Change in Egypt #egypt #Morsi #Ikhwan #cartoon

Mubarak and Marsa same dirty face

Jon Stewart defends Bassem Youssef (Egypt's Jon Stewart); Destroys Pres. Morsi

Jon Stewart defends Bassem Youssef (Egypt's Jon Stewart); Destroys Pres. Morsi 

أنا لا أفهم هذا الرجل .. أنت رئيس مصر.. أعظم أرض وأعظم شعب في التاريخ المدون، شعبك -سيدي الرئيس- اخترع الحضارة، حتى أن اليونانيين القدماء حين ذهبوا إلى مصر ذهلوا وقالوا: ماذا عندكم هنا؟ علم الهندسة والأساطير؟ عندما تفرغون منهما يمكننا استخدامهما، سيدي الرئيس لقد اخترع المصريون اللغة المكتوبة والورق ومعجون الأسنان، حتى إنهم دفنوا مع قططهم الأليفة، كذلك أصبح الكثيرون يقلدون الطريقة المصرية في الرقص، المصريون هم من بنوا الأهرامات.. ربما يجب عليك أن تأتي بأحد هؤلاء كي يجعل جلدك أكثر سمكاً (جلد إخوانجي تخين).. كل مافعله باسم يوسف هو السخرية من قبعتك وعدم قدرتك على الأداء الديمقراطي، ما الذي يقلقك؟ أنت رئيس مصر، ولديك جيش وأسلحة ودبابات وطائرات، ونحن نعلم ذلك لأن مازال لدينا الفواتير، انصت لي جيدا، محاولة إسكات كوميديان لن تؤهلك كي تصبح رئيس مصر، دعني أقول لك شيئا: مالذي يقلقك سيدي الرئيس؟ خوفك من قوة النقد الساخر على هيبتك؟ انظر إلى.. هذا ما أفعله في الـ 15 عام الماضيين، أنا أعرف باسم شخصيا، وهو صديقي وأخي، وإن كان هناك شيئان يحبهما باسم جدا فهما مصر والإسلام

جمعه الكرامه امام المقطم #الاخوان #مرسى #مصر #Ikhwankazeboon

جمعه الكرامه امام المقطم

تبدأ الحكاية بعد أن إتهمت بعض القوى الثورية وبعض النشطاء السياسيين جماعة الإخوان المسلمين وشبابها بالتعدى عليهم أمام مكتب الإرشاد وتباينت القصص والروايات حول لماذا تم افعتداء فالبعض يقول أن الإخوان أرداوا الإنتقام من خسارة إنتخابات نقابة الصحافة مع أن الإخوان لم يكن لهم مرشح مباشر فى هذه الإنتخابات ولم يعلن الإخوان المسلمين عن وجود مرشحين لهم فى هذه الإنتخابات وبالرغم من ذلك قالوا أن الإخوان المسلمين خسروا انتخابات نقابة الصحفيين كذلك قال البعض أن الصحفيين تواجدوا هناك لتغطية تواجد خالد مشعل فى مكتب الإرشاد ولقاؤه بالمرشد بالرغم انه لم يتم الإعلان عن ذلك ولم تصدر أى جهة تابعة للإخوان عن وجود خالد مشعل أو عن وجود لقاء بينه وبين المرشد داخل المقر بينما رد الإخوان على هذه الإتهامات من ناحيتهم عندما اكدوا أن النشطاء السياسيين تواجدوا امام المقر وقاموا بالسب للإخوان والمرشد كما قاموا بكتابة عبارات مسيئة ومهينة للإخوان والمرشد وحاولوا رسم بعض الرسومات او الجرافيتى كما يُطلق عليها فما كان من شباب الإخوان إلا انهم خرجوا لهم وإعتدوا عليهم وبين تلك الروايات وتلك وبين ضياع الحقيقة بين كلام هؤلاء وأولئك يبقى سؤال إستخدمه معارضى الإخوان فيما سبق ردا على أحداث قصر الإتحادية رددها كل المعارضين وكل القنوات الفضائية والصحف المعروفة بمهاجمة الإخوان وكان السؤال هو ..لماذ ذهب الإخوان أمام قصر الإتحادية ؟؟؟ ..فهل يمكن توجيه هذا السؤال الآن للنشطاء السياسيين وهل يمكن القول لماذا ذهب المعارضين والنشطاء أمام مقر الإخوان بالمقطم ؟؟ ولكن سوف نجد من يقول انهم تواجدوا فى مكان عام فى الشارع ولا يمكن أحد منعهم ولكن الرد سوف يكون بنفس الطريقة الإخوان هم أيضا عندما ذهبوا لقصر الإتحادية توجدوا أمام مكان عام من حقهم التواجد فيه سوف يقول البعض الآخر الإخوان ذهبوا أمام قصر الإتحادية وهم يعرفون أن المعارضة متواجدة هناك فسوف يكون الرد أيضا وهل عندما ذهب النشطاء أمام مقر الإخوان كانوا يتوقعون أن الإخوان لن يتواجدوا فى مقرهم ومن من الممكن التواجد داخل مقر الإخوان أو أمامه هل يمكن أن يتواجد المعارضين ؟؟
وبعد الأحداث السابق ذكرها دعت بعض القوى الثورية والعديد من النشطاء السياسيين للتظاهر امام مكتب الإرشاد بالمقطم ردا على ماحدث لهم من شباب الإخوان وبالفعل حدث ذلك أمام المكتب أمس ولكن شهد التواجد الذى دائما مايصفه الإعلام بالسلمى بالرغم ما يخلفه من حرائق وحالات تخريب وإصابات نفس ما يشهده دائما تواجد المعارضة فى أى مكان إعتداءات ومولوتوف وحرائق وإصابات بالجملة وأحداث أمس طرحت العديد من الأسئلة كانت تحتاج إلى إجابات ورددها العديد من الإعلاميين وهى
(1) هل بعد إحتراق مقرات الإخوان والإعتداء على مقر الإرشاد بالمقطم وسحل وحرق بعض أفرادهم أمس هل بعد كل ذلك مازال البعض يعتقد انهم يمتلكون ميلشيات مسلحة؟؟
(2) هل من كانوا يرددون ان الإخوان هم من قاموا بموقعة الجمل وهم من قاموا بأحداث بورسعيد وهم من يغتصبون ويتحرشون وكل ماسبق من أفعال إجرامية مازالوا يعتقدون ذلك ؟ وهل لو كان الإخوان يستأجرون بلطجية ليفعلوا ذلك لماذا لم يستأجروا نفس البلطجية للدفاع عنهم امس ؟؟
ونحن هنا نقدم لكم مجموعة من الفيديوهات التى توثق وتوضح كل ماتم من احداث أمس امام مكتب الإرشاد بالمقطم  

234 مصاباً في جمعة رد الكرامة والنيابة تحقق في دعوات التظاهر أمام مقر "الإخوان"

 

حازم عبدالعظيم: مليونية المقطم 22 مارس ستوجه رسالة للعالم أجمع مفادها أن الشعب لن يقبل بأن يحكم من مكتب الإرشاد

 حبس 6 شباب فى جمعة «رد الكرامة» أمام مكتب الإرشاد بالمقطم.. والمتهمون يتهمون الشرطة بسحلهم http://ow.ly/2vHYRw

القوى السياسية تجدد دعوتها للمشاركة في جمعة «رد الكرامة» أمام «الإرشاد»

«الوطن» تنشر شهادات معتقلى «سلخانة المقطم الإخوانية»

فيديو لاشتباكات جمعة رد الكرامة
تابع تغطية خاصة بالفيديو.. لاشتباكات المتظاهرين والإخوان أمام مقر الإرشاد بالمقطم

بالصور.. خالد علي يحمي مصابي الإخوان خلال اشتباكات المقطم 

http://ow.ly/jlsjE

11 فيديو لاشتباكات جمعة رد الكرامة
تابع تغطية خاصة بالفيديو.. لاشتباكات المتظاهرين والإخوان أمام مقر الإرشاد بالمقطم
http://files.elwatannews.com/video_49 

بالصور.. النيران تشتعل في أحد شباب «الإخوان» خلال اشتباكات «مكتب الإرشاد» http://ow.ly/jkqQo 

‫خلفان - تم تهديدى من #الإخوان بعد كشفى عن تجارة الشاطر للمخدرات‬

Egypt book blasts Brotherhood, becomes best-seller

#Egypt Egyptian book blasts Muslim Brotherhood and becomes a best-seller

 

An Egyptian lawyer whose dissenting voice got him thrown out of the Muslim Brotherhood examines what he calls the group's hidden radicalism in a book that has become a best-seller in Cairo.
Tharwat al-Khirbawy's "Secret of the Temple" has been dismissed by Brotherhood leaders as part of a smear campaign.

But its success points to a deep mistrust harboured by some Egyptians towards a once-outlawed movement that has moved to the heart of power since Hosni Mubarak was toppled and its candidate secured the presidency.
In its 12th print run since November, the book is being sold in upmarket shops and on street corners, pointing to a thirst for information about a group whose inner workings remain a mystery months after President Mohamed Mursi came to power.
Expelled from the group a decade ago, Khirbawy says he aims to expose dictatorship and extremism inside the Brotherhood. In the process, he has joined a media war being waged to shape views in Egypt's deeply polarised political landscape.
Asked to comment on the book, one senior Muslim Brotherhood leader dismissed its content as "fallacies". Another said that to comment on such a book would be a waste of time.
"I want to make all people know the reality about the Brotherhood," Khirbawy said in an interview with Reuters.
Khirbawy sees the way he was kicked out of the Brotherhood as an illustration of the group's authoritarian streak.
He was disciplined in 2001 at a "Brotherhood court" for publishing three articles that criticised the group for not engaging with other opposition parties - a criticism still levelled at the Brotherhood today. "The Brotherhood does not know the virtue of differences of opinion," he said.
Demonised for decades by Egypt's military-backed autocracy, the Brotherhood sees such attacks as propaganda concocted by opponents who have struggled to get organised and carve out their place in the new order.
But Khirbawy's arguments resonate among those Egyptians who believe the Brotherhood aims to subvert new freedoms for their own ends to set up a new Islamist autocracy - a view hardened late last year when Mursi unilaterally expanded his powers.
MURSI DEFENDS QUTB
Khirbawy has been extensively interviewed by independent Egyptian media that are broadly critical of the Brotherhood.
In his book, he explores the ideology of Mursi and the small group of leaders at the top of the movement, examining their devotion to Sayyid Qutb, a radical ideologue executed in 1966 for plotting to kill president Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Qutb, a Brotherhood leader, formulated some of the most radical ideas in political Islam. These included the idea that modern-day Muslim societies were living in a pre-Islamic state of ignorance. His most radical work, written while he was in prison, advocated violence to bring about change.
Mursi is on the record as defending Qutb as a thinker "who liberates the mind and touches the heart". In a 2009 talk show appearance posted on YouTube last year, Mursi said Qutb "finds the real vision of Islam that we are looking for".
Among Brotherhood watchers, it is no secret that the Brotherhood's current leadership were heavily influenced by Qutb, who also wrote more broadly on Islam.
But "trying to give the impression that Mursi is a Qutbist is an exaggeration" said Khalil al-Anani, an expert on Islamist movements. "Yes they are influenced by him in terms of the purity of ideas, but not in terms of believing in violence or judging people as non-believers," he said.
Brotherhood spokesman Ahmed Aref said the movement, like all groups, had rules that must be respected, adding that it was not the first time a member had left over the years and spoken out. "The difference this time is the media," he said.
A well-oiled campaign machine and grass-roots support base helped the Brotherhood sweep the first post-Mubarak parliamentary vote at the end of 2011, but the assembly was disbanded in June when Egypt's highest court declared the election rules unconstitutional.
Suspicion that the Brotherhood plans to dominate Egypt means the group may find it harder to win votes as fresh parliamentary elections near.
"They don't have people who can explain themselves in a good way, particularly those who talk to the Egyptian public," said Anani. "There is a huge gap of mistrust."
(Writing by Tom Perry; Editing by Tom Pfeiffer)

القول النفيس فى تعريص الاخوان الملحدين #Ikhwankazeboon

الكدب على اصولة ومرسى ومرشدة بديع مدرسة كبيرة
لا اول ولا اخر كدبة بس بمناسبة قطونيل والى قالة وغلطة منى الشاذلى انة لم تعرض لية الفيديو ما قالة فى نفس الوقت
اشكرى يا انشرح

The new #Egypt at (almost) #Morsi

On January 25, thousands of Egyptians will gather in Tahrir Square and across Egypt to commemorate the uprising that toppled the Hosni Mubarak dictatorship. They will celebrate with good reason. When Mubarak, pressured by millions in the streets and ultimately betrayed by his own top generals, resigned on February 11, 2011, a military-backed dictatorship that had ruled and largely abused Egypt for more than half a century came to an end. Most Egyptians were euphoric, and the world was transfixed by the unexpected power of the Tahrir Square freedom movement.

However, in the two years since, the transition remains fragile, and Egypt's politics remain dangerously polarized. In fact, in addition to celebration, there may also be clashes on January 25. Today Egypt has an elected president, a new constitution, and will soon hold parliamentary elections. But if Egypt has made halting steps toward democracy, worrying signs of illiberalism and poor governance are increasingly apparent. The outcome of the revolution in the Arab world's most populous country remains uncertain, and the threat of violence looms large. 

To understand where Egypt's revolution might go from here, it is useful to take a sober accounting of the key lessons that we have learned over the past two years, and to debunk some myths that stubbornly took root during that time.

The Muslim Brotherhood are not democrats. Despite some prominent Western journalists and analysts' continued wishful thinking to the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood -- a secretive, rigorously disciplined and hierarchical organization -- neither understands nor sees inherent value in democratic politics. Rather, the Muslim Brotherhood believes in a narrow majoritarianism and its leaders and supporters often confuse that with democracy. The Brotherhood believes that 50 percent + 1 equals a free hand to pursue its agenda. And its agenda is manifestly an illiberal one in which universal rights are subordinated to religious doctrine.

The manner in which Egypt's new constitution was conceived, written, and adopted offers the clearest example of the Brotherhood's authoritarian and majoritarian tendencies. A post-authoritarian state should adopt a consensus document, but the current constitution was rammed through despite the staunch objections of non-Islamists. Rather than guaranteeing protections for minorities and women, the constitution leaves a troublingly broad scope for violation of their human rights. Looking ahead, as the Brotherhood embarks upon a legislative agenda, expect laws that will seek to limit media freedoms and constrain freedom of assembly.

The military remains very powerful. In November 2011, Egypt's Islamists, which had for months worked closely with the Mubarak appointed military leadership, protested the proposed "Selmi document" which was designed to ensure the military's privileges in any new constitution. However, after President Mohamed Morsi was elected in June 2012 and dismissed the two top Mubarak era generals in August, Egypt's Islamist dominated constituent assembly crafted a constitution that explicitly guarantees the military's power and privileges. The Islamists learned that trying to bring the military under civilian control was a dangerous task, and the two entities now have a more collaborative relationship. This gives some of Egypt's non-Islamists, who erroneously believed that the military represents the last line of defense against Islamists, migraines. But the more salient factor is that a military not under direct civilian oversight is simply bad for nurturing a fledgling democracy.

Sectarianism in Egypt is alive and well. Attacks on Egyptian Christians were not uncommon in Mubarak's time -- on New Year's Day in 2011, three and a half weeks before the uprising, a church in Alexandria was bombed, killing 21 worshipers. But Christians have thus far fared even worse in post-revolution Egypt. Churches have been burned, Christians have been attacked and prevented from voting, a Christian man's ear was even cut off -- and few perpetrators have been arrested, fostering a culture of impunity. In fact, Christian victims are often blamed for being attacked. In October 2011, for example, the military attacked a group of Christian protesters, killing 27, and as the melee was taking place, a state TV presenter requested that "honorable citizens" report to the scene to protect the soldiers from the marauding Christians.

Now with Islamists politically ascendant, hardline influential Muslim clerics have ratcheted up their sectarian invective against Christians. They are emboldened by the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood and their Salafi extremist junior partners believe in the primacy of Islamic principles over equal citizenship. While the Brotherhood, to appease Western skeptics, has issued various blandishments about its commitment to "equality," its leaders will stand by idly as more hardline Islamists spew ugly and dangerous rhetoric about Christians. Egyptians Christians should be concerned. Even if legislation is not overtly prejudiced, the views of Egypt's leaders will increasingly permeate the country, fanning existing anti-Christian biases.

The progressive "Muslim Brotherhood youth" is a myth. In the years leading up to the Egyptian uprising, there was a prevalent belief that the younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood would exert a moderating influence on the Muslim Brotherhood, especially if the movement was granted legal recognition. Many young Islamists are indeed more moderate, revolutionary, and yes more liberal, than the leadership. However, these more progressive, democratic young Brothers are outnumbered by adherents of similar age who remain committed to conservatism. As a result, the "young brothers" have not had the moderating influence that was expected.

The more impressive progressive Brothers, like Ibrahim El Houdaiby, have left the Brotherhood and started their own small political parties, or joined forces with more established, popular, moderate former members like Abdel Moniem Aboul Fotouh. Their defections have only reinforced the orthodox conservatism and authoritarian nature of the movement. On November 22, 2012, when Morsi declared himself above legal challenges, the Brotherhood ordered its younger members to gather in support of the president's statement, even before the content of that statement was known. The young Brothers actually had no idea what Morsi was going to say. They just knew that they would agree with it.

The silent majority remains the most potentially potent force in Egypt. To be sure, the Brotherhood is currently the most powerful and organized political force in the country. It can count on a bloc of between five and 10 million voters. And these voters have delivered victory after victory over the last 22 months in referenda as well as parliamentary and presidential elections. In fact, it is likely that Islamists will win the upcoming parliamentary elections. However, Egypt has more than 50 million voters. The biggest bloc is the unaffiliated -- either because they don't care, don't know enough about politics, or are disillusioned. For example, only 11 million voters approved the Islamist crafted constitution. This of course does not mean that the other 39 million voters reject it, but if the Brotherhood can only get one fifth of voters to make their way to a polling station to register their approval of such an important document, it means they can be beaten.

The prevalence of undecided potential voters means that Egypt's divided non-Islamists could make electoral progress if they successfully appeal to new voters beyond their own bloc of five to six million, mostly urban supporters. However, to date, Egypt's non-Islamist movement remains incoherent. Thus far, their strategy has been to be the party of "no" and to try to pressure authorities through street protests. This will not work. Non-Islamists can certainly win Egyptian elections, but they have to work twice as hard. They have yet to hone an appealing message, focused on the economy, for example, that would attract voters in places like Upper Egypt or other rural parts of the country, where they are particularly weak.

Authorities are adrift on the economy. There was a strong economic component to the January 25 uprising. Egypt's economy, like those of many other non-oil Arab states, grew under Mubarak in the last few years of his rule, but that growth did little for the poor. As recently as last fall, the Muslim Brotherhood was heralded as "serious" about economic reform. Given Egypt's deep economic problems -- growth is anemic, the pound is losing value, structural limitations to growth abound -- this should have been the government's primary focus. Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood used its political capital to ram through a constitution and then found it had little leverage to push through some needed but difficult economic reforms.

Of course, if the Brotherhood had pursued political consensus, it might have been better positioned to carry out needed reforms -- for example, on taxation and subsidies. In addition, were there less polarization and political upheaval, tourism receipts could well be higher and foreign and domestic investors less skittish. But the Muslim Brotherhood gambled that it was more important to cement its political agenda. For a time, Egypt's regional importance will continue to attract aid -- from the IMF, the United States and, increasingly from the Gulf -- but room for maneuver on crucial reforms is now much more limited.

Sinai is a serious security problem. Sinai is becoming increasingly lawless and poses a potential threat to Egyptian security and the economy. Since Mubarak's ouster, the gas pipeline in Sinai has been attacked more than a dozen times. In August 2012, the border police were attacked and 16 officers were killed, leading to a major shakeup of the security and military leadership. It is also disturbing that it appears difficult to get solid information about what is actually happening in Sinai -- who the Sinai militants are and what are their goals. However, their actions can carry serious consequences. A single devastating terrorist attack on tourists from Sinai-based groups could deal a further blow to Egypt's ailing economy.

Despite all the challenges that post-uprising Egypt faces, Egyptian politics are more alive than they have been in decades, and Egyptian democracy and pluralism are still good long term bets. Entrenched interests and many newly empowered political forces are change resistant -- but it is very unlikely that Egypt will return to the kind of "stable" authoritarianism of Mubarak. While they are a small minority, the core group of revolutionary activists agitating for democracy remains indefatigable. Egypt will probably experience a very bumpy few years, but these activists will keep pushing those in power to move toward a more democratic Egypt. Egypt has changed.