On a busy Cairo street on a June night, two twentysomething women stood facing oncoming cars, each holding a banner. The first read "tamarod" – in reference to the "rebel" movement collecting signatures of citizens opposed to X President Mohamed Morsi. The other banner read: "If you want Morsi to leave, honk your horn." The air was filled with the sound of horns.
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A similar noise had filled the capital a year earlier, on the announcement that Morsi won the presidential elections
over Ahmed Shafik. Many viewed Morsi's win as a victory for the
revolution because Shafik was a Mubarak-era minister and prime minister,
and a former member of the army that has assumed an undemocratic role
in Egypt's politics and economy since 1952.
Then, the Muslim Brotherhood allied with a segment of the revolutionary forces named the National Front.
The Front campaigned for the Brotherhood's then-candidate in return for
pledges he made. Their role was decisive given the slim victory he
obtained – hardly 51% of the votes. Today, almost all of them have
turned against the president. Morsi's opponents are accused by
Brotherhood members, as well as by international observers, of not
accepting democracy and election's results.
Although this concern
is understandable, Egypt's reality is more complicated. From the
beginning, Morsi failed to meet the pledges he made in the historic Fairmont agreement
held with the National Front. Such pledges included forming a "national
salvation" government. He didn't even meet with the Front again after
the initial meeting held following his victory. Every time they tried to
meet him they were told he was busy, according to the Front's
spokeswoman Dr Heba Raouf.
Step by step, Morsi turned his back to
the revolution. He formed temporary alliances with the interior ministry
accused of killing protesters; with the military responsible for the
deaths of protesters in the months that followed Mubarak's ousting; and
with the businessmen accused of corruption under Mubarak. Instead of
restructuring the interior ministry, Morsi praised it, saying that the
police was "at the heart" of the revolution. And instead of holding the
army responsible for the deaths of protesters under military rule, Morsi
said it "protected the revolution".
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This could have been
tolerated if Morsi's rule had brought prosperity to Egyptians. In an
ailing economy, the quality of life has worsened, with rising poverty
and unemployment, frequent power cuts and gasoline shortages – all
topped by rising crime rates. The movement that brags about being 80
years old and having a grassroots outreach has demonstrated that it is
not qualified to run the country.
Morsi's supporters argue it is
too early to judge his performance, that one year is not enough to solve
problems inherited from Mubarak's 30-year rule, with many of the
corrupt state apparatuses still refusing to bend to his successor's
will. But Morsi has not shown signs that he has a workable plan for
handling those problems. Egyptians could have stood behind him in such a
fight if he had engaged them. He comes up with vague conspiracy
theories: "Whoever sticks his finger inside Egypt, I will cut it off. I
see the fingers of people getting inside who have no value in this
world," he said in March, without specifying who these people were.
His
supporters again point to the remnants of Mubarak's regime. But Morsi
leaves his opponents mind-boggled by appointing many leading figures
from that very regime as ministers and governors.
Egyptian society
is marred by division. By repeatedly addressing his supporters alone at
their rallies in times of nation-wide tensions, Morsi has helped deepen
such division. Amid the Ittihadiya events, he implicitly endorsed his supporters' attack on a sit-in waged by anti-Morsi protesters.
While
many Egyptians hope that the man and his movement will reap on 30 June –
when massive protests have been planned – what they have sown
throughout the past year. Some observers still hope that the opposition
will pursues "democratic mechanisms" – building their ranks and waiting
until the elections in three years' time. The latter would have been a
viable option if Morsi's rule had been democratic. The prosecution,
headed by a Morsi appointee, has warranted the arrest of influential
activists able to mobilise organised opposition, including Ahmed Maher
of the National Front, the group that helped Morsi come to power.
Charges tend to include "inciting protests" and "insulting the president".
Morsi
was elected before a constitution specifying his powers and the nature
of his post was drafted. After he became president, he sponsored and
endorsed a constitution with fundamentally undemocratic articles
legalising military tribunals for civilians and giving the military and
its budget special status above public accountability. This makes talk
of democracy unreasonable. A look back at 2011 reminds us that the
revolution erupted to save a country and a people from falling apart.
That took priority over "democratic means", even if democracy was an
ultimate goal. If it is still an ultimate goal, it is one that cannot be
achieved under the rule of the undemocratic organisation that is the
Muslim Brotherhood.