Independent freelancer blogger 2005,Writing is my passion it !

‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات Politics. إظهار كافة الرسائل
‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات Politics. إظهار كافة الرسائل


Cairo airport website hacked as Egyptians mark massacre

8/15/2015 0
The website of Cairo's airport has been hacked as Egyptians marked the second anniversary of the mass killing of demonstrators in the capital.

The incident, where security forces shot dead almost 700 supporters of ousted president Mohamed Morsi as they dispersed a protest camp in Cairo's Rabaa al-Adawiya Square, has remained a rallying point for the country's Muslim Brotherhood opposition.

"The revolution continues, and the earth does not drink blood," said the page, which bore the sign used by the protesters in Cairo's Rabaa al-Adawiya Square.
By Friday afternoon, the homepage of the airport website was blocked entirely.

The apparent hacking came as police bolstered their presence in the capital in anticipation of protests after Friday's Muslim prayers.
Two years on from the incident, no police officers have faced trial over the killings in Cairo's Rabaa al-Adawiya Square, but leaders and members of Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood have.
About 10 police were killed during the dispersal, after coming under fire from several gunmen in the sprawling camp on a crossroads in eastern Cairo when they moved to break it up.
But rights groups have said that security forces used disproportionate force, killing many unarmed protesters in what Human Rights Watch said "probably amounted to crimes against humanity."
The New York-based group on Friday called on the United Nations Human Rights Council to launch an inquiry into the killings.
"Washington and Europe have gone back to business with a government that celebrates rather than investigates what may have been the worst single-day killing of protesters in modern history," deputy Middle East director Joe Stork said.
In Egypt, however, the government has always defended the dispersal of the protesters, insisting that the Muslim Brotherhood members were armed "terrorists".
Morsi, the country's first democratically elected leader, ruled for only a year before mass protests prompted the military to overthrow and detain him. He has since been sentenced to death.
President Sisi, the former leader of the army, had pledged to eradicate Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood.
The group has been blacklisted and most of its leaders arrested, severely restricting its ability to mobilise followers in protests.



 Al Jazeera and agencies
Agence France-Presse reported.


Yemenis Protest Against Saudi Aggression.

8/12/2015 0
Yemenis Protest Against Saudi Aggression..

In pics #YemenCrisis #Sanaa Protest against foreign invasion and occupation of #Yemen


Yemenis Protest Against Saudi Aggression. Location: Sanaa - YemenDate: 11 August 2015Source:...
Posted by Stop War on Yemen on Wednesday, 12 August 2015


#Nelson_Mandela and His legacy for #Yemen

3/17/2014 0

Nelson Mandela was buried today at his family home in Qunu, South Africa. Over the last few days I have been reflecting on Mandela’s life, his achievements, and how – through the art of forgiveness, reconciliation and the power of dialogue – Mandela brought about visionary and historic change in South Africa. With the change happening all around us in Yemen, I wondered what we could learn from Mandela.
Last Tuesday, more than a hundred current and former heads of state or government attended Mandela’s memorial service to commemorate his life and times. The US’s President Obama and Cuba’s Raul Castro shook hands, showing that Mandela could help reconciliation from beyond the grave. As those who spoke at the service made clear, Mandela was an inspirational, visionary leader who became a legend in his own lifetime, and never forgot the values that were important to him.
Mandela’s dream was to see black and white South Africans living together as equals. So as part of the African National Congress Party, Mandela organised a resistance movement against the apartheid government. He was jailed for life in 1964 for his activities. The story could have ended there, but it didn’t.
Whilst in prison, Mandela overcame his own feelings of rage and bitterness towards the government for all the abuses and discrimination black South Africans had suffered under apartheid. But perhaps more importantly, Mandela learnt how to forgive, how to reconcile, and recognised the importance of looking forward, not back.
The lessons of forgiveness, reconciliation, looking forward, unity over a common dream, and the power of dialogue ring very true for Yemen today. They are the very issues that Yemen is grappling with in its transition.
As we saw in 2011, the glue that brought together the revolutionary youth, women and other proud Yemenis was their common dream to create a democratic, accountable and free society. One where there is a basic relationship between a government that listens to the needs of its people (water, security, electricity, health, education), and a people that mobilises civil society and the ballot box to put in power a government that will deliver those needs.
South Africa today still faces many challenges. Even with such a unique leader, Mandela could not change the country overnight – indeed, that was not his role. He was clear that each and every person had a responsibility to do their part. In his own words: “A fundamental concern for others in our individual and community lives would go a long way in making the world the better place we so passionately dreamt of.”
I sense fear in some Yemenis that whatever good they try and do, it will not make a difference. That the price of trying against entrenched interests will be too high. Mandela had some advice for you: “I learned that courage was not the absence of fear, but the triumph over it. The brave man is not he who does not feel afraid, but he who conquers that fear.”
And in spite of the difficulty of the task, he advised: “it always seems impossible until it’s done.” Sometimes, a successful transition in Yemen seems impossible, but one day, with the efforts of all Yemenis, it will be done.

By jane marriott Ambassador of Great England in Yemen


#RIP Ahmed Fouad Negm (1929-2013)

12/07/2013 0

The Fagomi has passed away :(

Renowned Egyptian Poet Ahmed Fouad Negm has passed away earlier this morning after long controversial life full of revolutionary poems. His funeral will start soon in Cairo at Al Hussein Mosque. I do not know 
what to say now except I represent my deepest condolences to his family especially his daughter Nawara Negm.

Through his life Negm refused to be the regime's poet insisting to be the voice of the poor and the oppressed and I think this is why he will be remembered more than any poet in our time.
Let's respect death for God sake.
Ahmed Fouad Negm has gone but his poems and songs remain as the words of the revolutionaries not only in Egypt but across the world. Here is a collection of his poems translated to English. 
I will be storifying his funeral



--> -->

                                   أحمد فؤاد نجم 

                     الأعمال الشعرية الكاملة

الكتاب يحمل جميع قصائد الشاعر الكبير أحمد فؤاد نجم
من الطبيعى ان تتعرف على تاريخ مصر عن طريق مؤرخ او كاتب ولكن من المميز ان تتعرف على تاريخ مصر عن طريق شاعر كبير مثل أحمد فؤاد نجم 
القصائد تحكى قصه شعب على مر النصف الاخير من القرن الماضى مرورا بثورة يوليو والنكسة والانتصار ، ستحزن كثيرا فى بعض القصائد الى ان تكاد تبكى وستفرح كثيراً فى بعض القصائد الى ان تكاد تطير من الفرح وهذا احساس طبيعى حينما تقرأ لـ أحمد فؤاد نجم


#Russia, #Egypt begin ‘new era’ in military relations

11/15/2013 0

Russia, Egypt begin ‘new era’ in military relations

Egypt wants to develop its ties with Russia, bringing the two nations to the level of friendship they enjoyed during the Soviet era. However, Egypt is not looking to replace the US as its key ally, according to the country’s foreign minister.
We want to give a new impetus to our relations and return them to the same high level that used to exist with the Soviet Union,” Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy said following a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Cairo on Thursday.
We believe that Russia plays an important role on the international arena. We want our relations to develop for the benefit of both states,” Fahmy added.
However, the Egyptian top diplomat said that Russia was not meant to be “a substitute” for any other country. 
Cairo wants to intensify relations. But they won't be alternative to anyone,” the Egyptian FM said. He sought to refute speculation that Cairo is headed toward a major shift in its foreign policy.
Washington has remained a close ally with the country for three decades, but tensions between the two nations have mounted since the military ouster of President Mohamed Morsi in July.
Sergey Lavrov refrained from making any judgments on the political developments in Egypt, saying that Moscow is against “any foreign interference into internal affairs.”

We respect Egypt’s sovereignty and the right of the Egyptians to decide on their fate,” he said during a joint press conference.  “We expect that current efforts, including the development of a new constitution and a referendum on this basic law to make further progress and achieve the goals set by Egypt.
Lavrov and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu are heading the Russian delegation in the highest level visit to Egypt in years. For the first time in the history of relations between the two states, talks are being held in the ‘2+2’ format - two top diplomats and two military chiefs.
Egypt’s interim president Adly Mansour (C) defense minister Abdlefatah al-Sissi (2ndR) meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (2-L), and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (L) on November 14, 2013 at the presidential palace in Cairo. (AFP Photo/Khaled Desouki)
Egypt’s interim president Adly Mansour (C) defense minister Abdlefatah al-Sissi (2ndR) meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (2-L), and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (L) on November 14, 2013 at the presidential palace in Cairo. (AFP Photo/Khaled Desouki)

Russia, Egypt begin ‘new era’ in military relations

Shoigu and his Egyptian counterpart, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, discussed military collaboration during the talks.
Strong and democratic Egypt will be an important factor to maintain peace in the Middle East. We hope that the situation will stabilize soon and that all problems will be solved by peaceful means,” the Russian defense minister said.
The Egyptian army chief told media that the talks prove the two countries “will continue strategic relationship, which is opening a new stage in constructive and fruitful military cooperation.” 
We have common goals for ensuring fair and lasting peace in the Middle East. Our region is a heart of peace and guarantor of security and calm,” Sisi said.
The two countries have agreed to hold joint military drills on countering terrorism and piracy, Shoigu said on Thursday.
We also agreed to step up exchange of delegations and expand cooperation between the Navies and Air Forces,” the Russian minister said.
Shoigu’s presence at the talks sparked rumors in the media of a possible major arms deal between the two nations. According to media reports, Cairo was lobbying for around US$2 billion worth of Russian arms after the US discontinued support to Egypt’s military-backed rulers. So far, there has been no official confirmation that any such deal was discussed at the talks. 
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy told RT Arabic that the possibility of his country buying Russian weapons “is being considered in principle.
Egypt-Russian relations in the military-technical area have been going on for over 30 years...Since 1970 ties and even earlier, Egypt has been purchasing weapons from Russia and also modernizing them. So, this topic is not new. An issue of buying new kinds of Russian military hardware should be thoroughly examined,” he said. 
Cairo was the USSR’s key Arab ally for about two decades, between the 1950s and 1970s, when the Soviet Union provided then Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser with technical and military aid, particularly during the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Soviet Union also helped Egypt construct the Aswan High Dam along the Nile.

Relations between the two nations weakened in the 1970s, when Egypt’s foreign policy took a U-turn under President Anwar Sadat, who brought the nation closer to the US. Washington has been contributing about $1.5 billion a year in military aid to Egypt for decades.

But following the July ouster of Morsi and subsequent crackdown on his supporters, Washingtonwithheld deliveries of military hardware and $260 million in cash aid to Egypt. The US underlined, however, that it was not severing ties with its long-standing ally.  Secretary of State John Kerry said in October that the US would consider resuming some of the aid "on a basis of performance" following the interim government's ‘roadmap’ which promises to lead to fair elections, Reuters reported.

The Egyptian army-backed government slammed the “strange” decision which was made “at such a vital time during which Egypt is facing a war against terrorism.” 

منظومات صواريخ "تور-إم 1"

MIG 29 #FIthe


Watching #Cairo from #Sanaa #Yemen #Egypt

7/20/2013 1
SANAA — The protests in Egypt have not only ignited unrest in Cairo, they've unleashed a flurry of debate across the rest of the region. It's not just about where things are heading in Egypt, the most populous country in the Arab world, or what the current uncertainty means about the country's post-Mubarak transition. It's about their resonance in the whole of the Arabic-speaking world and the potential spillover effects. From Sanaa, all that's truly clear at the moment is that Yemenis are watching a nearly absurd amount of Egypt coverage on TV..

Local Muslim Brothers and sympathizers watch Al Jazeera with trepidation. Politicians from former president Ali Abdullah Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) party watch Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya with a newly awakened revolutionary fervor. Leftists watch al-Mayadeen, the year-old Beirut-based "alternative" to Gulf-funded channels, wondering aloud whether the tide may have shifted against political Islam.
It can feel at times like they are looking at Egypt for cues for where things in Yemen could be heading; over the course of the past two and a half years, events in Cairo have tended to feel a few steps ahead of those Sanaa.
--> While large-scale protests aimed at the Yemeni dictator's ouster began almost immediately after Mubarak's toppling, Saleh didn't formally cede power until the following February. Demonstrators stayed in the streets in months-long protest encampments across the country, but the voices of Yemen's revolutionary youth were soon eclipsed. The military split between supporting the government and the protestors, and Sanaa erupted into urban warfare on two separate occasions. Al Qaeda-linked militants seized control of a series of towns in the south, and, all the while, opposition politicians engaged in a series of on-again, off-again negotiations with Saleh and his allies. In November 2011, the two sides finally reached an agreement, inking the so-called Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative, an internationally backed power transfer deal granting Saleh immunity in exchange for his ouster. The deal set Yemen on a two-year long "transitional period" presided over by longtime Vice President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and formed a compromise government split between the GPC and the opposition. Presidential and parliamentary elections are tentatively slated for early 2014.

There's plenty of heady talk about the building of a "new Yemen," but in Sanaa it often feels as if things are paused. Some things have moved forward elsewhere in the country: Once the target of a series of devastating wars, the Houthi movement has carved out a virtual state-within-a-state in their base in the far north, while rising secessionist sentiment has made it seem almost as if the only thing preventing the south from regaining its independence is a series of brittle divisions among the separatist leadership. The ongoing Conference of National Dialogue may have forced politicians in the capital to recognize the Houthis as a legitimate political force, while providing for a comparatively open forum for the discussion of southerners' grievances, but its deliberations often feel like rehashing long-running factional squabbles.
Even if new parties have been formed, the post-2011 political map often feels indistinguishable from the old one. Discussions in Sanaa tend to devolve into debates over the divide between the GPC and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), an ideologically fractious coalition of leftist and Islamist factions dominated by the Islah Party, which incorporates the bulk of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, and the Socialist and Nasserist parties. In that sense, there's been little change since 2005, when the JMP was initially formed.
The activists who spurred the former president's ouster -- and, for that matter, many politicians here -- have been open about their misgivings about the shape of Yemen's post-Saleh transition. But it has generally been accepted as the only option aside from further violence and instability.
Gathered around watching news coverage with activists on June 30 and July 1, however, it seemed the scenes in Cairo and other Egyptian cities had provided a potential course of action.

For a few brief days, there was talk about building a Yemeni Tamarod (or rebels, as the Cairo protestors called themselves). There were unofficial discussions between activists from across the political spectrum; the date for massive protests aimed at "correcting the course of the revolution" was tentatively set for July 7. Even at the speculative stage, though, disagreements about everything from demands to acceptable protest slogans foreshadowed that things would eventually come to naught. July 7 came and went with only street protests in the south, as secessionists marked the anniversary of their defeat in Yemen's 1994 civil war. The closest thing I witnessed to an outburst of discontent came a few days prior. Driving with a friend past the home of Yemen's embattled prime minister, Mohamed Basindowa, he rolled down his car window, stopped briefly, and shouted "Leave, Uncle Mohamed!"
The absence of Egypt-style protests hardly means people here are happy with the way things are going. Hoped-for improvements in the stagnant economy and the tenuous security situation remain largely elusive: kidnappings of foreigners have increased in frequency, while security officials continue to be targeted in a string of assassinations. The recurring sabotage of power lines has left even residents of the capital at the mercy of disgruntled tribesmen. Even if Hadi has held on to much of his tenuous public support, Yemenis from across the political spectrum have condemned the unity government as a failure.
Still, it seems, no one is willing to make a move. Chewing qat with a collection of GPC politicians on July 2, their enthusiasm for the protests against Morsy was palpable; Yahya Mohamed Saleh, the former Yemeni president's nephew, had already stopped by Cairo's Tahrir Square to show his solidarity with the "revolution against the Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood]." They watched as revolutionaries and remnants of the Mubarak regime joined together against a common foe, and I wondered if they thought they felt they could pull off a similar feat here, capitalizing on the longstanding misgivings many Saleh opponents hold regarding the Islah Party. 
"The question is no longer ‘with the revolution or against it,'" an activist had told me a few days before. "The stage has changed. What matters now is who is truly for or against building the state."
Comments like that are music to the GPC's ears. But that enthusiasm among revolutionaries and the regime's old guard seems distant from the current political reality.
Complaints over Islah's increased influence in post-Saleh Yemen notwithstanding, the power the party currently holds is in no way comparable to that of Morsy's Freedom and Justice Party. In the event of any possible shakeup, all parties would almost inevitably be affected; while plenty may raise issue with the current balance of power, few seem willing to take the risk of upsetting it.
--> Perhaps, however, it's the way things have gone in Egypt that has ultimately doomed any real aftereffects here. The violence and uncertainty since the July 3 coup has led many to quiet their misgivings about Yemen's own post-Arab Spring transition. It may be far from perfect, the argument goes, but things could certainly be worse.
There were certainly plenty of Yemenis who celebrated the military's overthrow of Morsy; plenty of others cast it as a far from ideal, but necessary step. But even many Yemenis with little sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood have expressed a deep discomfort as events have unfolded, wondering if it's all a message about the fragility of the tentative gains made in the wake of the Arab Spring.
"I don't like Morsy, but it's hard not to see the army overthrowing an elected president as a negative step -- a step backwards," an activist told me. "It makes me nervous about where Yemen is heading: Wherever Egypt was [before June 30], it was far ahead of where we are now."


Blame #morsi #egypt

7/09/2013 0
Let's make this abundantly clear: No one should be pleased with the division and bloodshed playing out in the streets of Cairo right now, particularly as military repression escalates. But let's also make this abundantly clear: One man bears the ultimate responsibility for the crisis of leadership -- Mohamed Morsy.
With Morsy now arbitrarily detained by the military following his July 3 ouster and Egyptian security forces indulging in violent, reckless repression, the former Egyptian president and his Muslim Brotherhood movement have legitimate grievances regarding their unjustifiable treatment. But let's not forget how we got to this grim point. On the night of June 30, in the face of unprecedented, nationwide mass mobilization and protest, Morsy was politically wounded, his legitimacy undermined, his ability to govern Egypt irreparably damaged. In response to the bottom-up, grassroots campaign that brought millions out into the streets, critical sectors of the state bureaucracy openly abandoned the president, leaving him with an illusory and nominal grip on power. He faced a country dangerously polarized, its social fabric fraying. At that moment, Egypt had fleetingly few options for avoiding the grim possibility of civil strife -- and all of them resided with Morsy. 

Despite inheriting intractable political, economic, and social problems, when Morsy ascended to power on June 30, 2012, he had choices -- and he chose factional gain, zero-sum politics, and populist demagoguery. In a system without functioning checks and balances, those choices generated increasing levels of polarization, destroying trust and crippling the state. These decisions were a reflection of his hostility to criticism and his and the Muslim Brotherhood's denigration of the opposition's role in Egyptian society. In the period prior to this year's June 30 mass protests on the first anniversary of Morsy's swearing-in, when concessions and compromise might have found an orderly way out for Egypt, Morsy instead grudgingly offered airy promises and hollow gestures.
The fateful, misguided decisions made throughout his tenure and in the run-up and aftermath of the June 30 protests have now put Egypt on the cusp of civil strife and violent conflict. An intransigent, isolated president chose to ignore reality and set the country on the course for an undeniably unfortunate military intervention into civilian politics. While Morsy and the Muslim Brotherhood will undoubtedly now assume their more familiar role as victims, significantly aided by the brutality and stupidity of a repressive Egyptian security sector, the primary responsibility for Morsy's ouster and Egypt's perilous state resides with the deposed president and his Brothers. None of this was inevitable.
This is not to suggest that the Brotherhood should now be ostracized, persecuted, or forced underground. The Muslim Brotherhood is an organic and deeply rooted religious, social, and political movement with a robust and resilient base. It must be a part of Egypt's future. But its part in Egypt's recent past has been an unmitigated disaster.
Morsy's fatal final decisions confirmed his insular, factional worldview, which prioritized the Muslim Brotherhood before the nation. Simply put, he failed to comprehend that his secret society had no monopoly on Egypt and that their electoral victories were not an unlimited mandate. The Muslim Brotherhood believed that the series of elections throughout 2011 and 2012, which represented in many ways the last elections of Hosni Mubarak's era, bespoke something essential about Egyptian society and the Brotherhood's place within it.
These traits -- bullheadedness, insularity, and paranoia -- were on vivid display as Egypt careened toward June 30, but they had manifested themselves repeatedly over the course of the Brotherhood's short, unhappy time in power.
Morsy's 369 days in power were typified by a lack of reform, which alienated activists and reformists; a lack of reconciliation, which blocked any potential outreach to members of the former regime; and narrow, monopolistic governance, which alienated all political forces -- including his erstwhile Islamist allies, particularly the al-Nour Party, which abandoned Morsy during his final hours. This reckless approach to power spurred alienation, paralyzed governance, and resulted in repression and discontent -- and opposition grew.
The bill of particulars is damning and dates back to the immediate post-Mubarak period, when the Brotherhood chose to pursue a formalistic procedural transition that saw elections alone as democracy, while ignoring substantive reform of a failing system. The narrow window for confronting Mubarak's police state and crony capitalism would have required a modicum of solidarity among the forces that propelled the uprising against Mubarak. But in the first of a series of betrayals, the Muslim Brotherhood set out on a course to retool Mubarak's authoritarian state and co-opt its tools of repression, with the Brotherhood itself in the helm.
Not only did the Muslim Brotherhood help craft and endorse the interim military ruler's flawed transitional road map, which was filled with gaps and omissions, but the Brotherhood immediately set about stigmatizing its opponents on the basis of crude religious and sectarian demagoguery. Reformist and activist forces who sought to challenge the emerging political order were tarred and treated as obstacles in the Brotherhood's pursuit of factional gain. Hence was set in motion a substance-free transition whose sole defining feature was a grueling series of elections. 

Despite this lack of trust, many reformists chose to support Morsy in his campaign against Ahmed Shafiq, the former Mubarak regime stalwart, for fear of immediate authoritarian relapse. These grudging supporters were coaxed by a series of promises regarding inclusive governance, including pledges to select a diverse group of advisors and a diverse group for the country's constitutional drafting body. This gamesmanship proved decisive in Morsy's narrow electoral victory.
Those guarantees, consecrated in a formal document almost a year ago, were almost uniformly unfulfilled, setting the stage for a turbulent period of creeping authoritarianism, gross mismanagement, and deepening polarization. With limited checks and balances, Morsy sought to neuter the judiciary while beginning a concerted, and ultimately futile, effort at institutional capture of various state institutions. Most damning in this vein were the efforts to come to a modus vivendi with the Brotherhood's former torturers in the unreconstructed police, whose abusive, unaccountable practices continued. All the while, Morsy and his government were praising the police force and giving its members raises and promotions. It is disturbingly ironic that this police force is now engaged in an effort to repress the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters into acquiescence.
Legislatively, Morsy's government pushed forward restrictive legislation on various fronts, including laws impeding independent labor organizing and interfering in the operation of nongovernmental organizations. His government did little to curtail a spike in prosecutions of speech crimes, including blasphemy cases and those related to insulting the presidency. Further, the criminal justice system was corrupted and used as a political tool in the wake of the extralegal appointment of a handpicked prosecutor general.
That appointment was accomplished through Morsy's dictatorial November 2012 constitutional declaration that temporarily immunized him from any judicial oversight and set the stage for the contentious adoption of a slipshod document as the country's foundational text. For many, this was the final act in institutionalizing Egypt's political crisis. The acute polarization made even basic governance impossible and furthered the country's economic crisis -- with rapidly rising unemployment helping to activate opposition within previously quiescent sectors of society. Opposition to Morsy was no longer geographically limited or defined by class; instead it was broadly dispersed geographically, representing a wide spectrum of Egyptian society, including the urban poor and various rural constituencies.
Finally, this mushrooming discontent took to the streets in protests that exceeded in size and scope of those that toppled Mubarak in January and February 2011. The warning signs were there for all to see, except perhaps for the blithe, hubristic leaders of the Brotherhood.
While the Tamarod ("Rebel") campaign was an extraordinary feat of creativity and organization, its success was predicated primarily on the outrage and frustration building throughout Egyptian society at the increasingly authoritarian, monopolistic, and incompetent administration of Morsy. With no immediate constitutional mechanism for impeachment, millions took to the streets calling for him to go, some hoping that public pressure would force him to resign, others pushing for a military intervention.
With this resounding show of no confidence and the fragile security situation in the country on June 30, the possibility of violence was high. But at that pivotal juncture, Morsy still had options. He, and he alone, could have dialed down the rhetoric and avoided the bloodshed that was to come. Instead, his reckless nonchalance ensured that compromise solutions would not be forthcoming. So Egypt was left with the inevitable: a military ouster and a spiraling street war.
An honorable exit for Morsy would have been a recognition of reality. A crippled executive with a tenuous grip on authority who could not govern effectively -- even at the peak of his popularity -- was no longer in a position to fulfill his role. A negotiated safe exit would have also preserved the Muslim Brotherhood's political gains and ensured its participation in the design of the transitional stage and upcoming elections. Such an exit would have also reversed its disastrous decision to renege on previous pledges and contest the presidential election, thereby relieving the organization of the enormous strain of governing Egypt during this tumultuous period.
Such a decision would have required Morsy to undertake a thorough assessment of his errors and an objective appraisal of the country's current dynamics. As difficult as such steps would have been, they were Egypt's only way out. Instead, the country has chosen one poison over the other.
But in the end, no functional political order can emerge, let alone a democratic transition, without the free, fair, and full participation by the Muslim Brotherhood. With Morsy now incommunicado and presumably filled with rightful indignation at his fate, he can still help bring Egypt back from the brink. To do so, however, will require him to be a real leader and make a painful concession -- placing his country's future first.



#Egypt: Restoring Revolution Vs.The People's Legitimacy

7/07/2013 0
#Egypt: Restoring Revolution Vs.The People's Legitimacy

#Egypt: Restoring Revolution Vs.The People's Legitimacy 

A live blog post for July 7th protests in Egypt

 The Morsi supporters will have their own million man protests in Cairo , Giza including 6th of October , Bani Sawif , Alexandria, Dakhalia "Al Mansoura" , Banha , Damietta, Qena at least.






#30June Get ready for A revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood #Tamarod

6/27/2013 0

 Tamarod ,the rebellious mother movement of the upcoming 30 June protests launched today the 30 June Front. That front is an attempt to have a political cover for the protests despite the founders of that front made it clear in a press conference that they do not represent all revolutionaries or political powers.
Now the 30 June Front presented a roadmap for Egypt after Mohamed Morsi as Tamarod believes that it is going to oust him on 30 June through petitions. The 6 months transitional period roadmap is as follows after getting rid from MB and Morsi :

  • To appoint an independent Prime minister that represents 25 Revolution.
  • To assign this prime minister with all the executive powers of the president and he will head a technocrat government whose main mission is to fix economy and adopt social justice policies.
  • To assign the head of supreme constitutional court with the President’s protocol missions.
  • To dissolve the Shura council and to suspend the current constitution.
  • To form a new constituent assembly in order to draft a new constitution.
  • To have presidential elections by the end of the 6 months followed by parliamentary elections monitored by judges and surpervised internationally. 
  • The National defense council is responsible for national security.
  • -->
    It is worth to mention that the boys and girls of Tamarod have met with Heikal, the old fox twice in the past two weeks. Politically speaking this roadmap is perfect or rather was perfect for Egypt on 12 February 2011 if people were honest in having true democracy. There is one missing detail is how to reach this roadmap already.
    Now there are too many players with other roadmaps and agendas.
    The 30 June Front is founded by a number of revolutionary and political activists like Israa Abdel Fatah, Amr Salah, Mohamed Abdel Aziz, Ahmed Harara , Khaled El Belshy and other others.
    The press conference was attended by many of the famous faces from activists like Ahmed Harara, Karima El Khafny, Hossam Eissa , Khaled Dawood , Hossam Mounis, Mazhar Shahin and Nour El Huda Zaki.
    Here are couple of photos I took from the press conference.

    #30June Media Updates And #Egyarmy is Back to Streets

    6/27/2013 0
    Troop reinforcements and armour have been brought to army bases near cities ahead of protests this weekend aimed at forcing the Islamist president out, security officials have said.

    Clashes between supporters and opponents of President Mohammed Morsi erupted, killing at least one person in the coastal city of Mansoura.
    The troop movements accompanied speculation over the army's role in the crisis leading up to Sunday's protests. Islamists accuse activists of paving the way for a coup, a charge that the opposition vehemently denies




    Libya faces growing Islamist threat

    Libya faces growing Islamist threat
    French embassy in Libya after car bomb blast
    Libyan security personnel gather outside the French embassy in Tripoli following a car bomb blast last week. Photograph: Xinhua/Landov/Barcroft Media
    Diplomats are warning of growing Islamist violence against western targets in Libya as blowback from the war in Mali, following last week's attack on the French embassy in Tripoli.
    The bomb blast that wrecked much of the embassy is seen as a reprisal by Libyan militants for the decision by Paris the day before to extend its military mission against fellow jihadists in Mali.
    The Guardian has learned that jihadist groups ejected from their Timbuktu stronghold have moved north, crossing the Sahara through Algeria and Niger to Libya, fuelling a growing Islamist insurgency.
    "There are established links between groups in both Mali and Libya – we know there are established routes," said a western diplomat in Tripoli. "There is an anxiety among the political class here that Mali is blowing back on them."
    That anxiety escalated last week after militants detonated a car bomb outside the French embassy, wounding two French guards and a Libyan student, the first such attack on a western target in the Libyan capital since the end of the 2011 Arab spring revolution.
    "The armed groups we are fighting are fleeing to Libya," said Colonel Keba Sangare, commander of Mali's army garrison in Timbuktu. "We have captured Libyans in this region, as well as Algerians, Nigerians, French and other European dual-nationals."
    France sent troops to Mali in January after an uprising in the north started by the ethnic Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA), named for the independent state it hopes to create.
    The impetus for this uprising came from ethnic Tuareg soldiers who had fought alongside Muammar Gaddafi and fled south when his regime fell. They were later augmented by jihadists from Libya and across north Africa, who triggered international condemnation for their destruction of ancient Sufi Muslim shrines in Timbuktu. The fear across the Maghreb is that the French operation that has pushed them out of the northern cities has inadvertently compounded problems elsewhere in north Africa as jihadist units disperse.
    "If you squeeze a balloon in one part, it bulges out in another," said Bill Lawrence, of International Crisis Group, a political consultancy. "There's no question that the French actions in Mali had the effect of squeezing that balloon towards Algeria and Libya."
    Timbuktu residents say there are links between Tuareg militants there and in southern Libya. "There were many Tuaregs in Mali who left during the drought of 1973 – some of them became senior figures in the Libyan army under Gaddafi," said Mahaman Touré, 53. "I personally know a local Tuareg who became a general under Gaddafi and was here with the jihadists. Now they have all gone back to Libya."
    Diplomats say jihadists cross the Sahara to join cadres in Libya's eastern coastal cities of Benghazi and Derna. Police stations in both cities have been hit by bombings in the past few days, part of an insurgency that threatens to undermine the country's fragile new democracy. Chad's president, Idriss Déby, claimed at the weekend that Benghazi was now home to training camps for Chadian rebel fighters.
    "From the perspective of an Islamist, it makes sense," said Dr Berny Sèbe, an expert on the Sahara region from Birmingham University. "If you are in northern Mali, the best thing that you can do is to make your way across Niger and then into southern Libya, where there is no state control."
    Eastern Libya has long been a base for Islamists, who launched an unsuccessful uprising against Gaddafi in the 1990s. Their units reappeared in the uprising two years ago, and while many have integrated with government forces, others are campaigning for a state ruled by clerics rather than secular politicians. Benghazi has become a virtual no-go area for foreigners following attacks on the British, Italian and Tunisian consulates, the fire-bombing of an Egyptian Coptic church and the killing of US ambassador Chris Stevens in September when militants overran the American consulate. The bombing in Tripoli indicates that terrorism has now spread to the capital.
    "Libya suffers this Mali blowback in two ways," said a diplomat in Tripoli. "First there are the fighters arriving here, second there are units carrying out attacks in support of their brothers [in Mali]."
    The result is not only being felt in Libya. In January, units from al-Qaida in the Maghreb, an Algerian-based al-Qaida offshoot, struck the In Amenas gas plant, killing 38 hostages, in what they said was retaliation for the France's Mali offensive.
    Ordinary Libyans are suffering. Watching French police investigators sifting through the mangled wreckage outside the abandoned embassy, neighbour Emad Tillisy, a Tripoli businessman, shook his head. "This is so bad for Libya," he said. "It is the worst message we can send out to the world. We need to have foreigners coming here for business, to build our country, but after this [bombing] they say 'no thanks, have a nice day'."
    Libya's efforts to tackle the militants are restricted by the distrust felt by much of the population for government security units, many of them drawn from former Gaddafi-era formations. Twin rocket attacks on oil and gas pipelines earlier this month south of Benghazi have meanwhile sent a shudder through Libya's oil industry, almost its only export earner.
    Libya has already piled resources into cutting the jihadist flow of men and weapons over its southern border, declaring its entire desert region a "free fire zone" for patrolling jets. In the south-west, work has now finished on a 108-mile trench cut through the desert to deter smugglers crossing into Libya.
    But experts say the Libyans face a herculean task. "To ensure that these borders are completely sealed off is impossible – we are talking about desert areas with mountains and very narrow valleys," said Sèbe.
    Libya's prime minister, Ali Zaidan, has vowed to launch a clear-out of militias in Benghazi, but many wonder if he has enough reliable units for the job.
    In December Washington provided drones and an Orion electronic warfare aircraft to support government units arresting jihadist suspects in Benghazi. It is now delivering border surveillance equipment to Libya and setting up a base for drones in Niger, from where it can monitor both Mali and Libya.
    This policy has its critics, who say experience in Afghanistan and Iraq shows military action works only when coupled with a political process that ensures the grievances of all sections of the population are met, denying militants popular support. "A drone-only approach to intelligence gathering can backfire," said Lawrence. "There's always bad guys who may blow up buildings – the question is what sea are they swimming in? The priority should be the support of a legitimate government that reflects the aspirations of all elements of Libyan society."
    The rise of Islamism in north Africa has spawned a galaxy of competing jihadist organisations, with alliances as fluid as the borders they cross. The units that staged the northern Mali uprising were drawn from both Libyan Tuareg fighters and jihadists, despite the fact that they fought on opposite sides in Libya's civil war. "For me, they are all the same – the Islamists and the MNLA," said Ahamadou Tahir, who was attacked by militants while delivering medical supplies 60 miles north of Timbuktu. "They all have guns and they all want to cause us harm."