Arab Spring Time in Saudi Cyberspace

Not more than two years ago, the concept of reform in Saudi Arabia would have been as much an oxymoron as business ethics or airline cuisine. In recent months, however, the Arab Spring’s uncertain winds of change have finally begun to sweep into the world’s last forbidden kingdom. Finding themselves alone in a crowd (of revolution) in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia’s monarchs are quickly realizing that their secret police and petrodollars may be no match for their citizens’ technology-driven empowerment.

On March 1, Saudi security forces cracked down on a woman-led protest in the city of Buraidah, known as the nerve center of Saudi Arabia’s ultraconservative Wahabbist ideology. Over 160 people, mostly women and children, were arrested after erecting a tent camp to pressure the government to free their imprisoned husbands whom they claim have been detained for years without visitation or access to legal counsel. The Saudi government claims that the detainees are part of a “deviant group,” a term given to suspected Al Qaeda sympathizers or Islamist political opposition groups across the Gulf.

News of the arrests spread like wildfire. Protests in support of the Buraidah women were called for by activists from the Shiite minority in the Eastern Province and liberal reformists in Riyadh and Jidda. The mobilization of Saudi conservatives, liberals and minorities against the government’s repressive policies bore a dangerous resemblance to the red-green alliances that toppled governments from Cairo to Tunis. While turnout at the demonstrations was limited due to the government’s ban on political gatherings, the Saudi Twittersphere was teeming with anger.

Two weeks later, the government-sponsored Arab News daily published a cover story condemning what it deemed “abusive” actions by Saudi Twitter users. The story mentioned that the authorities were mulling over a plan to link Twitter accounts with their users’ identification numbers. Soon after, the story was pulled from the online version of the newspaper without explanation.

For one of the most Internet-privy societies on the planet, any move to link Twitter accounts with personal ID numbers would result in a mass exodus to other online forums that are not monitored. Saudi Arabia ranks number one in the world for Twitter users per-capita, with an estimated 51 percent of all Saudi Internet users maintaining an account with the social media network. Analysts suggest that any such move would result in a 60 percent reduction of Twitter usage in the country — a true window onto how many Saudis are voicing dissent against their government.

Still, on March 31, the Saudi Communications and Information Technology Commission instructed Skype, WhatsApp and Viber to comply with local regulations or risk being shut down. These applications are Internet-based communications services that are both free of charge and not subject to the kingdom’s telecommunications regulations.

The Saudi government has a strong interest in limiting social media and online communications services. Protests are being increasingly organized through use of the WhatsApp messaging application. Political dissidents are able to use Skype to communicate with human rights organizations and foreign media networks without fear of government monitoring. Some government employees and those with ties to the royal family have begun to exploit Twitter to disseminate information regarding corruption in the kingdom.

The Saudi government is, however, becoming increasingly hesitant about limiting social media and other communications because of the potential for a political backlash. Freedom of speech and communication were a hallmark demand of popular uprisings elsewhere in the Arab world, with attempts to cut online activity serving to fuel discontent rather than mitigate unrest. Saudi Arabia is already a favorite target for civil rights activists across the globe, and a ban on social media would only add to a long list of reasons for further divestment and isolation campaigns.

As an alternative, the Saudi government has begun encouraging loyalists to condemn and pursue those suspected of online dissent rather than close the outlets altogether. In recent weeks, a Shura Council member filed a lawsuit against a critical Twitter user, while the government-appointed imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca dedicated his Friday sermon on April 5 to condemning the social network, calling it a “threat to national unity.”

As the government remains confounded by its inability to control online dissent, there is no doubt that the rising tide of anger across Saudi cyberspace has begun to spill over into physical reality. Unwillingly, the government has been forced to wrestle with undertaking previously unimaginable reforms with regard to women’s rights and employment opportunities for millions of young, educated citizens. With social media as their vehicle, Saudis are threatening to take control of their country’s destiny for the first time in history, and there may be nothing their government can do about it.

By DANIEL NISMAN

Did We Get the #Muslim_Brotherhood Wrong?

 

Nope. But it's time to revise our assessments. 

 The deterioration of Egyptian politics has spurred an intense, often vitriolic polarization between Islamists and their rivals that has increasingly spilled over into analytical disputes. Some principled liberalswho once supported the Muslim Brotherhood against the Mubarak regime's repression have recanted. Longtime critics of the Islamists view themselves as vindicated and demand that Americans, including me, apologize for getting the Brotherhood wrong. As one prominent Egyptian blogger recently put it, "are you ready to apologize for at least 5 years of promoting the MB as fluffy Democrats to everyone? ARE YOU?"

 

So, should we apologize? Did we get the Brotherhood wrong? Not really. The academic consensus about the Brotherhood got most of the big things right about that organization ... at least as it existed prior to the 2011 Egyptian revolution. U.S. analysists and academics correctly identified the major strands in its ideological development and internal factional struggles, its electoral prowess, its conflicts with al Qaeda and hard-line Salafis, and the tension between its democratic ambitions and its illiberal aspirations. And liberals who defended the Brotherhood against the Mubarak regime's torture and repression were unquestionably right to do so -- indeed, I would regard defending the human rights and political participation of a group with which one disagrees as a litmus test for liberalism.

But getting the pre-2011 period right doesn't let us off the hook for what has come since. How one felt about questions of the Brotherhood's ability to be democratic in the past has nothing to do with the urgency of holding it to those commitments today. Giving the group the chance to participate fully in the democratic process does not mean giving it a pass on bad behavior once it is in power -- or letting it off the hook for abuses of pluralism, tolerance, or universal values.  That's why I would like to see Egypt's electoral process continue, and for the Brotherhood to be punished at the ballot box for their manifest failures.

So what did we say about the Brotherhood, and what did they get wrong or right? I wouldn't presume to speak for a diverse academic community that disagrees about many important things, but some broad themes do emerge from a decade of literature. For one, most academics viewed the Brotherhood of the 2000s as a democratic actor but not a liberal one. That's an important distinction. By the late 2000s, the Brotherhood had a nearly two-decade track record of participation in national, professional, and student elections. It had developed an elaborate ideological justification for not just the acceptability but the necessity of democratic procedure. When it lost elections, such as in the professional associations, it peacefully surrendered power (and, ironically given current debates, it was willing to boycott when it saw the rules stacked against it). By 2007, it seemed to me that there was nothing more the Brotherhood could have done to demonstrate its commitment to democratic procedures in the absence of the actual opportunity to win elections and govern. I think that was right.

And of course it had developed a well-honed electoral machine ready for use whenever the opportunity presented itself.  Nobody in the academic community doubted that the Brotherhood would do well in the first wave of elections. Academics also pegged public support for the Brotherhood at about 20 percent, not far off the 25 percent Mohammed Morsy managed in the first round of the presidential election. They correctly identified the organizational advantages the Brotherhood would have in early elections, which would allow them to significantly overperform that baseline of support against new, less-organized opponents.

The Brotherhood's commitment to democratic procedures never really translated into a commitment to democratic or liberal norms, however. It always struggled with the obvious tension between its commitment to sharia (Islamic law) and its participation in democratic elections. Not being able to win allowed the Brothers to avoid confronting this yawning gap, even if they frequently found themselves enmeshed in public controversies over their true intentions -- for instance, with the release of a draft political party platform in 2007 that hinted at the creation of a state committee to review legislation for compliance with sharia and a rejection of a female or non-Muslim president.  As for liberalism, nobody ever doubted the obvious point that this was an Islamist movement with deeply socially conservative values and priorities. The real question was over their willingness to tolerate different points of view -- and there, deep skepticism remained the rule across the academic community.

سقوط الدولة المصرية: غياب قواعد اللعبة السياسية

من ساعة 25 يناير 2011 لم أرى أي فصيل سياسي في مصر يتحدث عن وضع قواد أساسية و واضحة و بسيطة تكون أساس إعادة بناء النظام السياسي في مصر.

 

القواعد دي غير تقديمها، كان لازم يبقى عليها إجماع... تكون مجموعة مبادئ لا يتنازع عليها أي فصيل سياسي: ليبرالي، إسلامي/ديني، يساري، إلخ

من الأمثلة في التاريخ هو إعلان الإستقلال الأمريكي. كان إعلان إستقلال لكنه كان إعلان مبادئ. الإعلان كان لا يزيد على صفحة وحدة.

الوقت بين إعلان الإستقلال لحد وضع الدستور الأمريكي كان 11 سنة!في هذه الأثناء كان إعلان الإستقلال ومبادئه هم قواعد اللعبة السياسية في امريكا.

الليبرالية لايمكنها تقديم أي حلول لولم يكن هناك قواعد واضحة حتى وإن كانت أقل من المستوى لئن اللمنهج الليبرالي يعتمد على البناء و التصحيح.

 

 

 

 

لكن مصر في السنتين إلي فاتوا و بالذات الفترة الأخيرة تفتقد لأي معالم واضحة و مطبقة تعطي ضمانات و تطمينات لكل الأطراف السياسية.

 

 

و الأسباب معروفة... فالإخوان تغطرسوا و ابعدوا الأخر و شكلوا قواعد اللعبة و غيروها على أهوائهم كما تطورت الأحداث.

 

هم كدة فاكرين انهم على طريق النجاح... لكن اللي مش فهمينه إنه لا يمكنهم تحقيق حتى اهدافهم الضيقة من غير قواعد واضحة مطبقة بحياد على الجميع.

 

و عشان كدة اسلوبهم و منهجهم لن يخلق إلا نظام مهلهل ساقط كالوضع في باكستان.

 

ما يحدث في مصر هو انها ما بقتش دولة قانون... لكنها دولة ساقطة... Failed State... أو على طريقها لذلك.

 

Lessons from #Syria

There are two parts to this brilliant article by Beesaan el Shaikh in Al Hayat (Arabic) which I believe is an imperative read for anyone interested in the Arab uprising.

The first part of the article uses the tragedies generated by the revolution as a very compelling argument NOT to support it. The second part, near the end, turns the argument around making a simple but slam-dunk case for the revolution.

I want to use the first part to rephrase a position I expressed in the very beginning of this revolution, days before the first Assad speech and the subsequent violent turn of the uprising: I expressed then my hope that Assad would do the wise thing and grab the opportunity to reform the regime by himself, because that was the only transition that would avoid destroying Syria, or handing it to Islamic extremists.

I was naïve in my hopes, obviously. But I believe that hope is a moral imperative. I knew then, like all those who lived through Lebanon's civil war, that no matter where it happens on this earth, or why, or how legitimate, when an uprising turns into an armed rebellion, there is absolutely no controlling of the damage it can make to the structure of society and its ability to recuperate post conflict (think Iraq, Lebanon, but also Salvador, Tchetchnia, or Sri Lanka more globally).

The unspeakable price of civil violence in terms of social dismantling (even more so than the toll on human life and heritage), is why I still believe that any people who has regime change in progress (i.e Tunisia, Egypt) - or in perspective (i.e Jordan, Morocco, or the Gulf in the coming 5 to 15 years) - must bend itself backwards twice, maybe thrice, before engaging in violent struggle, or violent ‘defense of the achieved revolution’ – as opposed to radically peaceful rebellion or political compromise.

One of the reasons I respect Moaz el Khatib so deeply is his awareness of this fact, and his courage to remain constantly open to compromise with the regime for the sake of ending violence – because he knows that no matter how high the price of such compromise is, it will always be lower than the one of sustained violence.

Don’t get me wrong, just like Beesaan el Sheikh says in her article, I believe that there is no choice BUT to support the Syrian revolution because it is the only legitimate and humanly acceptable path forward. But I certainly hope that idealists learn the lesson and understand that wars are, under all circumstances, unwinnable: because even by winning them, we destroy the basic social infrastructure that makes that victory worth anything.

This might sound obvious to some, but the consequence is less so: only a slower transition, or a stubbornly peaceful uprising can come at a lower cost.

I want to end by drawing a relevance to Tunisia and Egypt: compromise is a high price you might need to pay to avoid the higher price of a torn society. And if compromise is impossible (and it should take a lot before you get to this conclusion), than maintain your struggle peaceful at all cost (i.e no military repression of ‘medieval forces’). The alternative is worse than you can ever imagine or calculate.

##Cartoon – Saudi Arabia may block messaging apps – @Skype @Viber @WhatsApp

#ksa Saudi Arabia: poverty, tyranny and congestion .. and "vices under the veil"

Social issues

Saudi Arabia: poverty, tyranny and congestion .. and "vices under the veil"

The Saudi cleric denounced the close of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood to confiscate rights in Saudi Arabia and demanded reform, Saudi writer warned that Saudi Arabia is witnessing a time of reform and loose at the same time, and stressed the need to take advantage of the experiences of neighboring countries.

Condemned a prominent Saudi cleric of the stream near the thought of awakening the Muslim Brotherhood in the "open letter" Friday (March 15 / March 2013) confiscation of rights, calling for reform. And at the same time warned of congestion in the kingdom, which follow a conservative approach politically and religiously.

Salman wrote back in its website modeled on extracts that "people here have longings and demands and rights, and will not remain silent forever forfeited in whole or in part ... when man loses hope, you have to expect him anything."

The return to "negative feelings accumulated since the time for quite some ... if still feeling scared of people surmised them all, and if increased frequency of anger will not unhappy thing, with the rising anger lose symbols of legitimacy and political value, and become leadership, however the street."

He attributed the reasons Saudi cleric congestion to "financial and administrative corruption, unemployment, housing, poverty, poor health and education and the absence of political reform horizon", noting that "the continuation of the existing situation is impossible., But the question to track where it's heading?".

Salman returns considered that it was "necessary to release the detainees and decisiveness Jeddah إصلاحيي", in reference to the provisions, which were issued last Saturday sentenced prominent human rights activists about ten years each solve Jmeithma to lack of access to a license to carry out the business.

Authorities also arrested in 2007 a number of university professors and lawyers, in what has become known as the "cell Break Jeddah", some of the Awakening Movement. And sentenced to one of them, one of the symbols of the Umma Party of the Muslim Brotherhood to 30 years imprisonment.

Era of openness and loose

For his part, said Saudi writer Ali bin Mohammed quartet in his new book that while the era of King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, is the era of reform and opening up, but there are currents in Saudi Arabia grappling in the name of religion and disparate religious glances.

Extreme poverty and obscene wealth and the main controversy revolves around the veil

This came in a four-book, titled "Clash of currents in Saudi Arabia." According to the book quartet that "the reality of the situation in Saudi Arabia turns the equation, with leaves Halim Hiran, scene current ... suggests that we did not consider what happened around us coups and Anfelataat, what Ajdhir For more tyranny and authoritarianism in the absence of the rule of law and institutions."

Under the title "Corruption and Reform", the author believes that experienced by the country now "make money the state between the rich and the society referred to two main layers: the rich getting richer and poor belch poorest and debt troubles, with the decline of the middle class gradually."

"Vices under the veil"

With regard to issues controversial "It extrapolation of the reality of offering cultural popular ideological in Saudi Arabia since unification early thirties of the twentieth century, as most of our issues that we are preparing substantial centered on whether the woman's face rougher or not and whether separate from women or contact them and the rule of leadership Women of the car and who are the Islamists and what are their specifications through the prerogative of liberals and who are infidels and atheists who want to show corruption in the country and among people? what we must to stand in the face of conspirators against religion. "

"These issues formal list under a veil accumulate beneath sometimes vices various manifestations of pleading by some Alshahuanyen to achieve exactly the mundane name of God and His laws. These problems overtaken by many Islamic countries economy is based mostly on the Saudi funding for failed country that feeds arteries world resources of petroleum that feeds people and awareness beyond the sterile debate and did not succeed the dominant culture in the cities transition to a society tools product in his thoughts and ideas and industry. "

J. A / p. (AFP, Reuters)

‫خلفان - تم تهديدى من #الإخوان بعد كشفى عن تجارة الشاطر للمخدرات‬