What began as a humble attempt to translate countrywide
discontent with the way President Mohamed Morsi has governed Egypt, the Tamarod
-- or "Rebel" campaign -- has mobilized millions of Egyptians for a protest
that promises to be epic on the anniversary of Morsi's inauguration. Although
opposition forces initially kept the signature drive that demands Morsi's
removal from office and early elections at arms length, nearly all of the
relevant players in Egypt's transitional drama now recognize the campaign's
significance and potential to affect change. Movement within the political
opposition, including coordination meetings with the campaign and youth groups
for a post-Morsi transition plan, suggests a fundamental belief that the June
30 protests could realize Tamarod's goal of replacing the president.
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Islamists who support Morsi's government, primarily from the
Muslim Brotherhood, responded with a counter-signature drive of their own
called
Tagarrod
-- or "Impartiality" -- to reiterate their faith (no pun intended) in the
political system and the elections that brought him to power. Supportive
Islamist groups have also called for a June 21 protest against violence.
However, the counter-campaign's attempt to balance the scales only seems to
accentuate the country's deeply divided polity. The Muslim Brotherhood and
other pro-Morsi supporters have repeatedly vilified the Tamarod movement and
some have gone as far as labeling those who turn out to protest on June 30 as
traitors or
unbelievers.
Calmer heads within the Islamist movement have taken a more centrist position.
The ultraconservative Salafi al-Nour Party has surprisingly demonstrated one of
the most level headed attitudes with its promise to refrain from participating
in protests, but urging the Muslim Brotherhood and the government to make
concessions to opposition forces to diffuse the volatile situation. Abdel
Moneim Aboul Fotouh's Strong Egypt Party fell on the side of peaceful protests
but stood firm against calls for a military coup to replace Morsi.
The revolutionary fervor and scathing vitriol between the two
groups has gone beyond talking heads exchanging barbs in the Egyptian media. A
number of violent incidents, not the least of which involved an
arson
attack by unknown assailants on one of the Tamarod offices in Cairo on June
7, and hours of clashes between Muslim Brotherhood and Tamarod campaigners in
Alexandria on June 12, have heightened tensions between opposing ideologies in
the days leading up to the planned mass demonstration and worried government
security forces. The clashes involving attacks on Tamarod have prompted
Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim to publicize its security plans for June 30,
but interestingly
confusing
messages have come out of the ministry. Initial statements indicated a
police withdrawal from demonstration areas but Ibrahim subsequently announced
his commitment to protecting all citizens on June 30. Outraged Islamists called
for Ibrahim to be held accountable for his initial refusal to protect Muslim Brotherhood
headquarters and private property.
Other rumblings within the Morsi administration also
indicate some fear within the government that impending protests may shake the
foundations of the current system. Morsi reached out to the National Salvation
Front for yet another national dialogue in an effort to subdue the rising tide
but without suitable guarantees that any negotiations would lead to binding
decisions, opposition leaders declined. Instead, Morsi met with the Islamic
Legitimate Body of Rights and Reformation, an independent multi-party coalition
of Muslim scholars that includes Salafi and Muslim scholars whose deputy chief
threatened
the opposition with counter-rallies on June 30. Tamarod members have taken a
similar hardline stance, demanding nothing short of the formation of a
presidential council and a technocratic government with an eye toward Supreme
Constitutional Court (SCC) President Manar al-Beheiry
to
replace Morsi.
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The scene is certainly set for what could possibly be a
game-changing display of popular outrage. To hear either side of the political
chasm talk of June 30, one might think an Egyptian Armageddon is right around
the corner, with both sides bracing for an outbreak of violence. It is
distinctly possible -- even probable -- that protests could come to blows. In
past confrontations, it took little to provoke competing political forces into
a street battle. Today, not only are the Ultras (the hardcore soccer fans who
regularly clash with police) a factor, Black Bloc anarchists are also planning
to join the protests adding to an already volatile mix, despite promises of
nonviolent protests. "Popular committees" formed to prevent violence are just
as likely to instigate as they are to prevent fights from breaking out. Even
ordinary citizens, fed up with the dire economic conditions and a deteriorating
quality of life, may have little patience for Islamists who may goad them into
throwing the first punch. Some Egyptians who see no political or legal avenue
through which to channel their disapproval have even admitted hopes of a
confrontation to spark the army's intervention and another round of
revolutionary change. In this highly charged political climate, all it takes is
one angry reaction to ensnare an entire country.
Hopes of such clashes ousting Morsi, however, run into some
heady challenges. The Tamarod campaign managed to surpass its goal of 15
million signatures calling for Morsi's resignation and snap elections. It
rekindled the revolutionary flame sparked by its cross-party and youthful
energy and captured the imagination of the silent majority in Egypt, but falls
short of a legal avenue to realize a change in leadership. Currently, the
constitution allows only a few ways by which to remove the president (articles
150 through 152): if the president falls ill or can no longer perform his duty;
if he is charged with high treason and is subsequently impeached by at least
two-thirds of the House of Representatives: if he puts his own presidency up to
popular referendum: or if he voluntarily resigns. Anti-Islamist activists who
argue that the constitution -- by virtue of the highly flawed process of its
formation -- lacks the legitimacy to set appropriate standards for a
post-revolution Egypt may be right, but neither opposition forces nor the
judiciary have yet blatantly crossed the ambiguous legal boundaries that have
guided (or misguided) it through its transition. The irony of Tamarod's support
for the SCC's president to unconstitutionally lead the country is not lost on
those paying attention. The judiciary, in particular, has remained
conspicuously silent on the issue. However, judging by the
SCC
decision to allow the Shura Council to continue operating until a new
parliament is elected, despite the court's ruling to invalidate the council,
suggests its unwillingness to rock the boat.
With all of Egypt's dramatic twists and turns over the past
two years, those who claim to know what will happen on June 30 will find
themselves either wrong or lucky. The number of variables that factor into any
one event outstrip the imagination every time. The truth is, no one can claim
with any degree of certainty what might change after June 30, but Tamarod has
certainly revealed how the deep polarization affecting Egyptian society at
large might run deeper than previously imagined. It has tapped into a
disaffected population that lost all faith in Morsi or that elections under his
leadership could be free and fair. It has garnered the support of millions of
Egyptians by avoiding the partisan politics that many citizens have come to
abhor. Lastly, it has called on the aid of the army and the judiciary, the two
institutions with the most support in Egypt, to lead the country to a new
beginning. June 30 may amount to nothing more than a mass protest, but Morsi
would be wise to take the advice of fellow Islamists, abandon the
confrontational stance toward his detractors, and build the consensus that
Egypt desperately lacks sooner rather than later. The countdown begins.
Tarek Radwan is the associate director for research at the Atlantic
Council's Rafik Hariri Center. He previously reported on the Middle East with Human
Rights Watch's MENA division and served as a Human Rights Officer for the
United Nations/African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur. Mr. Radwan specializes
in Egypt, with a focus on civil society, human rights, the constitution, and
judicial issue
