التاريخ المشبوه للملك السعودي الجديد King Salman’s suspect History

King Salman’s suspect History

oseph Westphal, hailed the new Saudi ruler on Friday, proclaiming that ties “will only be strengthened by the wisdom and courage that is the essence of King Salman.” This was not just standard boilerplate from serving U.S. officials: Former U.S. envoy to Saudi Arabia Robert Jordan described Salman as “a reformer … well prepared for the task at hand,” and the Washington Post is reporting that analysts consider Salman “a moderate in the mold of Abdullah,” the late king.

Yet Salman has an ongoing track record of patronizing hateful extremists that is now getting downplayed for political convenience. As former CIA official Bruce Riedel astutely pointed out, Salman was the regime’s lead fundraiser for mujahideen, or Islamic holy warriors, in Afghanistan in the 1980s, as well as for Bosnian Muslims during the Balkan struggles of the 1990s. In essence, he served as Saudi Arabia’s financial point man for bolstering fundamentalist proxies in war zones abroad.

As longtime governor of Riyadh, Salman was often charged with maintaining order and consensus among members of his family. Salman’s half brother King Khalid (who ruled from 1975 to 1982) therefore looked to him early on in the Afghan conflict to use these family contacts for international objectives, appointing Salman to run the fundraising committee that gathered support from the royal family and other Saudis to support the mujahideen against the Soviets.

Riedel writes that in this capacity, Salman “work[ed] very closely with the kingdom’s Wahhabi clerical establishment.” Another CIA officer who was stationed in Pakistan in the late 1980s estimates that private Saudi donations during that period reached between $20 million and $25 million every month. And as Rachel Bronson details in her book, Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership With Saudi Arabia, Salman also helped recruit fighters for Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an Afghan Salafist fighter who served as a mentor to both Osama bin Laden and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Reprising this role in Bosnia, Salman was appointed by his full brother and close political ally King Fahd to direct the Saudi High Commission for Relief of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SHC) upon its founding in 1992. Through the SHC, Salman gathered donations from the royal family for Balkan relief, supervising the commission until its until its recent closure in 2011. By 2001, the organization had collected around $600 million — nominally for relief and religious purposes, but money that allegedly also went to facilitating arms shipments, despite a U.N. arms embargo on Bosnia and other Yugoslav successor states from 1991 to 1996.

And what kind of supervision did Salman exercise over this international commission? In 2001, NATO forces raided the SHC’s Sarajevo offices, discovering a treasure trove of terrorist materials: before-and-after photographs of al Qaeda attacks, instructions on how to fake U.S. State Department badges, and maps marked to highlight government buildings across Washington.

The Sarajevo raid was not the first piece of evidence that the SHC’s work went far beyond humanitarian aid. Between 1992 and 1995, European officials tracked roughly $120 million in donations from Salman’s personal bank accounts and from the SHC to a Vienna-based Bosnian aid organization named the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA). Although the organization claimed to be focused on providing humanitarian relief, Western intelligence agencies estimated that the TWRA actually spent a majority of its funds arming fighters aligned with the Bosnian government.

A defector from al Qaeda called to testify before the United Nations, and who gave a deposition for lawyers representing the families of 9/11 victims, alleged that both Salman’s SHC and the TWRA provided essential support to al Qaeda in Bosnia, including to his 107-man combat unit. In a deposition related to the 9/11 case, he stated that the SHC “participated extensively in supporting al Qaida operations in Bosnia” and that the TWRA “financed, and otherwise supported” the terrorist group’s fighters.

The SHC’s connection to terrorist groups has long been scrutinized by U.S. intelligence officials as well. The U.S. government’s Joint Task Force Guantanamo once included the Saudi High Commission on its list of suspected “terrorist and terrorist support entities.” The Defense Intelligence Agency also once accused the Saudi High Commission of shipping both aid and weapons to Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the al Qaeda-linked Somali warlord depicted as a villain in the movie Black Hawk Down. Somalia was subject to a United Nations arms embargo starting in January 1992.

Saudi Arabia’s support for Islamist fighters in Afghanistan and the Balkans ultimately backfired when veterans of the jihad returned home, forming the backbone of a resurgent al Qaeda threat to Saudi Arabia in 2003. Salman fell back on a tried-and-true Islamist trope to explain the attacks targeting the kingdom, declaring that they were “supported by extreme Zionism whose aim is to limit the Islamic call.”

The jihadi threat to Saudi Arabia, however, does not appear to have ended Salman’s willingness to associate with alleged jihadi funders and fundamentalist clerics. In November 2002, Prince Salman patronized a fundraising gala for three Saudi charities under investigation by Washington: the International Islamic Relief Organization, al-Haramain Foundation, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. Since 9/11, all three organizations have had branches shuttered or sanctioned over allegations of financially supporting terrorism. That same month, Salman cited his experience on the boards of charitable societies, asserting that “it is not the responsibility of the kingdom” if others exploit Saudi donations for terrorism.

As President Obama encourages Saudi Arabia to build “a society that is going to be able to sustain itself in this age,” he would do well to consider Salman’s role helping to run the Abdulaziz bin Baz Foundation, named after a Saudi grand mufti who passed away in 1999. The foundation’s website states that it has been “blessed with direct and continuous support” from Salman since its creation in 2001.

In part thanks to this foundation, the late bin Baz still ranks among the most influential Saudi clerics on the web, even from beyond the grave. Islamic historian Reuven Paz notes that the cleric was renowned for his “persistent attempts to move Saudi Arabia in the direction of strict and severe fundamentalism.” For example, bin Baz memorably ruled that women who study with men are equivalent to prostitutes.

Aqeel al-Aqil, a Saudi national placed under U.S. sanctions in 2004 for leading an organization alleged to have aided al Qaeda in more than 13 countries, was one member of the Baz Foundation’s board under Salman. Aqil retained his spot on the foundation’s board for several years following the imposition of the sanctions. When he did eventually leave the board, the foundation added another Saudi preacher, named Aidh Abdullah al-Qarni, who, in a speech on the Arab-Israeli conflict, declared that “throats must be slit and skulls must be shattered. This is the path to victory.”

Qarni is far from the only extremist cleric with whom Salman has worked. The new king has also embraced Saudi cleric Saleh al-Maghamsi, an Islamic supremacist who declared in 2012 that Osama bin Laden had more “sanctity and honor in the eyes of Allah,” simply for being a Muslim, than “Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, apostates, and atheists,” whom he described by nature as “infidels.” That didn’t put an end to Salman’s ties to Maghamsi, however. The new Saudi king recently served as head of the supervisory board for a Medina research center directed by Maghamsi. A year after Maghamsi’s offensive comments, Salman sponsored and attended a large cultural festival organized by the preacher. Maghamsi also advises two of Salman’s sons, one of whom took an adoring “selfie” with the preacher last year.

U.S. officials have explained that the purpose of President Obama’s visit is to forge a “close relationship” with the new Saudi king and to take his measure of the man. As Western officials consider how to engage with the new Saudi regime, Salman’s record of bolstering and embracing extremists needs to be part of the conversation. The worst-case scenario is that the new king shares the hard-liners’ views; the best case is that he is simply an opportunist, willing to accept intolerance in order to get ahead.

Many in the West wish for a Saudi king who will pass meaningful reforms and push back against incitement by local extremists. Sadly, Salman does not look to be that man.

By:David Andrew Weinberg

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/27/king-salmans-shady-history-saudi-arabia-jihadi-ties/

ترجمة: سامى قائد العليبى 

التاريخ المشبوه للملك السعودي الجديد

أشاد السفير الأمريكي في الرياض، جوزيف يستفال، يوم الجمعة بالملك السعودي الجديد، قائلا أن صفتي الحكمة والشجاعة المتأصلتين في الملك سلمان ستؤديان إلي تقوية العلاقات السعودية الأمريكية. لكن ذلك لم يكن تصريحا نمطيا معتادا من مسؤول أمريكي، فقد وصف المبعوث الأمريكي السابق في السعودية روبيرت جوردان سلمان بأنه "مصلح، ومستعد تماما لتحمل المسؤولية،" بينما ذكرت صحيفة "واشنطن بوست" الأمريكية أن المحللين يعتبرون سلمان "رجلا معتدلا، علي نهج سابقه عبد الله."

لكن الملك سلمان لديه سجل حافل برعايته للمتطرفين البغيضين وهو ما يتم التقليل من شأنه الآن لتحقيق بعض الملاءمات السياسية. فقد أشار بروس ريديل بذكاء، بصفته مسؤول سابق بالاستخبارات المركزية الأمريكية، إلي أن سلمان كان جامع التبرعات الرئيسي للمجاهدين الإسلاميين في أفغانستان في الثمانينيات، وكذلك للبوسنة المسلمين أثناء صراعات البلقان في التسعينيات. أي أنه عمل كركيزة للدعم المالي للمتشددين في الحروب التي خاضتها السعودية بالوكالة خارج أراضيها.

بصفته حاكما للرياض لفترة طويلة، كان سلمان مسؤولا عادة عن الحفاظ علي النظام والتوافق بين أعضاء العائلة المالكة. ونتيجة لذلك اختاره أخوه غير الشقيق الملك خالد (الذي حكم السعودية من العام 1975 حتي العام 1982) أثناء فترة الصراع الأفغاني ليستغل معارفه العائلية من أجل أهداف دولية، فنصبه مديرا للجنة جمع التبرعات من العائلة المالكة والسعوديين لدعم المجاهدين ضد السوفيت.

ويذكر ريديل أن سلمان "عمل بشكل وثيق مع المؤسسة الدينية الوهابية في السعودية." ويقدر مسؤول آخر بالاستخبارات المركزية الأمريكية عمل في باكستان في أواخر الثمانينيات أن التبرعات السعودية السرية خلال تلك الفترة تراوحت بين 20 مليون دولار و25 مليون دولار شهريا. وتوضح راشيل برونسون في كتابها "أثخن من النفط: شراكة أمريكا المضطربة مع السعودية"، أن سلمان قد ساعد في تجنيد المقاتلين لصالح عبد الرسول سياف، وهو مقاتل أفغاني سلفي عمل كمرشد لكلٍ من أسامة بن لادن والعقل المدبر لأحداث 11 سبتمبر خالد شيخ محمد.

أعاد سلمان أداء ذلك الدور مع البوسنة، حيث عينه أخوه الشقيق وحليفه السياسي الوثيق الملك فهد لإدارة اللجنة السعودية العليا لإغاثة البوسنة والهرسك بعد تأسيسها عام 1992. وعبر تلك اللجنة، جمع سلمان تبرعات من العائلة المالكة السعودية لإغاثة البلقان، واستمر في الإشراف علي اللجنة حتي إنتهاء دورها مؤخرا عام 2011. بحلول العام 2011، كانت المنظمة قد جمعت حوالي 600 مليون دولار، شكليا لأغراض الإغاثة ولأهداف دينية، لكن هناك مزاعم حول استغلال تلك الأموال في تقديم السلاح للمحاربين المسلمين، رغم قرار حظر التسليح الذي فرضته الأمم المتحدة علي البوسنة والدول الأخري التي خلفت يوغوسلافيا بين عامي 1991 و1996.

ما نوع الإشراف الذي مارسه سلمان علي تلك اللجنة الدولية؟ داهمت قوات الناتو عام 2001 مكاتب اللجنة في سراييفو، لتجد كنزا ثمينا من مواد دعم الإرهاب؛ حيث تضمنت صور لأهداف هجمات تنظيم القاعدة قبل وبعد تنفيذها، وإرشادات حول كيفية تزييف شارات وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية، وخرائط حددت عليها المباني الحكومية في واشنطن.

لكن مداهمة سراييفو لم تكن أول دليل علي تجاوز عمل اللجنة للإغاثة الإنسانية. فقد تعقب مسؤولون أوروبيون بين العامين 1992 و1995 تبرعات بقيمة حوالي 120 مليون دولار من الحسابات البنكية الشخصية لسلمان ومن اللجنة إلي المنظمة العاملة بإغاثة البوسنة "وكالة إغاثة العالم الثالث" ومقرها بفيينا. ورغم مزاعم المنظمة بتركيزها علي تقديم الإغاثة الإنسانية، إلا أن وكالات استخبارات غربية قدرت أن المنظمة قد أنفقت أغلب تمويلها علي تسليح المقاتلين المتحالفين مع الحكومة البوسنية.

استدعي أحد المنشقين عن تنظيم القاعدة ليدلي بشهادته أمام الولايات المتحدة، وقدم إقرارا للمحامين الممثلين لعائلات ضحايا أحداث 11 سبتمبر زاعما أن لجنة سلمان والمنظمة قد قدمتا دعما أساسيا لتنظيم القاعدة في البوسنة، والذي شمل وحدته القتالية. وفي إقرار متعلق بقضية 11 سبتمبر، أفاد بأن اللجنة "شاركت بشكل مكثف في دعم عمليات القاعدة في البوسنة" وأن المنظمة "مولت، ودعمت بطرق مختلفة" مقاتلي الجماعة الإرهابية.

خضعت الصلات بين اللجنة والجماعات الإرهابية لفحص دقيق ولمدة طويلة من قبل مسؤولي الاستخبارات الأمريكية. ضمت فرقة العمل المشتركة في جوانتانامو التابعة للحكومة الأمريكية اللجنة السعودية العليا إلى قائمتها للكيانات المشتبه بها كداعمة أو منفذة للإرهاب. كذلك اتهمت وكالة استخبارات الدفاع الأمريكية اللجنة السعودية العليا بتوصيل مساعدات وأسلحة إلي محمد فرح عيديد، وهو زعيم الحرب ذي الصلة بالقاعدة والمشار إليه في فيلم "سقوط الطائرة بلاك هوك." فقد خضعت الصومال لقرار حظر تسليح أصدرته الأمم المتحدة دخل حيز التنفيذ في يناير 1992.

لكن دعم السعودية للمقاتلين الإسلاميين في أفغانستان والبلقان أدي في النهاية إلي نتائج عكسية عندما عاد قدامي المجاهدين إلي ديارهم، حيث وضعوا حجر الأساس لتهديد القاعدة المتنامي في السعودية عام 2003. عند ذلك اعتمد سلمان علي حجة إسلامية مكررة لتفسير الهجمات التي تستهدف المملكة، حيث أعلن أن تلك الهجمات "مدعومة من قبل الصهيونية المتطرفة التي تهدف لصد الدعوة الإسلامية."

إلا أنه لا يبدو أن التهديد الجهادي الموجه صوب السعودية قد كبح رغبة سلمان في العمل المشترك مع ممولي الجهاد الإسلامي والشيوخ المتطرفين. حيث تتضمن "لجنة الموثوق بهم" الخاصة بمركز الأمير سلمان للشباب، والذي يرأسه سلمان نفسه، صالح عبد الله كامل، وهو ملياردير سعودي ظهر اسمه سابقا في القائمة المزعومة للداعمين المبكرين للقاعدة، والمعروفة باسم "السلسلة الذهبية." إلا أن صحيفة "وال ستريت جورنال" الأمريكية أوردت إنكار كامل دعمه للإرهاب. وبينما سعت الولايات المتحدة لإغلاق المنظمات الخيرية السعودية ذات الصلة بالإرهاب في أعقاب أحداث 11 سبتمبر، أدان كامل وسلمان تلك الجهود ووصفوها بأنها معادية للإسلام.

تبني الأمير سلمان عام 2002 احتفالية جمع تبرعات لثلاث جمعيات خيرية سعودية تحقق واشنطن بشأنها؛ وهي منظمة الإغاثة الإسلامية الدولية، ومؤسسة الحرمين، والندوة العالمية للشباب الإسلامي. ويجدر بالذكر أنه منذ أحداث 11 سبتمبر تم إغلاق بعض فروع المؤسسات الثلاثة أو فرضت عليها عقوبات إثر مزاعم حول تمويل الإرهاب ماليا. وعلق سليمان في نفس الشهر بأنها ليست مسؤولية المملكة إن استغل آخرون التبرعات السعودية في تمويل الإرهاب.

مع تشجيع أوباما للسعودية علي بناء "مجتمع قادر علي التجاوب مع متطلبات العصر الحالي،" يجب أن يضع في اعتباره دور سلمان في المساعدة علي تشغيل مؤسسة "عبد العزيز بن باز،" والتي سميت باسم المفتي السعودي الأكبر والذي توفي عام 1999. ويذكر موقع المؤسسة أنها "مباركة بالدعم المباشر والمستمر" من سلمان منذ إنشائها عام 2001.

يصنف بن باز الأخير كواحد من أكثر الشيوخ السعوديين تأثيرا علي شبكة الإنترنت، ويعود الفضل في ذلك جزئيا إلي هذه المؤسسة، حتي بعد موته. ويشير المؤرخ الإسلامي روفين باز إلي أنه عرف عن الشيخ "محاولاته المستمرة لتوجيه السعودية نحو التطرف المتشدد والخطير." فمن أحد فتاويه التي لا تنسي أن المرأة التي تدرس مع الرجال تعتبر في حكم العاهرة.

عقيل العقيل، هو مواطن سعودي فرضت عليه عقوبات أمريكية عام 2004 لقيادته لمنظمة زعم أنها قد ساعدت القاعدة في أكثر من 13 دولة، وكان أحد أعضاء مجلس إدارة مؤسسة "الباز." احتفظ العقيل بمنصبه في المؤسسة لعدة سنوات بعد فرض العقوبات. وعندما ترك المجلس أضافت المؤسسة داعية سعودي آخر، هو عائض عبد الله القرني، والذي أعلن في حديث عن الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي أنه "يجب قطع الرقاب وتحطيم الجماحم، وهذا هو طريق النصر."

ولكن القرني ليس أكثر الشيوخ الذين عمل معهم سلمان تشددا. فالملك الجديد تبني أيضا الداعية السعودي صالح المغامسي، والذي أعلن عام 2012 أن أسامة بن لادن "له قدسية وشرف أمام الله أكثر مما لليهود والمسيحيين والزراديشتيين والمرتدين والملحدين،" ببساطة لأنه مسلم، بينما وصف الآخرين بأنهم "كفار." إلا أن ذلك ليس نهاية علاقة سلمان بالمغامسي، فقد عمل سلمان مؤخرا كرئيس للجنة المشرفة علي مركز أبحاث المدينة والذي يديره المغامسي. وبعد عام من تعليقات المغامسي العدائية، رعي سلمان وحضر احتفالية ثقافية كبيرة نظمها الداعية. كذلك يعمل المغامسي كمستشار لاثنين من أبناء سلمان، حيث التقط أحدهما صورة شخصية له مع الداعية العام الماضي معبرا فيها عن إعجابه بالداعية.

أوضح مسؤولون أمريكيون أن الهدف من زيارة الرئيس أوباما هو صياغة "علاقة وثيقة" مع الملك السعودي الجديد وأتخاذ التدابير الملائمة مع الملك الجديد. وبينما يدرس مسؤولون غربيون كيفية التواصل بنجاح مع النظام السعودي الجديد، يجب وضع سجل سلمان من دعم وتبني المتطرفين في الحسبان. أسوء التصورات هو أن الملك الجديد يتشارك وجهات النظر مع المتشددين، وأفضلها هو أنه ببساطة انتهازي، قد يقبل بالتعصب حتي يمضي قدما نحو أهدافه.

يطمح الكثيرون في الغرب إلي ملك سعودي يمرر إصلاحات فعالة ويوقف التحريض الذي يمارسه المتشددون المحليون. ولكن مع الأسف، لا يبدو أن سلمان هو هذا الرجل.

Watching #Cairo from #Sanaa #Yemen #Egypt

SANAA — The protests in Egypt have not only ignited unrest in Cairo, they've unleashed a flurry of debate across the rest of the region. It's not just about where things are heading in Egypt, the most populous country in the Arab world, or what the current uncertainty means about the country's post-Mubarak transition. It's about their resonance in the whole of the Arabic-speaking world and the potential spillover effects. From Sanaa, all that's truly clear at the moment is that Yemenis are watching a nearly absurd amount of Egypt coverage on TV..

Local Muslim Brothers and sympathizers watch Al Jazeera with trepidation. Politicians from former president Ali Abdullah Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) party watch Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya with a newly awakened revolutionary fervor. Leftists watch al-Mayadeen, the year-old Beirut-based "alternative" to Gulf-funded channels, wondering aloud whether the tide may have shifted against political Islam.

It can feel at times like they are looking at Egypt for cues for where things in Yemen could be heading; over the course of the past two and a half years, events in Cairo have tended to feel a few steps ahead of those Sanaa.

--> While large-scale protests aimed at the Yemeni dictator's ouster began almost immediately after Mubarak's toppling, Saleh didn't formally cede power until the following February. Demonstrators stayed in the streets in months-long protest encampments across the country, but the voices of Yemen's revolutionary youth were soon eclipsed. The military split between supporting the government and the protestors, and Sanaa erupted into urban warfare on two separate occasions. Al Qaeda-linked militants seized control of a series of towns in the south, and, all the while, opposition politicians engaged in a series of on-again, off-again negotiations with Saleh and his allies. In November 2011, the two sides finally reached an agreement, inking the so-called Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative, an internationally backed power transfer deal granting Saleh immunity in exchange for his ouster. The deal set Yemen on a two-year long "transitional period" presided over by longtime Vice President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and formed a compromise government split between the GPC and the opposition. Presidential and parliamentary elections are tentatively slated for early 2014.

There's plenty of heady talk about the building of a "new Yemen," but in Sanaa it often feels as if things are paused. Some things have moved forward elsewhere in the country: Once the target of a series of devastating wars, the Houthi movement has carved out a virtual state-within-a-state in their base in the far north, while rising secessionist sentiment has made it seem almost as if the only thing preventing the south from regaining its independence is a series of brittle divisions among the separatist leadership. The ongoing Conference of National Dialogue may have forced politicians in the capital to recognize the Houthis as a legitimate political force, while providing for a comparatively open forum for the discussion of southerners' grievances, but its deliberations often feel like rehashing long-running factional squabbles.

Even if new parties have been formed, the post-2011 political map often feels indistinguishable from the old one. Discussions in Sanaa tend to devolve into debates over the divide between the GPC and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), an ideologically fractious coalition of leftist and Islamist factions dominated by the Islah Party, which incorporates the bulk of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, and the Socialist and Nasserist parties. In that sense, there's been little change since 2005, when the JMP was initially formed.

The activists who spurred the former president's ouster -- and, for that matter, many politicians here -- have been open about their misgivings about the shape of Yemen's post-Saleh transition. But it has generally been accepted as the only option aside from further violence and instability.

Gathered around watching news coverage with activists on June 30 and July 1, however, it seemed the scenes in Cairo and other Egyptian cities had provided a potential course of action.

For a few brief days, there was talk about building a Yemeni Tamarod (or rebels, as the Cairo protestors called themselves). There were unofficial discussions between activists from across the political spectrum; the date for massive protests aimed at "correcting the course of the revolution" was tentatively set for July 7. Even at the speculative stage, though, disagreements about everything from demands to acceptable protest slogans foreshadowed that things would eventually come to naught. July 7 came and went with only street protests in the south, as secessionists marked the anniversary of their defeat in Yemen's 1994 civil war. The closest thing I witnessed to an outburst of discontent came a few days prior. Driving with a friend past the home of Yemen's embattled prime minister, Mohamed Basindowa, he rolled down his car window, stopped briefly, and shouted "Leave, Uncle Mohamed!"

The absence of Egypt-style protests hardly means people here are happy with the way things are going. Hoped-for improvements in the stagnant economy and the tenuous security situation remain largely elusive: kidnappings of foreigners have increased in frequency, while security officials continue to be targeted in a string of assassinations. The recurring sabotage of power lines has left even residents of the capital at the mercy of disgruntled tribesmen. Even if Hadi has held on to much of his tenuous public support, Yemenis from across the political spectrum have condemned the unity government as a failure.

Still, it seems, no one is willing to make a move. Chewing qat with a collection of GPC politicians on July 2, their enthusiasm for the protests against Morsy was palpable; Yahya Mohamed Saleh, the former Yemeni president's nephew, had already stopped by Cairo's Tahrir Square to show his solidarity with the "revolution against the Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood]." They watched as revolutionaries and remnants of the Mubarak regime joined together against a common foe, and I wondered if they thought they felt they could pull off a similar feat here, capitalizing on the longstanding misgivings many Saleh opponents hold regarding the Islah Party. 

 

"The question is no longer ‘with the revolution or against it,'" an activist had told me a few days before. "The stage has changed. What matters now is who is truly for or against building the state."

Comments like that are music to the GPC's ears. But that enthusiasm among revolutionaries and the regime's old guard seems distant from the current political reality.

Complaints over Islah's increased influence in post-Saleh Yemen notwithstanding, the power the party currently holds is in no way comparable to that of Morsy's Freedom and Justice Party. In the event of any possible shakeup, all parties would almost inevitably be affected; while plenty may raise issue with the current balance of power, few seem willing to take the risk of upsetting it.

--> Perhaps, however, it's the way things have gone in Egypt that has ultimately doomed any real aftereffects here. The violence and uncertainty since the July 3 coup has led many to quiet their misgivings about Yemen's own post-Arab Spring transition. It may be far from perfect, the argument goes, but things could certainly be worse.

There were certainly plenty of Yemenis who celebrated the military's overthrow of Morsy; plenty of others cast it as a far from ideal, but necessary step. But even many Yemenis with little sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood have expressed a deep discomfort as events have unfolded, wondering if it's all a message about the fragility of the tentative gains made in the wake of the Arab Spring.

"I don't like Morsy, but it's hard not to see the army overthrowing an elected president as a negative step -- a step backwards," an activist told me. "It makes me nervous about where Yemen is heading: Wherever Egypt was [before June 30], it was far ahead of where we are now."

A Shameful Neglect

 Afghanistan's iniquities are grotesque. At Kabul University last week, zealots -- all men -- protested a law that would abolish child marriage, forced marriage, marital rape, and the odious practice, called ba'ad, of giving girls away to settle offenses or debts. Meanwhile, in jails all over the country, 600 women, the highest number since the fall of the Taliban, await trial on charges of such moral transgressions as having been raped or running away from abusive homes. 

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It is tempting to wring our hands at such obscene bigotry, to pity Afghanistan's women and vilify its men. Instead, we must look squarely at our own complicity in the shameful circumstances of Afghan women, billions of international aid dollars and 12 years after U.S. warplanes first bombed their ill-starred land.

I have been traveling to Afghanistan since 2001, mostly to its hardscrabble hinterland, where the majority of Afghans live. Over the years, I have cooked rice and traded jewelry with Afghan women, cradled their anemic children, and fallen asleep under communal blankets in their cramped mud-brick homes. I have seen firsthand that the aid we give ostensibly to improve their lives almost never makes it to these women. Today, just as 12 years ago, most of them still have no clean drinking water, sanitation, or electricity; the nearest clinic is still often a half day's walk away, and the only readily available palliative is opium. Afghan mothers still watch their infants die at the highest rate in the world, mostly of waterborne diseases such as bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis, and typhoid.

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Instead of fixing women's lives, our humanitarian aid subsidizes Afghanistan's kleptocrats, erects miniature Versailles in Kabul and Dubai for the families of the elite, and buys the loyalty of sectarian warlords-turned-politicians, some of whom are implicated in sectarian war crimes that include rape. Yet, for the most part, the U.S. taxpayers look the other way as the country's amoral government steals or hands out as political kickbacks the money that was meant to help Afghan women -- all in the name of containing what we consider the greater evil, the Taliban insurgency. In other words, we have made a trade-off. We have joined a kind of a collective ba'ad, a political deal for which the Afghan women are the price.

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To be sure, a lot of well-meaning Westerners and courageous Afghans have worked very hard to improve women's conditions, and there has been some headway as far as women's rights are concerned. The number of girls signed up for school rose from just 5,000 before the U.S.-led invasion to 2.2 million. In Kabul and a handful of other cities, some women have swapped their polyester burqas for headscarves. Some even have taken jobs outside their homes. But here, too, progress has been uneven. A fifth of the girls enrolled in school never attend classes, and most of the rest drop out after fourth grade. Few Afghan parents prioritize education for their daughters because few Afghan women participate in the country's feudal economy, and because Afghan society, by and large, does not welcome education for girls or emancipation of women. To get an idea about what the general Afghan public thinks of emancipation, consider this: the post-2001 neologism "khanum free" -- "free woman," with the adjective transliterated from the English -- means "a loose woman," "a prostitute." In villages, women almost never appear barefaced in front of strangers.

Doffing their burqas is the least of these women's worry. Their real problem is the intangible and seemingly irremovable shroud of endless violence. It stunts infrastructure and perpetuates insecurity and fear. It deprives women of the basic human rights we take for granted: to have enough food and drinking water that doesn't fester with disease; to see all of their children live past the age of five. The absence of basic necessities and the violence that has concussed Afghanistan almost continuously since the beginning of recorded history are the main reasons the country has the fifth-lowest life expectancy in the world. The war Westerners often claim to be fighting in the name of Afghan women instead helps prolong their hardship -- with little or no compensation. And now, as the deadline for the international troop pullout approaches, the country is spinning toward a full-blown civil war. A handful of hardline men shouting slogans at Kabul University fades in comparison.

How to help Afghan women? The road to their wellbeing begins with food security, health care that works, and a government that protects them against sectarian violence. Right now, none of these exist. I wish I could offer an adequate solution to the tragic circumstances of the women of Afghanistan's back-of-beyond. There does not appear to be one. Hurling yet more aid dollars into a intemperate funnel that will never reach their villages is not the answer: there is little reason to believe that we can count that such funding would be spent on creating enough mobile clinics to pay regular visits to remote villages; build roads that would allow the women and their families easy access to market; facilitate sanitation projects that would curb major waterborne diseases. The impending troop withdrawal means that women's security will likely go from bad to worse.

Is it possible to ensure that some of the funding we now hand to Karzai and Co. -- an estimated $15.7 billion in 2010-2011, according to the CIA (and that's not counting the infamous ghost money) -- is distributed among the small non-profits that actually are trying to make life in Afghanistan livable, organizations that create mobile clinics to pay regular visits to remote villages, build roads that allow villagers easier access to market, facilitate sanitation projects that curb major waterborne diseases? This could be a start, but only if these organizations continue to work in Afghanistan after NATO troops leave. That, too, is in question now: this week an attack against the International Committee for Red Cross led the organization to suspend its operations in the country for the first time in almost 30 years. But wringing our hands at Afghan women's abysmal state and shaky social status is not a way out. It is a navel-gazing conversation that avoids looking squarely at our role in perpetuating the very dire condition we condemn