. If they stopped and told the guy, "Don't do this!" or "You're attacking me!"--sometimes people on the street don't support a girl-- they actually blame her.

In Egypt, if a girl goes to a police station, people start gossiping about her. So girls can't go to the police, girls can't talk about it. Our first idea was to break the silence and let girls start talking.

Is it hard to do this in a culture where there's not a lot of conversation about sexuality in general?

At the time the campaign started, talking about sexual harassment or anything with a sexual nature was a taboo. There was this denial from girls, they said they didn't experience it, but when you talked to them a little bit away from sexual words, they started writing, and what they wrote was horrible.

We were really happy that, finally, people were talking about something that related to their sexuality or to their bodies. We found lots of girls who were blaming themselves for the issue. The girls thought that the reason they were getting harassed was because of their bodies and because their bodies were beautiful, whether they wore a veil or covered their faces or not.

Part of your campaign is to target both sides; you try to raise awareness among young men as well as women. Have you seen changes in the men you've worked with?

When you ask the question "Why do you sexually harass?" you get a very stupid answer from guys. They have this idea that girls like to be sexually harassed, at least verbally, because it gives them the impression that they are nice, they are beautiful, and guys think this is something that girls actually like.

But now, some of them say: "I think of my sister, I think of my mom. What if my mom was walking on the street and someone touched her? I would feel hurt, I would feel scared for her. I would feel I wanted to protect her. And maybe, thinking the other way, if I imagine that any woman on the street could be someone in my family, that would actually make me change."

For people who practice something like this for many years, just raising awareness is not enough to change their behavior. You need to change the circumstances around that behavior. The circumstance that is in our hands is to change legislation.

The economic situation that would allow men to get married sooner and actually start a life, to allow guys to find jobs and find themselves and have potential is not something that I can guarantee in the short term. What I can say is that if we had legislation along with a change in the economic and social situation, maybe one day soon we will see a change in the behavior.

The new #Egypt at (almost) #Morsi

On January 25, thousands of Egyptians will gather in Tahrir Square and across Egypt to commemorate the uprising that toppled the Hosni Mubarak dictatorship. They will celebrate with good reason. When Mubarak, pressured by millions in the streets and ultimately betrayed by his own top generals, resigned on February 11, 2011, a military-backed dictatorship that had ruled and largely abused Egypt for more than half a century came to an end. Most Egyptians were euphoric, and the world was transfixed by the unexpected power of the Tahrir Square freedom movement.

However, in the two years since, the transition remains fragile, and Egypt's politics remain dangerously polarized. In fact, in addition to celebration, there may also be clashes on January 25. Today Egypt has an elected president, a new constitution, and will soon hold parliamentary elections. But if Egypt has made halting steps toward democracy, worrying signs of illiberalism and poor governance are increasingly apparent. The outcome of the revolution in the Arab world's most populous country remains uncertain, and the threat of violence looms large. 

To understand where Egypt's revolution might go from here, it is useful to take a sober accounting of the key lessons that we have learned over the past two years, and to debunk some myths that stubbornly took root during that time.

The Muslim Brotherhood are not democrats. Despite some prominent Western journalists and analysts' continued wishful thinking to the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood -- a secretive, rigorously disciplined and hierarchical organization -- neither understands nor sees inherent value in democratic politics. Rather, the Muslim Brotherhood believes in a narrow majoritarianism and its leaders and supporters often confuse that with democracy. The Brotherhood believes that 50 percent + 1 equals a free hand to pursue its agenda. And its agenda is manifestly an illiberal one in which universal rights are subordinated to religious doctrine.

The manner in which Egypt's new constitution was conceived, written, and adopted offers the clearest example of the Brotherhood's authoritarian and majoritarian tendencies. A post-authoritarian state should adopt a consensus document, but the current constitution was rammed through despite the staunch objections of non-Islamists. Rather than guaranteeing protections for minorities and women, the constitution leaves a troublingly broad scope for violation of their human rights. Looking ahead, as the Brotherhood embarks upon a legislative agenda, expect laws that will seek to limit media freedoms and constrain freedom of assembly.

The military remains very powerful. In November 2011, Egypt's Islamists, which had for months worked closely with the Mubarak appointed military leadership, protested the proposed "Selmi document" which was designed to ensure the military's privileges in any new constitution. However, after President Mohamed Morsi was elected in June 2012 and dismissed the two top Mubarak era generals in August, Egypt's Islamist dominated constituent assembly crafted a constitution that explicitly guarantees the military's power and privileges. The Islamists learned that trying to bring the military under civilian control was a dangerous task, and the two entities now have a more collaborative relationship. This gives some of Egypt's non-Islamists, who erroneously believed that the military represents the last line of defense against Islamists, migraines. But the more salient factor is that a military not under direct civilian oversight is simply bad for nurturing a fledgling democracy.

Sectarianism in Egypt is alive and well. Attacks on Egyptian Christians were not uncommon in Mubarak's time -- on New Year's Day in 2011, three and a half weeks before the uprising, a church in Alexandria was bombed, killing 21 worshipers. But Christians have thus far fared even worse in post-revolution Egypt. Churches have been burned, Christians have been attacked and prevented from voting, a Christian man's ear was even cut off -- and few perpetrators have been arrested, fostering a culture of impunity. In fact, Christian victims are often blamed for being attacked. In October 2011, for example, the military attacked a group of Christian protesters, killing 27, and as the melee was taking place, a state TV presenter requested that "honorable citizens" report to the scene to protect the soldiers from the marauding Christians.

Now with Islamists politically ascendant, hardline influential Muslim clerics have ratcheted up their sectarian invective against Christians. They are emboldened by the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood and their Salafi extremist junior partners believe in the primacy of Islamic principles over equal citizenship. While the Brotherhood, to appease Western skeptics, has issued various blandishments about its commitment to "equality," its leaders will stand by idly as more hardline Islamists spew ugly and dangerous rhetoric about Christians. Egyptians Christians should be concerned. Even if legislation is not overtly prejudiced, the views of Egypt's leaders will increasingly permeate the country, fanning existing anti-Christian biases.

The progressive "Muslim Brotherhood youth" is a myth. In the years leading up to the Egyptian uprising, there was a prevalent belief that the younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood would exert a moderating influence on the Muslim Brotherhood, especially if the movement was granted legal recognition. Many young Islamists are indeed more moderate, revolutionary, and yes more liberal, than the leadership. However, these more progressive, democratic young Brothers are outnumbered by adherents of similar age who remain committed to conservatism. As a result, the "young brothers" have not had the moderating influence that was expected.

The more impressive progressive Brothers, like Ibrahim El Houdaiby, have left the Brotherhood and started their own small political parties, or joined forces with more established, popular, moderate former members like Abdel Moniem Aboul Fotouh. Their defections have only reinforced the orthodox conservatism and authoritarian nature of the movement. On November 22, 2012, when Morsi declared himself above legal challenges, the Brotherhood ordered its younger members to gather in support of the president's statement, even before the content of that statement was known. The young Brothers actually had no idea what Morsi was going to say. They just knew that they would agree with it.

The silent majority remains the most potentially potent force in Egypt. To be sure, the Brotherhood is currently the most powerful and organized political force in the country. It can count on a bloc of between five and 10 million voters. And these voters have delivered victory after victory over the last 22 months in referenda as well as parliamentary and presidential elections. In fact, it is likely that Islamists will win the upcoming parliamentary elections. However, Egypt has more than 50 million voters. The biggest bloc is the unaffiliated -- either because they don't care, don't know enough about politics, or are disillusioned. For example, only 11 million voters approved the Islamist crafted constitution. This of course does not mean that the other 39 million voters reject it, but if the Brotherhood can only get one fifth of voters to make their way to a polling station to register their approval of such an important document, it means they can be beaten.

The prevalence of undecided potential voters means that Egypt's divided non-Islamists could make electoral progress if they successfully appeal to new voters beyond their own bloc of five to six million, mostly urban supporters. However, to date, Egypt's non-Islamist movement remains incoherent. Thus far, their strategy has been to be the party of "no" and to try to pressure authorities through street protests. This will not work. Non-Islamists can certainly win Egyptian elections, but they have to work twice as hard. They have yet to hone an appealing message, focused on the economy, for example, that would attract voters in places like Upper Egypt or other rural parts of the country, where they are particularly weak.

Authorities are adrift on the economy. There was a strong economic component to the January 25 uprising. Egypt's economy, like those of many other non-oil Arab states, grew under Mubarak in the last few years of his rule, but that growth did little for the poor. As recently as last fall, the Muslim Brotherhood was heralded as "serious" about economic reform. Given Egypt's deep economic problems -- growth is anemic, the pound is losing value, structural limitations to growth abound -- this should have been the government's primary focus. Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood used its political capital to ram through a constitution and then found it had little leverage to push through some needed but difficult economic reforms.

Of course, if the Brotherhood had pursued political consensus, it might have been better positioned to carry out needed reforms -- for example, on taxation and subsidies. In addition, were there less polarization and political upheaval, tourism receipts could well be higher and foreign and domestic investors less skittish. But the Muslim Brotherhood gambled that it was more important to cement its political agenda. For a time, Egypt's regional importance will continue to attract aid -- from the IMF, the United States and, increasingly from the Gulf -- but room for maneuver on crucial reforms is now much more limited.

Sinai is a serious security problem. Sinai is becoming increasingly lawless and poses a potential threat to Egyptian security and the economy. Since Mubarak's ouster, the gas pipeline in Sinai has been attacked more than a dozen times. In August 2012, the border police were attacked and 16 officers were killed, leading to a major shakeup of the security and military leadership. It is also disturbing that it appears difficult to get solid information about what is actually happening in Sinai -- who the Sinai militants are and what are their goals. However, their actions can carry serious consequences. A single devastating terrorist attack on tourists from Sinai-based groups could deal a further blow to Egypt's ailing economy.

Despite all the challenges that post-uprising Egypt faces, Egyptian politics are more alive than they have been in decades, and Egyptian democracy and pluralism are still good long term bets. Entrenched interests and many newly empowered political forces are change resistant -- but it is very unlikely that Egypt will return to the kind of "stable" authoritarianism of Mubarak. While they are a small minority, the core group of revolutionary activists agitating for democracy remains indefatigable. Egypt will probably experience a very bumpy few years, but these activists will keep pushing those in power to move toward a more democratic Egypt. Egypt has changed.