Syria’s lung-eating rebel explains himself

 

The shocking video of a Syrian rebel eating the lung of a pro-Assad fighter spread like wildfire across the Internet earlier this week. The rebel, who goes by the nom de guerre Abu Sakkar, has filmed a YouTube video explaining his actions. 

"I am willing to face trial for my actions if Bashar and his shabeeha [militiamen] stand trial for their atrocities," he says. "My message to the world is if the bloodshed in Syria doesn't stop, all of Syria will become like Abu Sakkar."

The Syrian rebel, whose real name is Khalid al-Hamad, goes on to explain that he did what he did because of atrocities committed by pro-Assad fighters. He said that evidence taken from their cell phones showed how they raped women, killed children, and tortured men. In an article published this week by TIME magazine, the rebel fighter explained that he had a sectarian hatred of Alawites, and that he had made another video where he cuts up a pro-Assad fighter's body with a saw.

Abu Sakkar's actions not only created controversy among observers of the conflict, but also prompted the Syrian rebel leadership to take action. The Free Syrian Army's Military Council released a statement condemning Abu Sakkar's "monstrous act," and instructed field commanders to being an investigation "in which the perpetrator will be brought to justice."

So far, however, Abu Sakkar appears to still be on the battlefield. At the end of the video, the cameraman asks him whether he will continue fighting after this controversy. "Victory or martyrdom, I will fight to the death," he replies, then walks off down the road. 

Posted By David Kenner

Hackgate - The IPCC and Surrey's "Collective Amnesia"

Hackgate - The IPCC and Surrey's "Collective Amnesia" 

 

Published in late April '13, the Independent Police Complaints Commision (IPCC) Commissioner’s Report entitled 'IPCC independent investigation into Surrey Police’s knowledge of the alleged illegal accessing of Amanda (Milly) Dowler’s mobile phone in 2002' runs to just 6 scathing pages.  Its key observation is that

former senior officers at Surrey Police were 'afflicted by a form of collective amnesia' in relation to the force’s failure to investigate an allegation in 2002 that the voicemail of Amanda (Milly) Dowler had been hacked by the News of the World (NOTW).

The relevant documents in the public domain consist of a letter from Surrey Police to the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee (CMS) on Surrey's own investigation (Operation Baronet), evidence read-in to the Leveson Inquiry from the Metropolitan Police Service (MET), as well as that IPCC Commissioner's Report.  The latter specifically focused on the referrals of Maria Woodall and Craig Denholm for potential recordable conduct.

MARIA WOODALL

Then: In 2002, Maria Woodall was Detective Sergeant and Action Team Manager of Surrey Police's investigation Operation Ruby into the abduction of missing teenager Millie Dowler. She appears to have been frank with the IPCC that the hacking of Millie's mobile phone by NOTW was known by several on the investigation team - for example, DC John Lyndon's 23rd April '02 log entry (p14)

...in light of the News of the World revelation that they or a third party has accessed the voicemail it is possible that the messages had previously been listened to by unknown persons and deleted.

Millie's mother Sally recounted to the Leveson Inquiry (p14) her own suspicions that NOTW had intercepted family phones to get a particularly intrusive story for publication ('The Longest Walk').

Woodall's referral to the IPCC  however was not about 2002. She was investigated for allegedly failing to pass on knowledge of NOTW's hacking later during the investigation which led to the convictions of Clive Goodman and Glenn Mulcaire (p4):  

The case against her rested on her actions and knowledge in 2007, when the first phone hacking convictions took place. It is clear that at that point she accessed the HOLMES system to view documents from 2002 associated with phone hacking.

Though the IPCC investigation "concluded that there was no case to answer for misconduct."  From 2006, Operation Ruby's Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) was Detective Chief Superintendent Mark Rowley. It is not known if Woodall informed him of her HOLMES searches.

Now: Temporary Detective Superintendent Woodall is about to leave Surrey for a new job with the City of London Police.

STUART GIBSON

Then: Detective Chief Inspector Gibson was the initial appointed Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) when Millie Dowler disappeared in March 2002.  It has been alleged that Gibson was one of the Surrey officers who met with NOTW senior journalists and were told of the hacking. (here)

Documented evidence of his meeting(s) with NOTW are missing.  Within a few weeks, Gibson was removed from Operation Ruby. The conclusions from a progress review by Sussex Police undertaken in the summer of 2002 are here.

At the same time, there was adverse criticism from the press - one "describing the investigation under DCI Gibson as 'rudderless' and this media coverage has since been described by (then Deputy Chief Constable) Peter Fahy as 'a factor in replacing the SIO for [the investigation]".  (p9)

Now: Stuart Gibson is retired.

The IPCC Investigation also states that amongst senior officers interviewed were those at Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) level.

CRAIG DENHOLM  (ACPO level)

Surrey Police's evidence to the CMS Committee and the Leveson Inquiry came from Assistant Chief Constable Jerry Kirkby. Normally, both might have warranted the attention of the force Chief Constable.  However, Surrey's Chief Constable Mark Rowley had just left for a new post with the MET and Temporary Chief Constable Craig Denholm was himself implicated as the focus of Operation Baronet.

Then: In 2002, Detective Chief Superintendent Denholm (Head of Crime) was Overall Officer in Charge (OOC) of Operation Ruby - the immediate superior officer to SIO Stuart Gibson.

The case against Denholm "rested on his claim to have had no knowledge about the alleged hacking of Milly Dowler’s phone before this was revealed publicly in 2011. Given the extent of knowledge within the investigation team, and Surrey Police as a whole, and the fact that this was referred to in documents which he is known to have received, the investigation found it hard to understand how he, the officer in charge, could not have been aware of the alleged hacking. But despite detailed examination of all extant documents and interviews with all relevant witnesses, the investigation was unable to find any witness or documentary evidence that contradicted Mr Denholm’s own repeated assertions to the IPCC that he did not know, and had not made the relevant connections. In view of that...there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of a case to answer for gross misconduct."

Now: Denholm has just been appointed Deputy Chief Constable of Hampshire Police. Its Chief Constable Andy Marsh said: "Craig is an experienced and very capable DCC with a good track record of leadership and delivery of excellent policing services to the public."

MARK ROWLEY (ACPO level)

Then: Rowley joined Surrey in 2002 as Chief Superintendent to command West Surrey Basic Command Unit.  Previously (Guardian)

as a detective superintendent at the National Criminal Intelligence Service, he 'led on the national deployment of covert techniques to combat organised crime such as telephone interception' 

Rowley became Surrey Assistant Chief Constable from November 2003 and assumed the role of OOC for Operation Ruby in 2006.  He was appointed Chief Constable in 2009. Following the conviction of Levi Bellfield in 2011 for Millie Dowler's murder, Rowley iniated Operation Baronet under AC Jerry Kirkby.

Now:  Rowley is Assistant Commissioner at the MET. For some time he was direct superior officer of DAC Sue Akers command of Operations Weeting, Elveden and Tuleta.  Responsibility for these investigations was subsequently transferred to AC Cressida Dick.


PETER FAHY  (ACPO level)

Then: Throughout 2002, Fahy was Deputy Chief Constable of Surrey Police under Chief Constable Denis O'Connor. Fahy left Surrey in Dec '02 to become Chief Constable of Cheshire Police.

Now: Knighted in 2012, Sir Peter Fahy is currently Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police.

DENIS O'CONNOR  (ACPO level)

Then: In 2002, O'Connor was Chief Constable of Surrey Police. In all available evidence, O'Connor has been very keen to distance himself from the NOTW phone hacking in 2002.  Instead, he has consistently emphasized his heavy reliance on Peter Fahy's responsibility to have informed him:

You will understand that as a discipline authority, not everything reaches the Chief Constable, who must sit in judgment of things. So I may have been partially safe from it, but I would have expected and, you know,my sort of --my concern with the mission of policing and its credibility, that people would have drawn -- my senior staff, my professional standards department -- if there was anything significant, they would have told me... Particularly my Deputy Chief Constable at the present (sic) time, Peter Fahy, I had absolute faith in his integrity. I thought he would make the right judgments

Lord Justice Leveson did however challenge O'Connor on this strategy of continuing, unsighted insulation (pp 98-100).  His witness statement added (1st witness statement, p7):

I am not fully sighted on the details of the alleged contact between the News of the World and my staff during the Amanda Dowler investigation (I have deliberately limited my contact with Surrey Police pending current investigations) so cannot comment on the specifics of this issue.

Now:  Knighted in 2010, Sir Denis O'Connor is currently Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary.

And STILL there are inconsistencies emerging on the hacking of Millie Dowler. Note the investigation of Maria Woodall "rested on her actions and knowledge in 2007, when the first phone hacking convictions took place. It is clear that at that point she accessed the HOLMES system to view documents from 2002 associated with phone hacking."

Yet it is debatable just how much documentation was on the second generation HOLMES (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System) in 2002... or even in 2007. The - redacted - Sussex Review of September 2002 made Operational Recommendations:

Recommendation 56
That Surrey Police in general ensure that sufficient analysts are trained on the HOLMES 2 system.
Recommendation 57
That Surrey Police formulate an appropriate policy regarding the typing of at least the most significant 'other documents' onto HOLMES 2 during any enquiry.

Were those Sussex Police recommendations ignored? Or if significant 2002 Dowler phone hacking documents were in the HOLMES system, were they still there when Woodall looked in 2007? Had some disappeared by the time of the 2012 Operation Baronet?  Given that one of the aims of HOLMES is to facilitate crucial information access across force boundaries, was cross-force access to HOLMES 2002 documents volunteered by Surrey to Operation Caryatid (the MET 2005-6 investigation into Goodman and Mulcaire)? If not, why not?  Alternatively - following the high profile convictions of Goodman and Mulcaire in 2007 - Woodall may have tried to access cross-force MET HOLMES databases on NOTW phone hacking.

There were none. The MET did not enter details of the key Mulcaire Archive into HOLMES during the Operation Caryatid investigation in 2005. Or 2006. Or post-conviction in 2007.  It was only in July 2009, following intense criticism, that the MET's John Yates ordered the phone hacking data entry into HOLMES to enable victim notification. It was costly, protracted, and poorly executed.

The IPCC confirms "widespread knowledge uncovered in this investigation, we consider that it is scarcely credible that no one connected to the Milly Dowler investigation recognised the relevance and importance of the knowledge that Surrey Police had in 2002...There is no doubt, from our investigation and the evidence gathered by Operation Baronet, that Surrey Police knew in 2002 of the allegation that Milly Dowler’s phone had been hacked by the News of the World. It is apparent from the evidence that there was knowledge of this at all levels within the investigation team  ...former senior officers in particular appear to have been afflicted by a form of collective amnesia about this"

All this is highly reminiscent of the (contagious?) 'omerta' culture at the News of the World. Surrey Police seem to have demonstrated the self-same collective amnesia and willful blindness of NOTW senior executives, the plausible deniability of Andy Coulson, the trusting reliance on subordinates of Rupert Murdoch, the inability to read a log/email chain of James Murdoch, the document preservation abilities of News International's Datapool 3 team, and the reputational management skills of Colin Myler.

To date, six have been charged with conspiracy to intercept the voicemail messages of Millie Dowler in April 2002 - Rebekah Brooks, Andrew Coulson, Stuart Kuttner, Greg Miskiw, Neville Thurlbeck and Glenn Mulcaire.  Unless all six defendants plead guilty, these charges will have to be defended in open court. So there is much more evidence yet to emerge on the Dowler hacking, including the potential for former senior officers of Surrey Police being called as prosecution witnesses.

The short IPCC Commissioner's Report is a much-truncated and redacted version. The full IPCC formal Investigation Report "contains full details of the evidence supporting the findings and conclusions and the report into this case is not being published at this time at the request of the Crown Prosecution Service, in view of ongoing criminal proceedings."

This sorry Surrey saga is not over yet.

يا معشر الأعراب هيا عودوا إلى خيامكم

من هم الأعراب!?

قوله تعالى {الأَعْرَابُ أَشَدُّ كُفْرًا وَنِفَاقًا وَأَجْدَرُ أَلاَّ يَعْلَمُوا حُدُودَ مَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ عَلَى رَسُولِهِ وَاللَّهُ عَلِيمٌ حَكِيمٌ }

(السعودية- الإمارات - الكويت - قطر - البحرين )

بمعنى اصح دول الخليج فقط. 

على صحراء قاحلة شحيحة كانوا يسكنون ..كانوا قوماً حفاة عراة يئدون بناتهم و يقتلون صغارهم عند وقوع مجاعة ما وكان الرجل منهم يرث حتى زوجات أبيه ، وكان إذا سافر يُقيّد زوجاته إلى شجرة حتى يرجع من سفره

كانوا مفكّكين مبعثرين يُغيرون على بعضهم البعض ..كانوا لا يُؤتمنون على أماناتهم ولا على أعراضهم ..كان القويّ منهم ينهش الضعيف ..يعلنون الحرب لأجل ناقة ويُورّثون هذه الحرب للأجيال المتلاحقة ..


كانوا يُمثّلون بجثث أعدائهم ويُعلّقون الرؤوس على مداخل مدنهم ..كانوا يلبسون ما رثّ وما بليّ ..كانوا يجلسون على التراب ويتّخذونه نمارق ويتبرّزون عليه وينظّفون به عوراتهم ..


كانوا لا يعرفون لا قراءة ولا كتابة يتناقلون ما يقرضون من الشّعر شفوياً ..كانوا يُصَعلِكون شعرائهم ويُحلّون دمائهم ويحرّمون الحب ويقرنون بينه وبين الإثم والخطيئة .


كان الرجل منهم يجمع كبار قومه أدباً ونسباً ليطؤو زوجته حتى تلد له ولد يكون وارثاً لكل صفات الجمال والكمال التي يحملها أولئك الرجال ..


كانوا قطّاعا للطرق سلاّبين نهّابين ..يعتبرون العمل مهانة واستصغارا لذلك يوكلون الأعمال من فلاحة وحدادة وحياكة للعبيد والجواري ..


جاءهم محمد إبن عبد الله ( صلى الله عليه وسلم ) علمهم حتى نتف الإبط من شدة جهلهم وتخلفهم ..

أتستغربون بعد هذا أن يختن الرجل ابنته ويجلب صديقه حتى ترضعه زوجته بعدما يفاخذ صغيرته ؟

لم يُنجبوا ابطالاً فقد كان إبن خلدون من تونس وكان إبن الجزار من القيروان وكان الفارابي من بلاد ما وراء النهرين وكان الرازي وإبن المقفع من بلاد فارس وكان سيبويه من البصرة وكان إبن سيناء من بخارى وكان الغزالي من نيسابور وكان النووي من سورية …


ربما كان بينهم أدباء وشعراء فطاحلة لكنهم اُتّهموا من قبل هؤلاء الأعراب بالزندقة وبالإلحاد وبالشذوذ .. فحتى إذا أنجبت أرضهم القاحلة اِسثناء كفّروه أو قتلوه ..


كان هذا دأبهم ؛ لو حدّثتهم عن النساء لقالوا لك : جواري وختان واِرضاع الكبير ومفاخذة الصغير وبكر وعذرية ومثنى وثلاث ورباع ومتبرجة تبرج الجاهلية وعورة وما ملكت أيمانهم وهل يجوز النكاح قبل البلوغ …


ثم يقولون هذا رجس من عمل الشيطان ولا يجتنبونة ..أسَرُهم مفكّكة تملؤها الصراعات والمظالم…

الجنس في كلامهم وفي وعيهم وفي لا وعيهم في مدارسهم وفي ملابسهم وفي هواتفم وفي حواسبهم ..يزنون مع عشيقاتهم ثم يرجمنهن بالحجارة ..


ولا يكتفون بهذا بل يمزجون الجنس بلحاهم وبأفكارهم ويحاولون تصدير كبتهم عبر فتاوى شيوخهم المهوسون به ..


عندما كانوا ينسجون أساطيرهم بوادي الجن وضع أجدادنا العظماء أول دستور في البشرية ..كان أجدادي يسكنون القصور ويشربون الخمور في أواني الفضة والذهب كانوا يشيّدون المعابد والمسارح ويلتقون فيها للتٌسامر وتبادل المعارف وإقامة الألعاب و المسابقات والمناظرات الفكرية ..كانوا يبنون المكاتب قبل المطابخ ..كانت روما أعتى الإمبراطوريات تَرهَبُهم وتغار من تقدّم القرطاجين و الفينيقيين و من اِنفتاحهم ..
لو كتبت بحراً من الكلمات لم وصفت حضارة أجدادي ..


يا معشر الأعراب هيا عودوا إلى خيامكم وإبلكم واِنكحوة ما لذّ وطاب من جواركم وغلمانكم واِبتعدو عن أرضنا وشمسنا وبحرنا فأوطاننا أطهر من أن يدنّسها أمثالكم.

Arab Spring Time in Saudi Cyberspace

Not more than two years ago, the concept of reform in Saudi Arabia would have been as much an oxymoron as business ethics or airline cuisine. In recent months, however, the Arab Spring’s uncertain winds of change have finally begun to sweep into the world’s last forbidden kingdom. Finding themselves alone in a crowd (of revolution) in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia’s monarchs are quickly realizing that their secret police and petrodollars may be no match for their citizens’ technology-driven empowerment.

On March 1, Saudi security forces cracked down on a woman-led protest in the city of Buraidah, known as the nerve center of Saudi Arabia’s ultraconservative Wahabbist ideology. Over 160 people, mostly women and children, were arrested after erecting a tent camp to pressure the government to free their imprisoned husbands whom they claim have been detained for years without visitation or access to legal counsel. The Saudi government claims that the detainees are part of a “deviant group,” a term given to suspected Al Qaeda sympathizers or Islamist political opposition groups across the Gulf.

News of the arrests spread like wildfire. Protests in support of the Buraidah women were called for by activists from the Shiite minority in the Eastern Province and liberal reformists in Riyadh and Jidda. The mobilization of Saudi conservatives, liberals and minorities against the government’s repressive policies bore a dangerous resemblance to the red-green alliances that toppled governments from Cairo to Tunis. While turnout at the demonstrations was limited due to the government’s ban on political gatherings, the Saudi Twittersphere was teeming with anger.

Two weeks later, the government-sponsored Arab News daily published a cover story condemning what it deemed “abusive” actions by Saudi Twitter users. The story mentioned that the authorities were mulling over a plan to link Twitter accounts with their users’ identification numbers. Soon after, the story was pulled from the online version of the newspaper without explanation.

For one of the most Internet-privy societies on the planet, any move to link Twitter accounts with personal ID numbers would result in a mass exodus to other online forums that are not monitored. Saudi Arabia ranks number one in the world for Twitter users per-capita, with an estimated 51 percent of all Saudi Internet users maintaining an account with the social media network. Analysts suggest that any such move would result in a 60 percent reduction of Twitter usage in the country — a true window onto how many Saudis are voicing dissent against their government.

Still, on March 31, the Saudi Communications and Information Technology Commission instructed Skype, WhatsApp and Viber to comply with local regulations or risk being shut down. These applications are Internet-based communications services that are both free of charge and not subject to the kingdom’s telecommunications regulations.

The Saudi government has a strong interest in limiting social media and online communications services. Protests are being increasingly organized through use of the WhatsApp messaging application. Political dissidents are able to use Skype to communicate with human rights organizations and foreign media networks without fear of government monitoring. Some government employees and those with ties to the royal family have begun to exploit Twitter to disseminate information regarding corruption in the kingdom.

The Saudi government is, however, becoming increasingly hesitant about limiting social media and other communications because of the potential for a political backlash. Freedom of speech and communication were a hallmark demand of popular uprisings elsewhere in the Arab world, with attempts to cut online activity serving to fuel discontent rather than mitigate unrest. Saudi Arabia is already a favorite target for civil rights activists across the globe, and a ban on social media would only add to a long list of reasons for further divestment and isolation campaigns.

As an alternative, the Saudi government has begun encouraging loyalists to condemn and pursue those suspected of online dissent rather than close the outlets altogether. In recent weeks, a Shura Council member filed a lawsuit against a critical Twitter user, while the government-appointed imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca dedicated his Friday sermon on April 5 to condemning the social network, calling it a “threat to national unity.”

As the government remains confounded by its inability to control online dissent, there is no doubt that the rising tide of anger across Saudi cyberspace has begun to spill over into physical reality. Unwillingly, the government has been forced to wrestle with undertaking previously unimaginable reforms with regard to women’s rights and employment opportunities for millions of young, educated citizens. With social media as their vehicle, Saudis are threatening to take control of their country’s destiny for the first time in history, and there may be nothing their government can do about it.

By DANIEL NISMAN

Did We Get the #Muslim_Brotherhood Wrong?

 

Nope. But it's time to revise our assessments. 

 The deterioration of Egyptian politics has spurred an intense, often vitriolic polarization between Islamists and their rivals that has increasingly spilled over into analytical disputes. Some principled liberalswho once supported the Muslim Brotherhood against the Mubarak regime's repression have recanted. Longtime critics of the Islamists view themselves as vindicated and demand that Americans, including me, apologize for getting the Brotherhood wrong. As one prominent Egyptian blogger recently put it, "are you ready to apologize for at least 5 years of promoting the MB as fluffy Democrats to everyone? ARE YOU?"

 

So, should we apologize? Did we get the Brotherhood wrong? Not really. The academic consensus about the Brotherhood got most of the big things right about that organization ... at least as it existed prior to the 2011 Egyptian revolution. U.S. analysists and academics correctly identified the major strands in its ideological development and internal factional struggles, its electoral prowess, its conflicts with al Qaeda and hard-line Salafis, and the tension between its democratic ambitions and its illiberal aspirations. And liberals who defended the Brotherhood against the Mubarak regime's torture and repression were unquestionably right to do so -- indeed, I would regard defending the human rights and political participation of a group with which one disagrees as a litmus test for liberalism.

But getting the pre-2011 period right doesn't let us off the hook for what has come since. How one felt about questions of the Brotherhood's ability to be democratic in the past has nothing to do with the urgency of holding it to those commitments today. Giving the group the chance to participate fully in the democratic process does not mean giving it a pass on bad behavior once it is in power -- or letting it off the hook for abuses of pluralism, tolerance, or universal values.  That's why I would like to see Egypt's electoral process continue, and for the Brotherhood to be punished at the ballot box for their manifest failures.

So what did we say about the Brotherhood, and what did they get wrong or right? I wouldn't presume to speak for a diverse academic community that disagrees about many important things, but some broad themes do emerge from a decade of literature. For one, most academics viewed the Brotherhood of the 2000s as a democratic actor but not a liberal one. That's an important distinction. By the late 2000s, the Brotherhood had a nearly two-decade track record of participation in national, professional, and student elections. It had developed an elaborate ideological justification for not just the acceptability but the necessity of democratic procedure. When it lost elections, such as in the professional associations, it peacefully surrendered power (and, ironically given current debates, it was willing to boycott when it saw the rules stacked against it). By 2007, it seemed to me that there was nothing more the Brotherhood could have done to demonstrate its commitment to democratic procedures in the absence of the actual opportunity to win elections and govern. I think that was right.

And of course it had developed a well-honed electoral machine ready for use whenever the opportunity presented itself.  Nobody in the academic community doubted that the Brotherhood would do well in the first wave of elections. Academics also pegged public support for the Brotherhood at about 20 percent, not far off the 25 percent Mohammed Morsy managed in the first round of the presidential election. They correctly identified the organizational advantages the Brotherhood would have in early elections, which would allow them to significantly overperform that baseline of support against new, less-organized opponents.

The Brotherhood's commitment to democratic procedures never really translated into a commitment to democratic or liberal norms, however. It always struggled with the obvious tension between its commitment to sharia (Islamic law) and its participation in democratic elections. Not being able to win allowed the Brothers to avoid confronting this yawning gap, even if they frequently found themselves enmeshed in public controversies over their true intentions -- for instance, with the release of a draft political party platform in 2007 that hinted at the creation of a state committee to review legislation for compliance with sharia and a rejection of a female or non-Muslim president.  As for liberalism, nobody ever doubted the obvious point that this was an Islamist movement with deeply socially conservative values and priorities. The real question was over their willingness to tolerate different points of view -- and there, deep skepticism remained the rule across the academic community.

سقوط الدولة المصرية: غياب قواعد اللعبة السياسية

من ساعة 25 يناير 2011 لم أرى أي فصيل سياسي في مصر يتحدث عن وضع قواد أساسية و واضحة و بسيطة تكون أساس إعادة بناء النظام السياسي في مصر.

 

القواعد دي غير تقديمها، كان لازم يبقى عليها إجماع... تكون مجموعة مبادئ لا يتنازع عليها أي فصيل سياسي: ليبرالي، إسلامي/ديني، يساري، إلخ

من الأمثلة في التاريخ هو إعلان الإستقلال الأمريكي. كان إعلان إستقلال لكنه كان إعلان مبادئ. الإعلان كان لا يزيد على صفحة وحدة.

الوقت بين إعلان الإستقلال لحد وضع الدستور الأمريكي كان 11 سنة!في هذه الأثناء كان إعلان الإستقلال ومبادئه هم قواعد اللعبة السياسية في امريكا.

الليبرالية لايمكنها تقديم أي حلول لولم يكن هناك قواعد واضحة حتى وإن كانت أقل من المستوى لئن اللمنهج الليبرالي يعتمد على البناء و التصحيح.

 

 

 

 

لكن مصر في السنتين إلي فاتوا و بالذات الفترة الأخيرة تفتقد لأي معالم واضحة و مطبقة تعطي ضمانات و تطمينات لكل الأطراف السياسية.

 

 

و الأسباب معروفة... فالإخوان تغطرسوا و ابعدوا الأخر و شكلوا قواعد اللعبة و غيروها على أهوائهم كما تطورت الأحداث.

 

هم كدة فاكرين انهم على طريق النجاح... لكن اللي مش فهمينه إنه لا يمكنهم تحقيق حتى اهدافهم الضيقة من غير قواعد واضحة مطبقة بحياد على الجميع.

 

و عشان كدة اسلوبهم و منهجهم لن يخلق إلا نظام مهلهل ساقط كالوضع في باكستان.

 

ما يحدث في مصر هو انها ما بقتش دولة قانون... لكنها دولة ساقطة... Failed State... أو على طريقها لذلك.

 

Lessons from #Syria

There are two parts to this brilliant article by Beesaan el Shaikh in Al Hayat (Arabic) which I believe is an imperative read for anyone interested in the Arab uprising.

The first part of the article uses the tragedies generated by the revolution as a very compelling argument NOT to support it. The second part, near the end, turns the argument around making a simple but slam-dunk case for the revolution.

I want to use the first part to rephrase a position I expressed in the very beginning of this revolution, days before the first Assad speech and the subsequent violent turn of the uprising: I expressed then my hope that Assad would do the wise thing and grab the opportunity to reform the regime by himself, because that was the only transition that would avoid destroying Syria, or handing it to Islamic extremists.

I was naïve in my hopes, obviously. But I believe that hope is a moral imperative. I knew then, like all those who lived through Lebanon's civil war, that no matter where it happens on this earth, or why, or how legitimate, when an uprising turns into an armed rebellion, there is absolutely no controlling of the damage it can make to the structure of society and its ability to recuperate post conflict (think Iraq, Lebanon, but also Salvador, Tchetchnia, or Sri Lanka more globally).

The unspeakable price of civil violence in terms of social dismantling (even more so than the toll on human life and heritage), is why I still believe that any people who has regime change in progress (i.e Tunisia, Egypt) - or in perspective (i.e Jordan, Morocco, or the Gulf in the coming 5 to 15 years) - must bend itself backwards twice, maybe thrice, before engaging in violent struggle, or violent ‘defense of the achieved revolution’ – as opposed to radically peaceful rebellion or political compromise.

One of the reasons I respect Moaz el Khatib so deeply is his awareness of this fact, and his courage to remain constantly open to compromise with the regime for the sake of ending violence – because he knows that no matter how high the price of such compromise is, it will always be lower than the one of sustained violence.

Don’t get me wrong, just like Beesaan el Sheikh says in her article, I believe that there is no choice BUT to support the Syrian revolution because it is the only legitimate and humanly acceptable path forward. But I certainly hope that idealists learn the lesson and understand that wars are, under all circumstances, unwinnable: because even by winning them, we destroy the basic social infrastructure that makes that victory worth anything.

This might sound obvious to some, but the consequence is less so: only a slower transition, or a stubbornly peaceful uprising can come at a lower cost.

I want to end by drawing a relevance to Tunisia and Egypt: compromise is a high price you might need to pay to avoid the higher price of a torn society. And if compromise is impossible (and it should take a lot before you get to this conclusion), than maintain your struggle peaceful at all cost (i.e no military repression of ‘medieval forces’). The alternative is worse than you can ever imagine or calculate.