And people went to
protest today. Egyptians vs. Egyptians , civilians Vs. Civilians or Non
Islamists Vs. Islamists to be accurate.
Hundreds
of thousands protests against Muslim brotherhood and Mohamed Morsi in
rehearsal today across the country for the big day on the 30th. Also
hundreds of thousands were there in Cairo protesting in solidarity with Muslim brotherhood and Mohamed Morsi.
The
scene of Islamists was repetitive but the scene of angry citizens
including first time protesters and NDPians in the protests along with
the revolutionaries was rare.
Of
course it was not that peaceful because clashes happened and we got
over 500 injured. Ministry of health says that 3 have been killed
including a US citizen who was stabbed in Alexandria unfortunately. The
death toll of the Muslim brotherhood is 5 up till now while 2 for the protesters as well 1 US citizen.
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Today several MB headquarters and branches have been torched and vandalized by angry protesters in Alexandria and Mansoura.
Here is a quick Storify report from photos and videos about the day. I am still updating it after the break.
Now
leaks I knew earlier this week that things will be bloody in North
Delta and the old NDPian leading figures will make it bloody in all
possible ways so the army would intervene. I think I said it before. If
you speak about peacefulness than you are either weak coward who lives
in lala land or secret MB agent Online.
I do not underestimate the anger of the people nor the fact that everybody is denying that we are fully armed society now.
Tahrir square is full again but …
I
can not be so happy that Tahrir square is full now , it has been full
before by revolutionaries alone without MB or Mubarak loyalists or
military loyalists. I can not be so happy because I see too much hate
and anger blinding everybody.
Today
I found a tweep comparing the Muslim brotherhood as the Jews in Germany
before WWII reaching to the conclusion that a holocaust would be great
for the Muslim brotherhood.
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I
can not be so happy when I see that bearded men are being attacked in
the streets and there are threats to butcher the Muslim brotherhood and
their families like sheep.
I
can not be so happy that Tahrir square is full when I see faces from
those who called the martyrs of Tahrir and Mohamed Mahmoud street every
possible name and accusing revolution of being a foreign plot bragging
on how they are protesting in the square. Yes the square is for
everybody but emotionally speaking I remember what everybody said in the
past two years , it is curse. For God those people are still attacking
the January 25 Revolution calling it a defeat , a setback and a foreign
conspiracy.
Politically
and realistically speaking I believe that we can not win the battle
when we have different goals. This is the dilemma , the revolutionaries
want their revolution back on track once again for democracy and freedom
while the Mubarak loyalists want the military back and to end
democracy.They got higher voice in the media now despite they need the
revolutionary cover in front of the world.
Of
course if anyone dares to speak about this matter online in Arabic he
or she will be accused of being a secret MB cell spreading lies who is
trying to split the unity of the great people’s revolution. I have had
my share already for being called all sort of insults for saying this.
Anyhow
to be realistic you do not need to be an expert to know that sooner or
later the army will do something considering how the armed forces troops
are deployed throughout the country. Whether it is going to be a full
scale coup or soft coup I do not know.
Nevertheless
I have to admit that greed and stupidity of the Muslim brotherhood will
be studied and that the deep state in Egypt knew how to use that greed
in order to return back to the scene just like knowing the weakness
points of the 25 January revolutionaries. Unfortunately the
revolutionaries and the people do not want to understand or learn from
their mistakes like others.
What began as a humble attempt to translate countrywide
discontent with the way President Mohamed Morsi has governed Egypt, the Tamarod
-- or "Rebel" campaign -- has mobilized millions of Egyptians for a protest
that promises to be epic on the anniversary of Morsi's inauguration. Although
opposition forces initially kept the signature drive that demands Morsi's
removal from office and early elections at arms length, nearly all of the
relevant players in Egypt's transitional drama now recognize the campaign's
significance and potential to affect change. Movement within the political
opposition, including coordination meetings with the campaign and youth groups
for a post-Morsi transition plan, suggests a fundamental belief that the June
30 protests could realize Tamarod's goal of replacing the president.
-->
Islamists who support Morsi's government, primarily from the
Muslim Brotherhood, responded with a counter-signature drive of their own
called Tagarrod
-- or "Impartiality" -- to reiterate their faith (no pun intended) in the
political system and the elections that brought him to power. Supportive
Islamist groups have also called for a June 21 protest against violence.
However, the counter-campaign's attempt to balance the scales only seems to
accentuate the country's deeply divided polity. The Muslim Brotherhood and
other pro-Morsi supporters have repeatedly vilified the Tamarod movement and
some have gone as far as labeling those who turn out to protest on June 30 as
traitors or unbelievers.
Calmer heads within the Islamist movement have taken a more centrist position.
The ultraconservative Salafi al-Nour Party has surprisingly demonstrated one of
the most level headed attitudes with its promise to refrain from participating
in protests, but urging the Muslim Brotherhood and the government to make
concessions to opposition forces to diffuse the volatile situation. Abdel
Moneim Aboul Fotouh's Strong Egypt Party fell on the side of peaceful protests
but stood firm against calls for a military coup to replace Morsi.
The revolutionary fervor and scathing vitriol between the two
groups has gone beyond talking heads exchanging barbs in the Egyptian media. A
number of violent incidents, not the least of which involved an arson
attack by unknown assailants on one of the Tamarod offices in Cairo on June
7, and hours of clashes between Muslim Brotherhood and Tamarod campaigners in
Alexandria on June 12, have heightened tensions between opposing ideologies in
the days leading up to the planned mass demonstration and worried government
security forces. The clashes involving attacks on Tamarod have prompted
Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim to publicize its security plans for June 30,
but interestingly confusing
messages have come out of the ministry. Initial statements indicated a
police withdrawal from demonstration areas but Ibrahim subsequently announced
his commitment to protecting all citizens on June 30. Outraged Islamists called
for Ibrahim to be held accountable for his initial refusal to protect Muslim Brotherhood
headquarters and private property.
Other rumblings within the Morsi administration also
indicate some fear within the government that impending protests may shake the
foundations of the current system. Morsi reached out to the National Salvation
Front for yet another national dialogue in an effort to subdue the rising tide
but without suitable guarantees that any negotiations would lead to binding
decisions, opposition leaders declined. Instead, Morsi met with the Islamic
Legitimate Body of Rights and Reformation, an independent multi-party coalition
of Muslim scholars that includes Salafi and Muslim scholars whose deputy chief threatened
the opposition with counter-rallies on June 30. Tamarod members have taken a
similar hardline stance, demanding nothing short of the formation of a
presidential council and a technocratic government with an eye toward Supreme
Constitutional Court (SCC) President Manar al-Beheiry to
replace Morsi.
-->
The scene is certainly set for what could possibly be a
game-changing display of popular outrage. To hear either side of the political
chasm talk of June 30, one might think an Egyptian Armageddon is right around
the corner, with both sides bracing for an outbreak of violence. It is
distinctly possible -- even probable -- that protests could come to blows. In
past confrontations, it took little to provoke competing political forces into
a street battle. Today, not only are the Ultras (the hardcore soccer fans who
regularly clash with police) a factor, Black Bloc anarchists are also planning
to join the protests adding to an already volatile mix, despite promises of
nonviolent protests. "Popular committees" formed to prevent violence are just
as likely to instigate as they are to prevent fights from breaking out. Even
ordinary citizens, fed up with the dire economic conditions and a deteriorating
quality of life, may have little patience for Islamists who may goad them into
throwing the first punch. Some Egyptians who see no political or legal avenue
through which to channel their disapproval have even admitted hopes of a
confrontation to spark the army's intervention and another round of
revolutionary change. In this highly charged political climate, all it takes is
one angry reaction to ensnare an entire country.
Hopes of such clashes ousting Morsi, however, run into some
heady challenges. The Tamarod campaign managed to surpass its goal of 15
million signatures calling for Morsi's resignation and snap elections. It
rekindled the revolutionary flame sparked by its cross-party and youthful
energy and captured the imagination of the silent majority in Egypt, but falls
short of a legal avenue to realize a change in leadership. Currently, the
constitution allows only a few ways by which to remove the president (articles
150 through 152): if the president falls ill or can no longer perform his duty;
if he is charged with high treason and is subsequently impeached by at least
two-thirds of the House of Representatives: if he puts his own presidency up to
popular referendum: or if he voluntarily resigns. Anti-Islamist activists who
argue that the constitution -- by virtue of the highly flawed process of its
formation -- lacks the legitimacy to set appropriate standards for a
post-revolution Egypt may be right, but neither opposition forces nor the
judiciary have yet blatantly crossed the ambiguous legal boundaries that have
guided (or misguided) it through its transition. The irony of Tamarod's support
for the SCC's president to unconstitutionally lead the country is not lost on
those paying attention. The judiciary, in particular, has remained
conspicuously silent on the issue. However, judging by the SCC
decision to allow the Shura Council to continue operating until a new
parliament is elected, despite the court's ruling to invalidate the council,
suggests its unwillingness to rock the boat.
With all of Egypt's dramatic twists and turns over the past
two years, those who claim to know what will happen on June 30 will find
themselves either wrong or lucky. The number of variables that factor into any
one event outstrip the imagination every time. The truth is, no one can claim
with any degree of certainty what might change after June 30, but Tamarod has
certainly revealed how the deep polarization affecting Egyptian society at
large might run deeper than previously imagined. It has tapped into a
disaffected population that lost all faith in Morsi or that elections under his
leadership could be free and fair. It has garnered the support of millions of
Egyptians by avoiding the partisan politics that many citizens have come to
abhor. Lastly, it has called on the aid of the army and the judiciary, the two
institutions with the most support in Egypt, to lead the country to a new
beginning. June 30 may amount to nothing more than a mass protest, but Morsi
would be wise to take the advice of fellow Islamists, abandon the
confrontational stance toward his detractors, and build the consensus that
Egypt desperately lacks sooner rather than later. The countdown begins.
Tarek Radwan is the associate director for research at the Atlantic
Council's Rafik Hariri Center. He previously reported on the Middle East with Human
Rights Watch's MENA division and served as a Human Rights Officer for the
United Nations/African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur. Mr. Radwan specializes
in Egypt, with a focus on civil society, human rights, the constitution, and
judicial issue
Muhammad Haza’a is one of some 180 people facing death in Yemeni
prisons for crimes they allegedly committed when they were under 18.
-->
-->
He is due to be taken out of his crowded prison cell tomorrow morning and shot.
Those who supported our call last week to save him from execution
appear to have bought him a precious extra week of life, but would have
hoped that his case be reopened and dealt with justly, according to the
law, not that he would be subjected to a cold-blooded killing.
We were shocked when we first received the phone call that Muhammad Haza’a was going to be executed within 24 hours.
Capital punishment is unfortunately common enough in Yemen, but the
authorities would normally at least grant the prisoner a couple of days
between formally telling them and ending their life.
Equally shocking was the fact that Muhammad had “proof” that he was under 18 at the time of his alleged crime.
We only had a few hours to do something. We had lists of alleged
juvenile offenders on death row in Yemen, but Muhammad’s name was not on
them. We knew nothing about him or his case. Yet we trusted our source
and knew that the information he had provided us was highly likely to be
correct.
Our source had himself been about to be executed a few years ago as a
juvenile offender, when Amnesty International, with the help of other
organizations, intervened; he felt that Amnesty International saved his
life and regularly supports our work.
After we received the call, we urgently sent emails, made calls and
issued appeals. At first we only received automated messages by email
and were confronted with piped musical recordings by phone.
But one breakthrough here and another there soon created momentum.
International and local organizations jumped in and phone calls to the
Yemeni President and the General Prosecutor’s office brought the promise
that the execution would be postponed and the case reviewed.
That was on Tuesday, 26 February. Less than a week later, the following Monday, two parallel events occurred.
In the city of Tai’zz, where Muhammad has been held, the head of the
Appeal Court there filled in a form no longer than four lines and sent
it to the prison authorities. It probably took him or his assistant less
than a minute to fill in the blanks. The execution date is set for
Saturday, 9 March 2013, it read. He added a line underneath: “We advise
that security measures are taken on the above mentioned date of the
execution.”
That last line was added in anticipation of protests. There were
rumours that other death row inmates were planning to prevent the prison
authorities from taking Muhammad to his execution.
Rumours were also emerging that a demonstration in front of the prison was being planned.
Local and international activists were making calls and noise about
the unfairness and illegality of the sentence besides the inhumane
nature of the execution itself. The head of the court apparently
considered that all these calls warranted by way of response was a
single sentence of warning at the bottom of an execution order.
In the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, meanwhile, the General Prosecutor
signed a form ordering the prosecution in Ta’izz to refer Muhammad’s
case to the relevant courts for review on the basis that there remained a
dispute about his age at the time of the alleged offence.
Muhammad’s lawyer decided to personally take the form signed by the
General Prosecutor to the relevant authorities in Ta’izz because he knew
that if the document was faxed or sent by post, it would probably
either arrive too late or mysteriously disappear.
It took him around four hours to drive the 260km south from Sana’a to
Ta’izz. The lawyer was met, but the form was not accepted. Apparently
the Ta’izz authorities were too unhappy with the attention Muhammad’s
case had brought and so have simply refused to follow the laws of their
own country and forward a case to the relevant courts when being ordered
to do so by their superior.
It would surely be unconscionable for an execution to go ahead
essentially because some officials had felt emboldened to flout
instructions, but that seems to be the situation as things stand.
We continue to call on the Yemeni President, the General Prosecutor
and the relevant authorities in Ta’izz to immediately suspend the
execution of Muhammad Haza’a and to order a retrial that is fair and
does not resort to the death penalty.
Violence against women in Egypt gained national and international
attention following a series of well-publicized sexual assaults on women
in the vicinity of Tahrir Square earlier this year during protests
commemorating the second anniversary of the “25 January Revolution”.
Unfortunately, these instances of violence against women were neither isolated nor unique.
-->
Whether in the public or private spheres, at the hands of state or
non-state actors, violence against women in Egypt continues to go mostly
unpunished.
Most cases go unreported for a plethora of reasons that stem from
discriminatory gender stereotypes, the lack of women’s awareness of
their rights, social and family pressures to remain silent,
discriminatory legislation and women’s economic dependence. Even when
women do surmount these obstacles and turn to state institutions for
protection, justice and reparation, they are often confronted with
dismissive or abusive officials who fail to refer cases to prosecution
or trial, and lengthy and expensive court proceedings if they want to
get divorced. Women who do manage to obtain a divorce then face the
likelihood that court orders for child support or spousal maintenance
will not be enforced.
In recent weeks during an Amnesty International mission to Egypt, I
met several women and girls who were assaulted by their husbands and
other relatives. Many suffer in silence for years while they are
subjected to beatings, severe physical and verbal abuse and rape.
Om Ahmed (mother of Ahmed) told me that her husband began drinking
and beating her after three years of marriage. She recounted daily
abuse, punctuated with particularly vicious attacks. In one instance,
her ex-husband smashed a full glass bottle on her face, leaving her
without her front teeth. She stayed with him for another 17 years,
partially, she explained, because she had nowhere else to go, and
partially because she did not want to bring “shame” on her family. She
never considered approaching the police, shrugging:
“The police don’t care, they don’t think it is a problem if a husband
beats his wife. If you are a poor woman, they treat you like you don’t
even exist and send you back home to him after hurling a few insults.”
Eventually, Om Ahmed’s husband kicked her out of their home, and for
the next year she lived with her three children in an unfinished
building in an informal settlement without running water and
electricity. After two years in family court, she was awarded a meagre
150 Egyptian pounds (approx. US$21) per month for her daughter’s child
support (her other two children don’t qualify for it as they over 18).
Her own spousal maintenance decision is still pending.
Unlike Egyptian Muslim men who can divorce their wives unilaterally –
and without giving any reason – women who wish to divorce their abusive
husbands have to go to court and prove “fault” or that their marriage
caused them “harm”. To prove physical harm, they have to present
evidence, such as medical reports or eyewitness testimony, in
proceedings that are drawn out and expensive. Many women’s rights
lawyers and lawyers working in family court cases told me that this is a
very difficult task for many women because they don’t always report the
abuse to the police, and neighbours, who are usually the only witnesses
other than household members, are reluctant to get involved.
I met one woman who had a particularly striking case. She told me:
“We [my ex-husband and I] only lived together for a few months, but
it took me six years to get a divorce, and I am still in court to get my
full [financial] rights back. Problems started soon after we got
married, and he would beat me. His mother and sisters were also abusive…
After a particularly bad beating, I went to the police station to lodge
a complaint, but I withdrew it under pressure [from my husband who
threatened me]. The case took so long because he had good lawyers who
knew all the loopholes in the law.”
-->
In 2000, a second option for women seeking divorce was introduced,
whereby women can obtain khul’ (no-fault divorce) from the courts
without having to prove harm, but only if they forego their right to
spousal maintenance and other financial rights. These court proceedings
can still take up to a year and put women who are financially dependent
on their husbands at a severe disadvantage. Despite this, several
divorcees told Amnesty International that they opted for khul’ after
waiting for a court fault-based divorce for years.
Twenty-four-year-old Om Mohamed (mother of Mohamed) told Amnesty International:
“We have been separated for over four years, but I am still neither
married nor divorced… I was trying to prove all this time in court that
he didn’t spend any money on me or our son, and that [my husband] used
to beat me with whatever he could find under his hands, including belts
and wires. Every time I go to court, the hearing is postponed, and I
need this or that paper. I spent a lot of money on lawyers, and got
nowhere… Eventually, I gave up and in January [2013] I raised a khul’
case.”
During my visit to Egypt in May and June this year, I also met women
and girls who suffered violence and sexual abuse at the hands of other
relatives. A 17-year-old girl told me that she ran away from home after a
particularly brutal beating by her brother, who stabbed her in the nose
with a kitchen knife, and burned her with a hot iron. Her scars
corroborated her story. She was too scared to report the incident at the
hospital where she sought treatment, as her brother had accompanied her
and threatened to kill her if she spoke out. She spent months wandering
the streets before being admitted into a private shelter for children.
Another woman who fled home after her brother sexually assaulted her
found temporary protection in a shelter run by an association under the
Ministry of Insurances and Social Affairs. She fled from the shelter
after the administration insisted that she give them her brother’s
contact details, to try to set up a “reconciliation meeting”.
There are only nine official shelters across Egypt, which are
severely under-resourced and in need of capacity-building and training.
Most survivors of domestic violence don’t even know they exist. The idea
of shelters is not widely accepted, because of the stigma attached for
women living outside their family or marital homes.
A staff member at a shelter recounted to me how, after an
awareness-raising session in a village in Upper Egypt, a village leader
got up and – in front of all those gathered – threatened to “stab to
death” any woman who dared to leave an abusive household and run to a
shelter. In another instance, the husband of a woman living in a shelter
threatened to set it on fire.
In May, the authorities announced the establishment of a special
female police unit to combat sexual violence and harassment. While this
may be a welcome step, the Egyptian authorities need to do much more to
prevent and punish gender-based violence and harassment, starting by
unequivocally condemning it. They also need to amend legislation to
ensure that survivors receive effective remedies. They must also show
political will and tackle the culture of denial, inaction and, in some
cases complicity, of law enforcement officials who not only fail to
protect women from violence but also to investigate properly all
allegations and bring perpetrators to trial.
Egyptian women were at the forefront of the popular protests that
brought down Hosni Mubarak’s presidency some two and a half years ago.
Today, they continue to challenge the prevailing social attitudes and
gender biases that facilitate violence against women, in all its forms,
to continue with impunity – while they continue their fight against
marginalization and exclusion from the political processes shaping the
country’s future.
Meanwhile, with the help of human and women’s rights organizations,
seven women who were sexually assaulted around Tahrir Square lodged a
complaint with the prosecution in March 2013 calling for accountability
and redress. Investigations were started, but have since stalled.
One of the lawyers for the women was told by a prosecutor that the
case was not that “important” compared to other cases on his desk. But
the plaintiffs are not giving up. As one of them told Amnesty
International: “Even as I was being abused, I felt that I will not stay
quiet, I will not back down. They have to be punished.”
By Diana Eltahawy, Amnesty International’s Egypt researcher
Afghanistan's iniquities are grotesque. At Kabul University
last week, zealots -- all men -- protested
a law that would abolish child marriage, forced marriage, marital rape, and the
odious practice, called ba'ad, of giving girls away to settle offenses
or debts. Meanwhile, in jails all over the country, 600 women, the highest
number since the fall of the Taliban, await
trial on charges of such moral transgressions as having been raped or
running away from abusive homes.
-->
It is tempting to wring our hands at such obscene bigotry, to
pity Afghanistan's women and vilify its men. Instead, we must look squarely at
our own complicity in the shameful circumstances of Afghan women, billions of
international aid dollars and 12 years after U.S. warplanes first bombed their
ill-starred land.
I have been traveling to Afghanistan since 2001, mostly to
its hardscrabble hinterland, where the majority of Afghans live. Over the years,
I have cooked rice and traded jewelry with Afghan women, cradled their anemic
children, and fallen asleep under communal blankets in their cramped mud-brick
homes. I have seen firsthand that the aid we give ostensibly to improve their
lives almost never makes it to these women. Today, just as 12 years ago, most
of them still have no clean drinking water, sanitation, or electricity; the
nearest clinic is still often a half day's walk away, and the only readily
available palliative is opium. Afghan mothers still watch their infants die at
the highest
rate in the world, mostly of waterborne diseases such as bacterial and
protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis, and typhoid.
-->
Instead of fixing women's lives, our humanitarian aid
subsidizes Afghanistan's kleptocrats, erects miniature Versailles in Kabul and
Dubai for the families of the elite, and buys the loyalty of sectarian warlords-turned-politicians,
some of whom are implicated
in sectarian war crimes that include rape. Yet, for the most part, the U.S. taxpayers
look the other way as the country's amoral government steals or hands out as
political kickbacks the money that was meant to help Afghan women -- all in the
name of containing what we consider the greater evil, the Taliban insurgency.
In other words, we have made a trade-off. We have joined a kind of a collective
ba'ad, a political deal for which the Afghan women are the price.
-->
To be sure, a lot of well-meaning Westerners and courageous Afghans
have worked very hard to improve women's conditions, and there has been some
headway as far as women's rights are concerned. The number of girls signed up
for school rose
from just 5,000 before the U.S.-led invasion to 2.2 million. In Kabul and a
handful of other cities, some women have swapped their polyester burqas for headscarves. Some even have
taken jobs outside their homes. But here, too, progress has been uneven. A
fifth of the girls enrolled in school never attend classes, and most of the
rest drop
out after fourth grade. Few Afghan parents prioritize education for their
daughters because few Afghan women participate in the country's feudal economy,
and because Afghan society, by and large, does not welcome education for girls
or emancipation of women. To get an idea about what the general Afghan public
thinks of emancipation, consider this: the post-2001 neologism "khanum free" -- "free
woman," with the adjective transliterated from the English -- means "a loose
woman," "a prostitute." In villages, women almost never appear barefaced in
front of strangers.
Doffing their burqas is the least of these women's worry.
Their real problem is the intangible and seemingly irremovable shroud of
endless violence. It stunts infrastructure and perpetuates insecurity and fear.
It deprives women of the basic human rights we take for granted: to have enough
food and drinking water that doesn't fester with disease; to see all of their
children live past the age of five. The absence of basic necessities and the
violence that has concussed Afghanistan almost continuously since the beginning
of recorded history are the main reasons the country has the fifth-lowest life
expectancy in the world. The war Westerners often claim to be fighting in the
name of Afghan women instead helps prolong their hardship -- with little or no
compensation. And now, as the deadline for the international troop pullout
approaches, the country is spinning toward a full-blown civil war. A handful of
hardline men shouting slogans at Kabul University fades in comparison.
How to help Afghan women? The road to their wellbeing begins
with food security, health care that works, and a government that protects them
against sectarian violence. Right now, none of these exist. I wish I could offer
an adequate solution to the tragic circumstances of the women of Afghanistan's back-of-beyond.
There does not appear to be one. Hurling yet more aid dollars into a
intemperate funnel that will never reach their villages is not the answer:
there is little reason to believe that we can count that such funding would be
spent on creating enough mobile clinics to pay regular visits to remote
villages; build roads that would allow the women and their families easy access
to market; facilitate sanitation projects that would curb major waterborne
diseases. The impending troop withdrawal means that women's security will
likely go from bad to worse.
Is
it possible to ensure that some of the funding we now hand to Karzai and Co. --
an estimated $15.7 billion in 2010-2011, according to the CIA (and that's not
counting the infamous ghost
money) -- is distributed among the small non-profits that actually are
trying to make life in Afghanistan livable, organizations that create mobile
clinics to pay regular visits to remote villages, build roads that allow
villagers easier access to market, facilitate sanitation projects that curb major
waterborne diseases? This could be a start, but only if these organizations continue
to work in Afghanistan after NATO troops leave. That, too, is in question now: this
week an attack against the International Committee for Red Cross led the
organization to suspend its operations in the country for the first time in
almost 30 years. But wringing our hands at Afghan women's abysmal state and
shaky social status is not a way out. It is a navel-gazing conversation that
avoids looking squarely at our role in perpetuating the very dire condition we
condemn
Hackers belonging to the nebulous Internet collective Anonymous
launched #OpTurkey this week in a show of solidarity with fierce
anti-government protests that have sent shock waves throughout Turkey.
The cyberattack, which targeted the Turkish government led by Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, brought down websites belonging to
President Abdullah Gul, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the
Istanbul Directorate of Security and the Istanbul Governor’s Office on
Sunday.
-->
According to the Russian website RT,
the Anonymous attack came after a series of brutal clashes between
police and protesters that arose on Friday after Turkish police
conducted a crackdown on a peaceful environmental demonstration
in Istanbul’s Taksim Square. The ensuing conflict, during which police
fired tear gas at protestors, some of whom fought back by throwing
rocks, seemed to take on broader political significance
.
-->
We are coming Turkey. Be strong, We will not let you down. Stay in the streets, We will take your government offline. #OpTurkey
— Anonymous(@AnonOpsMob) June 2, 2013
“It’s the first time in Turkey’s democratic history that an
unplanned, peaceful protest movement succeeded in changing the
government’s approach and policy,” Sinan Ulgen, chairman of the Turkish
research group the Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies, told
the New York Times.
“It gave for the first time a strong sense of empowerment to ordinary
citizens to demonstrate and further their belief that if they act like
they did the last few days they can influence events in Turkey.”
The government’s reaction drew the ire of Anonymous, who slammed the
Turkish government for acting like “petty dictators.” In a message
posted on YouTube on Sunday, Anonymous announced the launch of Operation
Turkey, saying, “We have watched for days with horror as our brothers
and sisters in Turkey who are peacefully rising up against their
tyrannical government [have been] brutalized, beaten, run over by riot
vehicles, shot with water cannons and gassed in the streets."
“Turkey is supposed to be a so-called modern democracy, but the
Turkish government behaves like the petty dictators in China or Iran,”
the missive’s computer generated voice continued. “Anonymous is outraged
by this behavior and we will unite across the globe and bring the
Turkish government to its knees."
The collective stated that it planned to “attack every Internet and
communications asset of the Turkish government.” In tweets, the group
encouraged protesters to “be strong,” promising to lend their support.
The River Nile has been a source of life for millions over the
centuries. Now Ethiopia is diverting water to build a giant dam pushing
those downstream who depend on the river, to wonder when and whether
this issue can be resolved peacefully. To discuss this, presenter David
Foster, is joined by guests: Bereket Simon, Ethiopian minister of
information; Lama El Hatow, co-founder of water institute of the Nile
and specialist in water governance and climate change; and Cleo Paskal
from Chatham House, specialist in water and food security and writer of
'Global warring.'
Would you be comfortable being surrounded by robots?
A British manufacturing firm is trying to make robots that
share more human characteristics, to make interaction with them more
natural and intuitive than ever before.
Cornwall's Engineered Arts is in the vanguard of this area of
research, which aims to make robots' facial expressions, body language
and way of moving more recognisable to real people.
Founder Will Jackson gave a tour of his robot factory to the
BBC, and explained how he and his team of a dozen people are looking to
expand the frontiers of robot technology.
Yemen plane crash: Pilot dies after mid-air explosion
A pilot in Yemen has died after the plane he was flying exploded in mid-air, according to an army official.
The aircraft was reportedly on a military exercise when it
crashed in a residential district of the capital
From a few kilometres across town, the blast sounded like a muffled
thump - the grim reality of an explosion going off inside a packed
crowd.
Sitting under fruit trees in a beautiful garden in Sanaa,
my Yemeni companions looked up from their cups of tea and waited for the
sound of gunfire to follow.
When they did not, we all settled back into our conversation.
We had no idea from our leafy oasis that the worst single terror attack in Yemen's history had just occurred.
Within
30 minutes, we were driving back to our hotel crammed into the usual
chronic traffic. The sound of ambulance sirens screamed past us.
An
al-Qaeda suicide bomber had just pulled off a ruthlessly symbolic
attack at a rehearsal for Tuesday's National Day military parade. Menacing group
The
parade was supposed to celebrate Yemen's unification since 1990, when a
war between the north and south ended in northern victory.
But
the southern secessionists have been replaced by a more modern, more
menacing group pulling Yemen apart: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP).
Their local affiliate, known as Anshar Al Shariah, later
claimed responsibility for the attack in a message sent across the
capital of this less-than-unified Arabian Peninsula nation.
The
attack was set against the backdrop of a raging war in the southern
provinces of Yemen. Al-Qaeda fighters have taken advantage of almost a
year and a half of political chaos to grab swathes of the country there.
To
the alarm of Western security concerns, al-Qaeda was taking ground,
invading cities and getting close to their dream of their own Caliphate.
Yemen, in fact, was looking like the group's biggest success story in
recent years.
Since Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to resign as
president and hand power over to his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi,
however, the fight against al-Qaeda has been stepped up enormously.
Targeted drone strikes and a fresh offensive have been attributed to US military co-operation.
The
American government has not confirmed it is carrying out the current
targeted air strikes against the fighters, or that it has sent military
advisers to help Hadi fight AQAP.
Strength or desperation
Monday's attack could be seen as either a sign of strength or desperation by the group.
They
have lost hundreds of fighters in recent weeks to the fighting,
according to the Yemeni government, and have been pushed back from some
of their territories in the south.
So, these attacks are in many ways revenge against the government.
They
also clearly show the strength of the group, carrying out an attack
right in the centre of the capital, literally metres from a main
military base and down the street from the presidential palace.
A few hours after the attack, reports circulated of two other would-be bombers found hiding in a park nearby.
What was a huge blow at the heart of Yemen's new government and military, could have been even bigger.
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Not more than two years ago, the concept of reform in Saudi Arabia would
have been as much an oxymoron as business ethics or airline cuisine. In
recent months, however, the Arab Spring’s uncertain winds of change
have finally begun to sweep into the world’s last forbidden kingdom.
Finding themselves alone in a crowd (of revolution) in the Middle East,
Saudi Arabia’s monarchs are quickly realizing that their secret police
and petrodollars may be no match for their citizens’ technology-driven
empowerment.
On March 1, Saudi security forces cracked down on a woman-led protest in
the city of Buraidah, known as the nerve center of Saudi Arabia’s
ultraconservative Wahabbist ideology. Over 160 people, mostly women and
children, were arrested after erecting a tent camp to pressure the
government to free their imprisoned husbands whom they claim have been
detained for years without visitation or access to legal counsel. The
Saudi government claims that the detainees are part of a “deviant
group,” a term given to suspected Al Qaeda sympathizers or Islamist
political opposition groups across the Gulf.
News of the arrests spread like wildfire. Protests in support of the
Buraidah women were called for by activists from the Shiite minority in
the Eastern Province and liberal reformists in Riyadh and Jidda. The
mobilization of Saudi conservatives, liberals and minorities against the
government’s repressive policies bore a dangerous resemblance to the
red-green alliances that toppled governments from Cairo to Tunis. While
turnout at the demonstrations was limited due to the government’s ban on
political gatherings, the Saudi Twittersphere was teeming with anger.
Two weeks later, the government-sponsored Arab News daily published a
cover story condemning what it deemed “abusive” actions by Saudi Twitter
users. The story mentioned that the authorities were mulling over a
plan to link Twitter accounts with their users’ identification numbers.
Soon after, the story was pulled from the online version of the
newspaper without explanation.
For one of the most Internet-privy societies on the planet, any move to
link Twitter accounts with personal ID numbers would result in a mass
exodus to other online forums that are not monitored. Saudi Arabia ranks
number one in the world for Twitter users per-capita, with an estimated
51 percent of all Saudi Internet users maintaining an account with the
social media network. Analysts suggest that any such move would result
in a 60 percent reduction of Twitter usage in the country — a true
window onto how many Saudis are voicing dissent against their
government.
Still, on March 31, the Saudi Communications and Information Technology
Commission instructed Skype, WhatsApp and Viber to comply with local
regulations or risk being shut down. These applications are
Internet-based communications services that are both free of charge and
not subject to the kingdom’s telecommunications regulations.
The Saudi government has a strong interest in limiting social media and
online communications services. Protests are being increasingly
organized through use of the WhatsApp messaging application. Political
dissidents are able to use Skype to communicate with human rights
organizations and foreign media networks without fear of government
monitoring. Some government employees and those with ties to the royal
family have begun to exploit Twitter to disseminate information
regarding corruption in the kingdom.
The Saudi government is, however, becoming increasingly hesitant about
limiting social media and other communications because of the potential
for a political backlash. Freedom of speech and communication were a
hallmark demand of popular uprisings elsewhere in the Arab world, with
attempts to cut online activity serving to fuel discontent rather than
mitigate unrest. Saudi Arabia is already a favorite target for civil
rights activists across the globe, and a ban on social media would only
add to a long list of reasons for further divestment and isolation
campaigns.
As an alternative, the Saudi government has begun encouraging loyalists
to condemn and pursue those suspected of online dissent rather than
close the outlets altogether. In recent weeks, a Shura Council member
filed a lawsuit against a critical Twitter user, while the
government-appointed imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca dedicated his
Friday sermon on April 5 to condemning the social network, calling it a
“threat to national unity.”
As the government remains confounded by its inability to control online
dissent, there is no doubt that the rising tide of anger across Saudi
cyberspace has begun to spill over into physical reality. Unwillingly,
the government has been forced to wrestle with undertaking previously
unimaginable reforms with regard to women’s rights and employment
opportunities for millions of young, educated citizens. With social
media as their vehicle, Saudis are threatening to take control of their
country’s destiny for the first time in history, and there may be
nothing their government can do about it.
