‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات ENGLISH. إظهار كافة الرسائل
‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات ENGLISH. إظهار كافة الرسائل

5/17/2013

I, Robot Maker: Making robots to interact with humans




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Would you be comfortable being surrounded by robots?
A British manufacturing firm is trying to make robots that share more human characteristics, to make interaction with them more natural and intuitive than ever before.
Cornwall's Engineered Arts is in the vanguard of this area of research, which aims to make robots' facial expressions, body language and way of moving more recognisable to real people.
Founder Will Jackson gave a tour of his robot factory to the BBC, and explained how he and his team of a dozen people are looking to expand the frontiers of robot technology.
Video journalist: Dougal Shaw



5/13/2013

#Yemen plane crash: Pilot dies after mid-air explosion

Yemen plane crash: Pilot dies after mid-air explosion

 

A pilot in Yemen has died after the plane he was flying exploded in mid-air, according to an army official.
The aircraft was reportedly on a military exercise when it crashed in a residential district of the capital
From a few kilometres across town, the blast sounded like a muffled thump - the grim reality of an explosion going off inside a packed crowd.
Sitting under fruit trees in a beautiful garden in Sanaa, my Yemeni companions looked up from their cups of tea and waited for the sound of gunfire to follow.
When they did not, we all settled back into our conversation.
We had no idea from our leafy oasis that the worst single terror attack in Yemen's history had just occurred.
Within 30 minutes, we were driving back to our hotel crammed into the usual chronic traffic. The sound of ambulance sirens screamed past us.
An al-Qaeda suicide bomber had just pulled off a ruthlessly symbolic attack at a rehearsal for Tuesday's National Day military parade.
Menacing group
The parade was supposed to celebrate Yemen's unification since 1990, when a war between the north and south ended in northern victory.
But the southern secessionists have been replaced by a more modern, more menacing group pulling Yemen apart: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Their local affiliate, known as Anshar Al Shariah, later claimed responsibility for the attack in a message sent across the capital of this less-than-unified Arabian Peninsula nation.
The attack was set against the backdrop of a raging war in the southern provinces of Yemen. Al-Qaeda fighters have taken advantage of almost a year and a half of political chaos to grab swathes of the country there.
To the alarm of Western security concerns, al-Qaeda was taking ground, invading cities and getting close to their dream of their own Caliphate. Yemen, in fact, was looking like the group's biggest success story in recent years.
Since Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to resign as president and hand power over to his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, however, the fight against al-Qaeda has been stepped up enormously.
Targeted drone strikes and a fresh offensive have been attributed to US military co-operation.



The American government has not confirmed it is carrying out the current targeted air strikes against the fighters, or that it has sent military advisers to help Hadi fight AQAP.
Strength or desperation
Monday's attack could be seen as either a sign of strength or desperation by the group.
They have lost hundreds of fighters in recent weeks to the fighting, according to the Yemeni government, and have been pushed back from some of their territories in the south.
So, these attacks are in many ways revenge against the government.
They also clearly show the strength of the group, carrying out an attack right in the centre of the capital, literally metres from a main military base and down the street from the presidential palace.
A few hours after the attack, reports circulated of two other would-be bombers found hiding in a park nearby.
What was a huge blow at the heart of Yemen's new government and military, could have been even bigger.

5/02/2013

'Sphinx' in 'orange' to celebrate the coronation of a new king of the #Netherlands

the Ministry of Tourism, a special celebration at the pyramid, marking the culmination of a new king of the Netherlands to succeed his mother, Queen «Beatrice» after 120 years of rule by queens, and the courtyard of sound and light, where lit three pyramids and Sphinx orange, the color of the royal family in the Netherlands.

4/22/2013

Arab Spring Time in Saudi Cyberspace



Not more than two years ago, the concept of reform in Saudi Arabia would have been as much an oxymoron as business ethics or airline cuisine. In recent months, however, the Arab Spring’s uncertain winds of change have finally begun to sweep into the world’s last forbidden kingdom. Finding themselves alone in a crowd (of revolution) in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia’s monarchs are quickly realizing that their secret police and petrodollars may be no match for their citizens’ technology-driven empowerment.
On March 1, Saudi security forces cracked down on a woman-led protest in the city of Buraidah, known as the nerve center of Saudi Arabia’s ultraconservative Wahabbist ideology. Over 160 people, mostly women and children, were arrested after erecting a tent camp to pressure the government to free their imprisoned husbands whom they claim have been detained for years without visitation or access to legal counsel. The Saudi government claims that the detainees are part of a “deviant group,” a term given to suspected Al Qaeda sympathizers or Islamist political opposition groups across the Gulf.
News of the arrests spread like wildfire. Protests in support of the Buraidah women were called for by activists from the Shiite minority in the Eastern Province and liberal reformists in Riyadh and Jidda. The mobilization of Saudi conservatives, liberals and minorities against the government’s repressive policies bore a dangerous resemblance to the red-green alliances that toppled governments from Cairo to Tunis. While turnout at the demonstrations was limited due to the government’s ban on political gatherings, the Saudi Twittersphere was teeming with anger.
Two weeks later, the government-sponsored Arab News daily published a cover story condemning what it deemed “abusive” actions by Saudi Twitter users. The story mentioned that the authorities were mulling over a plan to link Twitter accounts with their users’ identification numbers. Soon after, the story was pulled from the online version of the newspaper without explanation.
For one of the most Internet-privy societies on the planet, any move to link Twitter accounts with personal ID numbers would result in a mass exodus to other online forums that are not monitored. Saudi Arabia ranks number one in the world for Twitter users per-capita, with an estimated 51 percent of all Saudi Internet users maintaining an account with the social media network. Analysts suggest that any such move would result in a 60 percent reduction of Twitter usage in the country — a true window onto how many Saudis are voicing dissent against their government.
Still, on March 31, the Saudi Communications and Information Technology Commission instructed Skype, WhatsApp and Viber to comply with local regulations or risk being shut down. These applications are Internet-based communications services that are both free of charge and not subject to the kingdom’s telecommunications regulations.
The Saudi government has a strong interest in limiting social media and online communications services. Protests are being increasingly organized through use of the WhatsApp messaging application. Political dissidents are able to use Skype to communicate with human rights organizations and foreign media networks without fear of government monitoring. Some government employees and those with ties to the royal family have begun to exploit Twitter to disseminate information regarding corruption in the kingdom.
The Saudi government is, however, becoming increasingly hesitant about limiting social media and other communications because of the potential for a political backlash. Freedom of speech and communication were a hallmark demand of popular uprisings elsewhere in the Arab world, with attempts to cut online activity serving to fuel discontent rather than mitigate unrest. Saudi Arabia is already a favorite target for civil rights activists across the globe, and a ban on social media would only add to a long list of reasons for further divestment and isolation campaigns.
As an alternative, the Saudi government has begun encouraging loyalists to condemn and pursue those suspected of online dissent rather than close the outlets altogether. In recent weeks, a Shura Council member filed a lawsuit against a critical Twitter user, while the government-appointed imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca dedicated his Friday sermon on April 5 to condemning the social network, calling it a “threat to national unity.”
As the government remains confounded by its inability to control online dissent, there is no doubt that the rising tide of anger across Saudi cyberspace has begun to spill over into physical reality. Unwillingly, the government has been forced to wrestle with undertaking previously unimaginable reforms with regard to women’s rights and employment opportunities for millions of young, educated citizens. With social media as their vehicle, Saudis are threatening to take control of their country’s destiny for the first time in history, and there may be nothing their government can do about it.

4/16/2013

Did We Get the #Muslim_Brotherhood Wrong?

 


Nope. But it's time to revise our assessments. 


 The deterioration of Egyptian politics has spurred an intense, often vitriolic polarization between Islamists and their rivals that has increasingly spilled over into analytical disputes. Some principled liberalswho once supported the Muslim Brotherhood against the Mubarak regime's repression have recanted. Longtime critics of the Islamists view themselves as vindicated and demand that Americans, including me, apologize for getting the Brotherhood wrong. As one prominent Egyptian blogger recently put it, "are you ready to apologize for at least 5 years of promoting the MB as fluffy Democrats to everyone? ARE YOU?"

 

So, should we apologize? Did we get the Brotherhood wrong? Not really. The academic consensus about the Brotherhood got most of the big things right about that organization ... at least as it existed prior to the 2011 Egyptian revolution. U.S. analysists and academics correctly identified the major strands in its ideological development and internal factional struggles, its electoral prowess, its conflicts with al Qaeda and hard-line Salafis, and the tension between its democratic ambitions and its illiberal aspirations. And liberals who defended the Brotherhood against the Mubarak regime's torture and repression were unquestionably right to do so -- indeed, I would regard defending the human rights and political participation of a group with which one disagrees as a litmus test for liberalism.
But getting the pre-2011 period right doesn't let us off the hook for what has come since. How one felt about questions of the Brotherhood's ability to be democratic in the past has nothing to do with the urgency of holding it to those commitments today. Giving the group the chance to participate fully in the democratic process does not mean giving it a pass on bad behavior once it is in power -- or letting it off the hook for abuses of pluralism, tolerance, or universal values.  That's why I would like to see Egypt's electoral process continue, and for the Brotherhood to be punished at the ballot box for their manifest failures.
So what did we say about the Brotherhood, and what did they get wrong or right? I wouldn't presume to speak for a diverse academic community that disagrees about many important things, but some broad themes do emerge from a decade of literature. For one, most academics viewed the Brotherhood of the 2000s as a democratic actor but not a liberal one. That's an important distinction. By the late 2000s, the Brotherhood had a nearly two-decade track record of participation in national, professional, and student elections. It had developed an elaborate ideological justification for not just the acceptability but the necessity of democratic procedure. When it lost elections, such as in the professional associations, it peacefully surrendered power (and, ironically given current debates, it was willing to boycott when it saw the rules stacked against it). By 2007, it seemed to me that there was nothing more the Brotherhood could have done to demonstrate its commitment to democratic procedures in the absence of the actual opportunity to win elections and govern. I think that was right.
And of course it had developed a well-honed electoral machine ready for use whenever the opportunity presented itself.  Nobody in the academic community doubted that the Brotherhood would do well in the first wave of elections. Academics also pegged public support for the Brotherhood at about 20 percent, not far off the 25 percent Mohammed Morsy managed in the first round of the presidential election. They correctly identified the organizational advantages the Brotherhood would have in early elections, which would allow them to significantly overperform that baseline of support against new, less-organized opponents.
The Brotherhood's commitment to democratic procedures never really translated into a commitment to democratic or liberal norms, however. It always struggled with the obvious tension between its commitment to sharia (Islamic law) and its participation in democratic elections. Not being able to win allowed the Brothers to avoid confronting this yawning gap, even if they frequently found themselves enmeshed in public controversies over their true intentions -- for instance, with the release of a draft political party platform in 2007 that hinted at the creation of a state committee to review legislation for compliance with sharia and a rejection of a female or non-Muslim president.  As for liberalism, nobody ever doubted the obvious point that this was an Islamist movement with deeply socially conservative values and priorities. The real question was over their willingness to tolerate different points of view -- and there, deep skepticism remained the rule across the academic community.

4/12/2013

Sleeping with the Enemy

What happened between the Neanderthals and us?


The Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, in Leipzig, is a large, mostly glass building shaped a bit like a banana. The institute sits at the southern edge of the city, in a neighborhood that still very much bears the stamp of its East German past. If you walk down the street in one direction, you come to a block of Soviet-style apartment buildings; in the other, to a huge hall with a golden steeple, which used to be known as the Soviet Pavilion. (The pavilion is now empty.) In the lobby of the institute there’s a cafeteria and an exhibit on great apes. A TV in the cafeteria plays a live feed of the orangutans at the Leipzig Zoo.
Svante Pääbo heads the institute’s department of evolutionary genetics. He is tall and lanky, with a long face, a narrow chin, and bushy eyebrows, which he often raises to emphasize some sort of irony. Pääbo’s office is dominated by a life-size model of a Neanderthal skeleton, propped up so that its feet dangle over the floor, and by a larger-than-life-size portrait that his graduate students presented to him on his fiftieth birthday. Each of the students painted a piece of the portrait, the over-all effect of which is a surprisingly good likeness of Pääbo, but in mismatched colors that make it look as if he had a skin disease.
At any given moment, Pääbo has at least half a dozen research efforts in progress. When I visited him in May, he had one team analyzing DNA that had been obtained from a forty- or fifty-thousand-year-old finger bone found in Siberia, and another trying to extract DNA from a cache of equally ancient bones from China. A third team was slicing open the brains of mice that had been genetically engineered to produce a human protein.
In Pääbo’s mind, at least, these research efforts all hang together. They are attempts to solve a single problem in evolutionary genetics, which might, rather dizzyingly, be posed as: What made us the sort of animal that could create a transgenic mouse?
The question of what defines the human has, of course, been kicking around since Socrates, and probably a lot longer. If it has yet to be satisfactorily resolved, then this, Pääbo suspects, is because it has never been properly framed. “The challenge is to address the questions that are answerable,” he told me.
Pääbo’s most ambitious project to date, which he has assembled an international consortium to assist him with, is an attempt to sequence the entire genome of the Neanderthal. The project is about halfway complete and has already yielded some unsettling results, including the news, announced by Pääbo last year, that modern humans, before doing in the Neanderthals, must have interbred with them.
Once the Neanderthal genome is complete, scientists will be able to lay it gene by gene—indeed, base by base—against the human, and see where they diverge. At that point, Pääbo believes, an answer to the age-old question will finally be at hand. Neanderthals were very closely related to modern humans—so closely that we shared our prehistoric beds with them—and yet clearly they were not humans. Somewhere among the genetic disparities must lie the mutation or, more probably, mutations that define us. Pääbo already has a team scanning the two genomes, drawing up lists of likely candidates.
“I want to know what changed in fully modern humans, compared with Neanderthals, that made a difference,” he said. “What made it possible for us to build up these enormous societies, and spread around the globe, and develop the technology that I think no one can doubt is unique to humans. There has to be a genetic basis for that, and it is hiding somewhere in these lists.”
Pääbo, who is now fifty-six, grew up in Stockholm. His mother, a chemist, was an Estonian refugee. For a time, she worked in the laboratory of a biochemist named Sune Bergström, who later won a Nobel Prize. Pääbo was the product of a lab affair between the two, and, although he knew who his father was, he wasn’t supposed to discuss it. Bergström had a wife and another son; Pääbo’s mother, meanwhile, never married. Every Saturday, Bergström would visit Pääbo and take him for a walk in the woods, or somewhere else where he didn’t think he’d be recognized.
“Officially, at home, he worked on Saturday,” Pääbo told me. “It was really crazy. His wife knew. But they never talked about it. She never tried to call him at work on Saturdays.” As a child, Pääbo wasn’t particularly bothered by the whole arrangement; later, he occasionally threatened to knock on Bergström’s door. “I would say, ‘You have to tell your son—your other son—because he will find out sometime,’ ” he recalled. Bergström would promise to do this, but never followed through. (As a result, Bergström’s other son did not learn that Pääbo existed until shortly before Bergström’s death, in 2004.)
From an early age, Pääbo was interested in old things. He discovered that around fallen trees it was sometimes possible to find bits of pottery made by prehistoric Swedes, and he filled his room with potsherds. When he was a teen-ager, his mother took him to visit the Pyramids, and he was entranced. He enrolled at Uppsala University, planning to become an Egyptologist.

4/01/2013

#Burma : Satellite Images Detail Destruction in Meiktila

Burma: Satellite Images Detail Destruction in Meiktila
 
 
 The Burmese government should thoroughly investigate and hold accountable those who incited and committed deadly violence in Meiktila in central Burma from March 20 to 22, 2013. Decisive government action to combat impunity, end discrimination, and promote tolerance among religious groups is needed to end the tide of attacks against Muslim communities.

An estimated 40 people were killed and 61 wounded in the clashes between Muslims and majority Buddhists in Meiktila in the Mandalay Region. Satellite images analysed by Human Rights Watch show the scale of the destruction: an estimated 828 buildings, the vast majority residences, were totally destroyed and at least 35 other buildings were partially destroyed. Areas with near total destruction were concentrated within three locations in Meiktila measuring more than 24 hectares in total area west and northeast of the city’s main market. The destruction appears similar to satellite imagery of towns affected by sectarian violence in Arakan State in 2012, in which arson attacks left large, clearly defined residential areas in ashes.

“The government should investigate responsibility for the violence in Meiktila and the failure of the police to stop wanton killings and the burning of entire neighborhoods,” said Brad Adams, Asia director. “Burma’s government should have learned the lessons of recent sectarian clashes in Arakan State and moved quickly to bolster the capacity of the police to contain violence and protect lives and property.”


Meiktila (Main Damage Area 1)
442 likely residential buildings destroyed or severely damaged.
Move the slider to compare images from before and after the violence.
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Before: Meiktila (Main Damage Area 1)
After: Meiktila (Main Damage Area 1)


Meiktila (Main Damage Area 2)
345 likely residential and commercial buildings destroyed and severely damaged
Move the slider to compare images from before and after the violence.
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Before: Meiktila (Main Damage Area 2)
After: Meiktila (Main Damage Area 2)

According to a needs assessment released by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs (OCHA), over 12,000 people were displaced by the violence in Meiktila and are in shelters around the town.
Since the Meiktila violence, attacks against Muslims have occurred elsewhere in central Burma, including Okpho, Gyobingauk, and Minhla townships of Pegu region. Soldiers reportedly fired warning shots in the air to disperse protesters in Pegu, and an estimated nine townships in Burma are under emergency provisions or curfew, limiting public assembly.
The spread of anti-Islamic sentiment and religious intolerance is a serious challenge to the rights of Muslims in Burma. Some well-known members of the Buddhist monkhood, or Sangha, have given sermons and distributed anti-Muslim tracts and directives that call on Buddhist residents to boycott Muslim businesses and shun contact with Muslim communities.
Burma’s 2008 Constitution contains provisions that ensure religious freedom and states that the government should “assist and protect the religions it recognizes to its utmost.” President Thein Sein’s office on March 28 called for “earnest effort[s] to control and address all forms of violence including instigations that lead to racial and religious tensions in the interest of the people in accord with the Constitution and existing laws.”
Such efforts need to be accompanied by strong measures, including holding those who planned, organized, and carried out the recent violence accountable, irrespective of the person’s position or the community from which they originate. The government should also make it clear that it will not tolerate incitement to violence, especially by clergy or others in positions of authority.
The government should also take urgent steps to ensure that the police respond impartially to violence. During the violence in Arakan State in June and October, police frequently sided with the majority Buddhist community against the minority Rohingya Muslim population. Frequently the police did nothing to stop the violence against Muslims and in many cases joined with Buddhist mobs to attack predominantly Muslim villages.
“Burma’s government and political, religious, and community leaders should demand an end to the hate speech that has fuelled violence and discrimination against communities in Burma’s fragile multicultural society,” Adams said. “Decisive government action according to the rule of law is critically important to deter extremists and anyone else using violence to further economic, religious, and political agendas.”