‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات SupportYemen. إظهار كافة الرسائل
‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات SupportYemen. إظهار كافة الرسائل

1/21/2015

STATE OF WAR IN #YEMEN #UPDATE

حرب اليمن
STATE OF WAR IN #YEMEN #UPDATE 

و هل من جديد!! اليمن دائما فى حالة حرب من وقت انضمام الجنوب و الحدة ودائما (الدولة) تحارب من يقف فى طريقة و (الدولة) فى اليمن ما هى الا عائلة الاحمر و حاشيتة فقط ,,,, فهمى ملكية لكن تحت اسم الجمهورية و اليمن دولة فاشلة بكل المقيايس من فساد فى كل نواحى الحياة و السلاح ارخص من الطعا و مخدر القات اهم من اى شئ لليمنين 
القات هو من الاسباب الرئيسية فى تدمير اليمن حيث دمر الاقتصاد ة دمر زراعة البن فى اليمن وانهاء المخزون المائى فى اليمن كلة حتى ان اليمن اصبحت اول عاصمة فى العالم بلا موارد مياة.

و ال سعود من اكثر من 60 عام و هما يحاربون اليمن من خلال مرتزقة من السياسين و المحاربين فى كل موسسات الدولة العفنة, حتى ال سعود استعلوا امريكا نفسة لتدمير الجمهورية فى اليمن, و دفع مليارات لزعماء القبائل لشراء سلاح وافتعل الفتنة فيما بينهما.

و زرع الخلافات فى ما بين اهل الجنوب و تحريضهما على الانفصال, حتى قامت ثورات التقسيم للشرق الاوسط الجديد و النظام العالمى و اهمية اليمن فقط فى باب المندب و البترول و الغاز ال>ى تحارب السعودية من اجلة حتى لا يكتشف ولكى يكون اليمن فقيرا.

و من بعد خلع على عبدالله صالح وهميا فقط وافتعل رئيس وهمى و لكن الحاكم الحقيقى هو صالح وعائلة الاحمر الى تحارب من اجل السيطر على خيرات اليمن البكر, اليمن دولة ليست فقيرة ولكنة دولة منهوبة وخيراتة تحت الارض لم تكتشف حتى الان.
و تدخل ايران لمساندة الحوثيين ماديا و عسكريا وكانت اقصى طموح مجموع الحوثى هى حكم محافظة عمران فقط.


وطبعا ال سعود حاربوهما حيث اصبح الحوثثين يد ايران فى اليمن وبالتالى لن تقف ال سعود متفرجين.
الحوثييين يتحركون باوامر صالح و ايران الان ولكن الان اصبحت حالة الحرب رسميا و ضاع اليمن السعيد بسبب الخونة والعملاء و المرتزقة دمروا اقدم دولة فى التاريخ.
و دور قطر الخبيث فى تدمير اليمن و مصر و تونس 
الحوثييون..
عجزوا عن احتلال قرية دماج والتي تبلغ مساحتها3 كم
فـ كيف اليوم يسيطرون على اليمن!!!
لاتقولون إيران!!!!!





A video posted by Akrăm Al Jăhmee 😏 (@akram_aljahmi) on

يتابع ......

3/17/2014

#Nelson_Mandela and His legacy for #Yemen


Nelson Mandela was buried today at his family home in Qunu, South Africa. Over the last few days I have been reflecting on Mandela’s life, his achievements, and how – through the art of forgiveness, reconciliation and the power of dialogue – Mandela brought about visionary and historic change in South Africa. With the change happening all around us in Yemen, I wondered what we could learn from Mandela.
Last Tuesday, more than a hundred current and former heads of state or government attended Mandela’s memorial service to commemorate his life and times. The US’s President Obama and Cuba’s Raul Castro shook hands, showing that Mandela could help reconciliation from beyond the grave. As those who spoke at the service made clear, Mandela was an inspirational, visionary leader who became a legend in his own lifetime, and never forgot the values that were important to him.
Mandela’s dream was to see black and white South Africans living together as equals. So as part of the African National Congress Party, Mandela organised a resistance movement against the apartheid government. He was jailed for life in 1964 for his activities. The story could have ended there, but it didn’t.
Whilst in prison, Mandela overcame his own feelings of rage and bitterness towards the government for all the abuses and discrimination black South Africans had suffered under apartheid. But perhaps more importantly, Mandela learnt how to forgive, how to reconcile, and recognised the importance of looking forward, not back.
The lessons of forgiveness, reconciliation, looking forward, unity over a common dream, and the power of dialogue ring very true for Yemen today. They are the very issues that Yemen is grappling with in its transition.
As we saw in 2011, the glue that brought together the revolutionary youth, women and other proud Yemenis was their common dream to create a democratic, accountable and free society. One where there is a basic relationship between a government that listens to the needs of its people (water, security, electricity, health, education), and a people that mobilises civil society and the ballot box to put in power a government that will deliver those needs.
South Africa today still faces many challenges. Even with such a unique leader, Mandela could not change the country overnight – indeed, that was not his role. He was clear that each and every person had a responsibility to do their part. In his own words: “A fundamental concern for others in our individual and community lives would go a long way in making the world the better place we so passionately dreamt of.”
I sense fear in some Yemenis that whatever good they try and do, it will not make a difference. That the price of trying against entrenched interests will be too high. Mandela had some advice for you: “I learned that courage was not the absence of fear, but the triumph over it. The brave man is not he who does not feel afraid, but he who conquers that fear.”
And in spite of the difficulty of the task, he advised: “it always seems impossible until it’s done.” Sometimes, a successful transition in Yemen seems impossible, but one day, with the efforts of all Yemenis, it will be done.

By jane marriott Ambassador of Great England in Yemen

7/23/2013

Brave Little Girl Flees Forced Marriage, Records Powerful Testimonial #yemen


Brave Little Girl Flees Forced Marriage, Records Powerful Testimonial

 


The longstanding severity of Yemen's child marriages is gaining some much needed sunlight this week after a young survivor of this shocking custom took it upon herself to speak out on behalf of the untold many who can't.

Nada al-Ahdal, an 11-year-old from Sana’a, had been promised by her parents to an adult suitor not once, but twice.
The "gifted singer" had been raised by her uncle Abdel Salam al-Ahdal since practically birth, and had been given the opportunity to go to school and learn English.
Abdel Salam, who was also raising a nephew and his aging mother, attempted to guard young Nada from any attempt by her biological parents to marry her off to a rich groom, having experienced the death of his sister by self-immolation over an arranged marriage.
When Nada turned 10, Abdel Salam learned that Nada's mother and father had indeed sold her off to a Yemeni expat living in Saudi Arabia.
He phoned the groom in a panic, desperate to get him to rescind his offer.
"I called the groom and told him Nada was no good for him," Abdel Salam told the Lebanese publication NOW. "I told him she did not wear the veil and he asked if things were going to remain like that. I said ‘yes, and I agree because she chose it.’ I also told him that she liked singing and asked if he would remain engaged to her."
The man was persuaded to call the whole thing off, leaving Nada's parents "disappointed."
Months later they arrived in Sana'a, ostensibly to visit their daughter, but in reality were there to kidnap her and attempt another arranged marriage.
Nada asked to be returned to her uncle, but was told she had already been promised to someone.
Saying she would run away, Nada's family reportedly threatened her with death, but were unable to stop her escape.
She reunited with her uncle, who took her straight to the authorities.
After an investigation was opened into the forced marriage allegations, Nada's dad suddenly backed off the idea, and permitted her to continue living with her uncle.
"I managed to solve my problem, but some innocent children can't solve theirs," Nada said in a confessional released yesterday by MEMRI-TV. "[A]nd they might die, commit suicide, or do whatever comes to mind...It's not our fault. I'm not the only one. It can happen to any child."

6/06/2013

We wish to inform you that tomorrow you will be executed

Muhammad Haza’a is one of some 180 people facing death in Yemeni prisons for crimes they allegedly committed when they were under 18.
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He is due to be taken out of his crowded prison cell tomorrow morning and shot.
Those who supported our call last week to save him from execution appear to have bought him a precious extra week of life, but would have hoped that his case be reopened and dealt with justly, according to the law, not that he would be subjected to a cold-blooded killing.
We were shocked when we first received the phone call that Muhammad Haza’a was going to be executed within 24 hours.
Capital punishment is unfortunately common enough in Yemen, but the authorities would normally at least grant the prisoner a couple of days between formally telling them and ending their life.
Equally shocking was the fact that Muhammad had “proof” that he was under 18 at the time of his alleged crime.
We only had a few hours to do something. We had lists of alleged juvenile offenders on death row in Yemen, but Muhammad’s name was not on them. We knew nothing about him or his case. Yet we trusted our source and knew that the information he had provided us was highly likely to be correct.
Our source had himself been about to be executed a few years ago as a juvenile offender, when Amnesty International, with the help of other organizations, intervened; he felt that Amnesty International saved his life and regularly supports our work.
After we received the call, we urgently sent emails, made calls and issued appeals. At first we only received automated messages by email and were confronted with piped musical recordings by phone.
But one breakthrough here and another there soon created momentum. International and local organizations jumped in and phone calls to the Yemeni President and the General Prosecutor’s office brought the promise that the execution would be postponed and the case reviewed.
That was on Tuesday, 26 February. Less than a week later, the following Monday, two parallel events occurred.
In the city of Tai’zz, where Muhammad has been held, the head of the Appeal Court there filled in a form no longer than four lines and sent it to the prison authorities. It probably took him or his assistant less than a minute to fill in the blanks. The execution date is set for Saturday, 9 March 2013, it read. He added a line underneath: “We advise that security measures are taken on the above mentioned date of the execution.”
That last line was added in anticipation of protests. There were rumours that other death row inmates were planning to prevent the prison authorities from taking Muhammad to his execution.

Rumours were also emerging that a demonstration in front of the prison was being planned.
Local and international activists were making calls and noise about the unfairness and illegality of the sentence besides the inhumane nature of the execution itself. The head of the court apparently considered that all these calls warranted by way of response was a single sentence of warning at the bottom of an execution order.
In the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, meanwhile, the General Prosecutor signed a form ordering the prosecution in Ta’izz to refer Muhammad’s case to the relevant courts for review on the basis that there remained a dispute about his age at the time of the alleged offence.
Muhammad’s lawyer decided to personally take the form signed by the General Prosecutor to the relevant authorities in Ta’izz because he knew that if the document was faxed or sent by post, it would probably either arrive too late or mysteriously disappear.
It took him around four hours to drive the 260km south from Sana’a to Ta’izz. The lawyer was met, but the form was not accepted. Apparently the Ta’izz authorities were too unhappy with the attention Muhammad’s case had brought and so have simply refused to follow the laws of their own country and forward a case to the relevant courts when being ordered to do so by their superior.
It would surely be unconscionable for an execution to go ahead essentially because some officials had felt emboldened to flout instructions, but that seems to be the situation as things stand.
We continue to call on the Yemeni President, the General Prosecutor and the relevant authorities in Ta’izz to immediately suspend the execution of Muhammad Haza’a and to order a retrial that is fair and does not resort to the death penalty.

4/21/2013

#yemen in photo`s











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Bab al-Yaman. Sana’a. Yemen in Yemen

4/18/2013

Yemen’s Southern Intifada #yemen

In early February, a car made its way along the winding road from the southern Yemeni port city of Aden to Dhale, a dusty mountain town of traditional mud-brick houses. As the car sped toward its destination, the flags and checkpoints increased in regularity with every passing mile.
Yemen's flag is made up of three horizontal stripes of red, white, and black. Those flying from the rooftops along the roadside sported an additional blue triangle dotted with a single red star. The flags, a remnant of the south's independent past, are a symbol of defiance; the checkpoints, manned by soldiers from Yemen's north, a source of simmering tension.
"See," said Fatima, an Adeni college professor, as the car stopped at yet another checkpoint so that a uniformed youth, his cheek bulging with the narcotic qat leaf and an AK-47 casually slung across his shoulder, could take a look inside. "How can they say that this is not an occupation?" 
On the outskirts of Dhale, the military checkpoints came to a sudden halt. The government had no jurisdiction beyond the town's borders. At the top of a hill in the center of Dhale, Shalal Ali Shaye'a, a top leader in Dhale of Hirak, squinted into the sun. "Look," he said, pointing to another blue-triangled flag painted onto the mountainside opposite him. "This is the free south."
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Shaye'a is a leading member of one of the more radical factions of Hirak al-Janoubi ("the southern movement," better known in Yemen as Hirak), a loose coalition of southern rights groups formed in Yemen in 2007. Since a popular uprising unseated former President Ali Abdullah Saleh -- a hated figure for many southerners -- in 2011, secessionist sentiment has been on the rise in the south and the pro-independence wing of Hirak has been gaining confidence. While politicians and diplomats in the northern capital of Sanaa have been focused on the peace plan that led to Saleh's ouster, Shaye'a and his cohort have been planning their "peaceful intifada" which they hope will end with talks in Geneva, an end to the checkpoints, and the arrival of U.N. peacekeepers.
But if recent events are anything to go by, southerners' attempts to extricate themselves from their two decade-old union with the north could prove to be a messy affair. Tensions between Hirak and the government had been rising for months when, on February 20, security forces raided the Aden home of Qasem Asker Jubran, Yemen's onetime ambassador to Mauritania, now a committed secessionist. Juran was arrested, accused of planning to disrupt "by any means possible" a rally planned for the next day by Islah (Yemen's biggest Islamist party) to celebrate the first anniversary of the man who replaced Saleh as president, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Over the next week, Hiraki protesters clashed again and again with security forces. By the end of February, members of the southern movement estimated that up to 20 of their number had died in the violence, while the Islah's party headquarters in the southern city of Mukalla had been set on fire in just one of a series of attacks on northern political parties and businesses.
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Dhale and nearby Radfan hold an important place in Hiraki and southern mythology. It was in Habilayn, a village in Radfan, that British troops shot and killed seven men in October 1963, sparking the uprising that ended British rule in the south. The revolt was launched from the craggy, volcanic mountains of Dhale, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), the socialist state that succeeded the British, populated its military with men from the area.
In 1990, bankrupted by the fall of the Soviet Union and a bloody 1986 civil war, the PDRY merged with its northern neighbor, the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), led by Saleh. But four years later Ali Salem al-Beidh, the PDRY leader who took the south into the unity deal, declared the foundation of a new state, the Democratic Republic of Yemen. Southerners had complained of an unequal partnership and of a campaign of assassinations targeting their leaders since the north-south merger. Fed up after a series of inconsequential talks, they had decided to quit the union. 
The militaries of the PDRY and YAR, which were not integrated after unity, went to war. Dhale was a key battleground during the fighting, which the northerners won, backed by tribal militias, mujahedeen recently returned from Afghanistan, and even former PDRY soldiers who defected after a bloody civil war in the south in 1986.
Many southern officers and civil servants, including Shaye'a, were forced into early retirement after the war, and most accounts of the life in the south after1994 run down similar lines: of northern tribal, military, and economic interests taking over vast swathes of land and businesses; of soaring unemployment among southerners while northerners arrived to take juicy government jobs; and of brutal repression of any kind of secessionist sentiment or expression of southern identity.
"Before unity," Shaye'a said, "I was a student at military college. I graduated in 1990, into unity. I practiced for a few years and then the war started. They kicked all our soldiers out, and I fled. I came back six months later. After they kicked us out, we lived in a miserable situation."
In 2006, former military officers from the region began to organize protests at home and in Aden over low pensions and lack of jobs. A year later, Hirak was formed as an umbrella organization to bring together the plethora of southern rights movements that had sprung up since 1994. Today, it is made up of around seven major groups and many more splinter organizations, loosely formed around the Supreme Council of the Southern Movement, led by Hassan Baoum, a popular pro-independence activist.          
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Hirakis are not just disappointed former government workers. Many of the group's most vocal supporters are so young that they cannot remember life before unity. At one of the weekly marches the group holds in Crater, a volcanic outcrop of the Shamsan mountain which towers over Aden, Nour, 20, tried to explain her involvement in the movement.  
"I was born inside unity; I don't like it. I want separation," she said. "It is unfair. I don't like the poverty. I want to get back the country. We need to support the demonstrations."
Unemployment is a big issue for young southerners like Nour. Even those who do not actively support Hirak believe that the best state jobs go to the friends and families of Sanaa's political elite. This is frustrating and baffling to those who believe that most of the country's resources are located in the south -- two of Yemen's biggest oil fields are to be found in the former PDRY, while Aden was once one of the busiest ports in the world. 
Other Hirakis have only recently come around to the secessionists' way of thinking. "I am from those who wanted to correct the road of the unity," said Nasser Mohamed Al-Khubaji, one of Hirak's top leaders in Lahj, as he reclined in the cushioned mafraj of his simple home in Radfan in mid-February. "I thought we could do something through parliament. But when we took up the case of the south, we faced aggression. People became angry with us."
Al-Khubaji quit parliament after the 2007 shooting of southerners preparing for a rally to celebrate the anniversary of the revolt against the British by the central security forces. As a member of parliament for Lahj governorate, he had taken part in the preparations. "When we were preparing for our revolutionary activities, the military from the north came. They killed four and injured 20," he said. The opportunity for negotiation with the north died then, he said: "The time was over for talk."
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If Nour had been born to the north, she would probably have taken part in the protest movement that unseated Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, voicing frustrations about Yemen's northern elite similar to those heard across the south. But like many Hirakis, after initially supporting the revolution she came to see it as a largely northern affair.
Yemen's 2011 uprising started as a nonviolent movement in the big northern cities of Taiz and Sanaa. But it soon descended into a violent elite power struggle, fought between military units loyal to Saleh and his son Ahmed Ali; those with ties to the powerful general and former Saleh ally Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and militias loyal to the tribal leaders and brothers Hamid and Sadeq al-Ahmar.
The deal brokered by members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to end the fighting in November 2011 was an elite peace accord, Nour said, not a solution to southerners' problems -- the GCC deal explicitly references the problems in the south, but does not go far enough toward addressing southern grievances for many Hirakis. "I don't care about 2011; that was just a fight between Ali Abdullah Saleh and Hamid al-Ahmar," she said. "It has nothing to do with the south."
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Yet if foreign diplomats involved in brokering the accord are to be believed, the GCC deal presents a unique opportunity for southerners, in the form of a much-vaunted national dialogue conference. The deal's brokers have effectively staked Yemen's future on the dialogue's success and President Hadi has said that the country could descend into civil war if it fails.
During six months of talks, which are due to start on March 18, the conference's organizers hope that working groups will be able to draft a new constitution and discuss solutions to the country's many problems, including the "southern question" as it is often described in Sanaa. Delegations from Yemen's many fissiparous factions have been invited to the conference and Hirak has been offered the second-biggest allotment of seats, 85 in total. Yet for many Hirakis, the conference is a non-starter.
Despite diplomats' best efforts to convince them that attending the talks is in their best interests, a number of Hiraki groups have said that they will not go to the dialogue. Most vocal in rejecting the talks have been factions linked to Baoum and al-Beidh, one of the main architects of unity in 1990 and, since 1994, one of its biggest critics. They want bilateral negotiations between the north and the south over separation, not to discuss the shape of the unified state.
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Other southern movement leaders are more open to the idea of the talks. In March 2012 Mohamed Ali Ahmed, the former governor of Abyan governorate, returned to Aden after nearly two decades in exile in Britain. Diplomats overseeing the GCC deal, who describe him as a moderate, say that he has become a key point of contact in Hirak. Speaking at his home in Aden in February, he told Foreign Policy that he would go to the dialogue even though Hadi is yet to meet a series of demands that he helped southerners to formulate in 2012 as a precondition to taking part in the conference.
"We will go so that the international community does not say that southerners do not cooperate," he said. "We cannot ignore the international community. We will [get our demands] from the inside. We cannot ignore the will of the people, but we want to use peaceful means."
Ali Ahmed believes the creation of a two-state federal union between the north and south followed by a referendum after five years could be the best path to independence, an idea first floated by Hirakis in 2009. But the al-Beidh factions of Hirak, many who mutter that Ali Ahmed is working for Hadi to maintain rather than end unity, has become increasingly hard line.
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The differences between al-Beidh and Ali Ahmed run deep -- much deeper than mere strategy. On January 13, 1986, the bodyguards of then-President Ali Nasser Mohammed opened fire on a meeting of the PDRY's politburo. Former associates say that he hoped to consolidate his power by assassinating the leaders of a faction loyal to his predecessor, Abdul Fattah Ismail, who was killed soon after the fighting started. But Ismail loyalists led by al-Beidh gained the upper hand in the ensuing civil war and after a month of fighting Mohammed fled to the north along with tens of thousands of his followers. Among those who fled north with him were Ali Ahmed and Hadi -- Yemen's current president.
Hirak's leadership has worked in recent years to reconcile the differences between the Toghma -- the winners of the 1986 war -- and the Zomra -- Nasser Mohammed's "desperate band" of followers -- hoping that the common goal of independence will be enough to patch over past rivalries and resentments. Since 2009, Hirak has held reconciliation marches every January 13 to mark the anniversary of the civil war. The 2013 rally was the biggest ever, according to the local Yemen Post. A number of Hirakis, who see the march as a watershed moment for the independence movement, claim that one million people attended (more reliable estimates run to the tens of thousands). But many Toghma still view their Zomra counterparts with suspicion. Some of the bloodiest fighting during the 1986 war occurred between militias loyal to Ali Ahmed and Baoum in Abyan; Shaye'a still recalls how his father, ministry of interior at the time, was killed by Nasser Mohammed's men at the January 1986 politburo meeting.
Hirak is unified in its quest for independence, said Jubran, who is widely seen as al-Beidh's man in Aden (the former president lives in exile in Beirut) during an interview at his home in the southern capital a week before he was arrested. "There are a lot of disputes between the different parties of Hirak," he said. "But the main goal is freedom. We are unified. In some other parties they want five years and a referendum but they will not prevail. When we got independence in 1967 no one told us to make freedom or a referendum and we don't need a referendum now."
"Ninety-nine percent" of southerners are behind the al-Beidh faction of Hirak, Jubran argued. While this figure is likely some way off -- and a of number Hirakis say that they support the equally pro-independence Baoum, who is based in Yemen, rather than Beirut-bound al-Beidh -- it is fair to say that a growing number of southerners are falling in behind the two men's uncompromising approach. And at rallies across the country, it is al-Beidh's image that is most visible on placards and banners. In Dhale and Lahj it is not uncommon to hear him described as "the president," a title he still bestows upon himself. Analysts estimate that support for the al-Beidh and Ahmed factions is split about 70 to 30 among Hirakis.
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Some southerners had hoped that the northern revolution would lead to improvements in life in the former PDRY, and worried that independence would require a long, potentially bloody, and hugely costly struggle. Others thought that having Hadi, a southerner, as president might see Hirak treated with more leniency and were encouraged when the huge reconciliation march in January was allowed to pass unmolested. But the violence in February proved a tipping point for even more moderate southerners.
"I don't support Hirak, I am not a Hiraki," said Anas, a young southern woman who lives in Aden, in March. "But I no longer support unity either."
Perhaps sensing the direction in which popular opinion is going, southern movement leaders who had previously expressed willingness to compromise have also been taking a more combative stance of late. In February, Haydar al-Attas, prime minister of Yemen's first unity government, said that he would reject an invitation to the dialogue and demanded that Jamal Benomar, the U.N. envoy to Yemen, oversee a referendum on independence.
"In the end, they will all come around to our way of thinking or they will not matter," said one al-Beidh aligned Hiraki leader in response to the news. Ali Ahmed, who is not as widely popular as Baoum and al-Beidh, could lose the chance of a future role in the south if he attends the talks, he added.
Many southerners are skeptical of the international community's intentions meanwhile. At the Crater march, Mohamed, a pro-independence activist, could barely contain himself. "Where is the international community in all of this?" he asked, an often-repeated refrain at the march. "Where are our rights? In the north, they fought for one year, people were killed, and the international community gave them their peace. The northerners have dominated us, killed us, stolen from us since unity. Where is our dialogue with the north? We have been fighting for 20 years, but still they ignore us."
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Thus far, the southern movement has been largely peaceful -- surprisingly so, given the availability of arms in Yemen and the number of disaffected, unemployed young men in the south. The leaders of even its more radical factions say that they are committed to peaceful protest, and while violence flared up in February, it did not boil over into the kind of devastating armed conflict seen in the north during 2011.
But a number of questions about Hirak's more extreme wing remain to be answered, not least its commitment to a nonviolent struggle. While Hiraki activists at marches like those in Crater are unarmed, and it is easy to believe people like Nour when she expresses her commitment to a peaceful uprising, al-Beidh's arm of Hirak has been accused on a number of occasions of building its own militia, and has recently been linked with arms shipments from Iran. Clashes have broken out between Hirak-aligned armed groups and government troops in recent years, many of them in Dhale and Lahj, a stronghold for the al-Beidh faction.
It is particularly hard to reconcile Shaye'a with the idea of Hirak's peaceful intifada. A number of Yemeni analysts say that he is one of the leaders of "The Movement for Self Determination," or Hatam, a militia formed after the civil war which has fought with the Yemeni military on a number of occasions in the past. In October 2010, a bomb placed outside of Al-Wahda Sports Club in Aden killed four people. The attack was blamed on Hatam, which planned to disrupt an upcoming football tournament, and Hirak. The government named Shaye'a as the ringleader of the group that planned the blast -- a charge he denies. "They are willing to say anything about the southern people," he said. "It is far from my peaceful revolution. I love sports." 
Shaye'a remained tightlipped as to whether Hirak has armed militias in and around Dhale, but when he left his home, he clambered into a battered Toyota pickup, armed gunmen -- one man wielding a rocket-propelled grenade launcher -- bouncing in the back as the truck wound its way along the dirt road. Earlier, he had explained why he lived in Dhale rather than Aden.
"We started here, in Dhale and in Radfan, because we were safe here," Shaye'a said. "Here, all the people are active with Hirak. Most of our army who were kicked out of their jobs came from here. Most of the military forces who were retired came from here. Here, the community helped us to start out activities. They were ready. The occupation forces were here -- there was action and there was reaction."
Al-Khubaji, Hirak's man in Lahj, agreed that his area was under Hiraki control but disagreed that the movement's success in the area had been achieved through force. Hirak has spent much of the past six years building a parallel state structure, providing public goods to residents of the area, he said. "Most of our work is in enhancing administrative and regulatory capacities," he said. "Politically the governorate is under the rule of Hirak. But we are under occupation. Before us, the courts were full of cases. Now, we have the councils of Hirak to solve problems. We even solve security problems. I would say that 90 percent of Lahj is under Hirak control. The occupation forces are still here; here, but not in control."
But few moments later, he added a familiar caveat. "Our movement is to get separation peacefully," he said. "But I cannot guarantee that other interests and movements will not take action. We insist on a peaceful movement. But we will not discourage anyone who wants to take this path." 
---- 
It might not be long before it becomes apparent how, exactly, Shaye'a, Jubran, and others plan to move forward. Jubran -- who was freed in late February having declared his commitment to peaceful protest -- ended his interview with the promise that by the 20th anniversary of the south's last attempt at separation, it would be an independent state once again. "On 21 May 2013, you will see," he said. "The peaceful intifada will begin." 
Within a year, he said, it would all be over.

3/13/2013

Now Saleh is gone, will North and South #Yemen separate?

Now Saleh is gone, will North and South Yemen separate?

Baraa Shiban
The risks that threaten the Yemeni Unity as it enters its twenty-three years seems to be huge, while some forces in the South are seeking to secede and the army is seeking to drive out Al-Qaeda militias from the areas they control in the South, Al-Houthi rebels have Sa’ada province under control and some other areas in the North.
The celebration of the Unity anniversary last Tuesday came after a violent attack that killed one hundred soldiers and wounded more than 220, who were participating in a military parade on the occasion of the Unity anniversary.
The exception in the celebrations of this year is that the two presidents who signed the Unity agreement are no longer in power. The ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh, was forced to leave according to a political initiative sponsored by the Gulf Countries and the UN Security Council after the break out of a popular revolution, and his former deputy Ali Salem Al-Beedh who had to leave the country after the war of 1994.
Calls for Secession:
The most important challenge facing the Yemeni unity, is the high tone of secession raised by some Southern parts, especially that some of these forces are trending to violent methods instead of the peaceful methods.
In addition to that, some components of the Southern Movement, believe that they should take advantage of the success of the youth revolution in overthrowing Saleh’s regime, to push toward secession as the only alternative for solving the Southern issue.
Mr. Ahmed Abdul-Gani – the Head of Al-Jazeera Center for Strategic Studies – said that the negative role played by the former regime gave the opportunity for many projects to appear like Al-Qaeda, the Houthis, and the Southern Movement who are calling for separation.
He also said that there is a hope for the failure of such projects, if the Yemeni president Abdo Rabbo Mansoor Hadi and the reconciliation government speed up in facing the economical challenges, reduce the people’s suffering and provide the basic services such as electricity, and water.
Security Challenges:
Mr. Abdul-Gani also pointed out that “the security challenge of fighting Al-Qaeda militias and ending their control in some areas Southern the country is an important issue, as well as the start of restructuring the army under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, and restructuring the security forces under the leadership of the Ministry of Interior, emphasizing that it will help to overcome the political challenges in the country.”
The success of the coming National Dialogue will be the main guarantee for maintaining the unity, because the most important outputs of the dialogue will be agreeing on the constitution and the shape of the regime.
The International and Regional Community seems to be supporting the unity and stability of Yemen, but the details of this unity will be a matter of huge argument during the National Dialogue.
Furthermore, the Minister of State – Ezzy Shaif – said that “what we see and hear of projects of secession is a political game that only serves the interests of some outside forces, and take advantage of some mistakes occurred by some policy makers.”
He added that “Al-Qaeda in Yemen, is an international issue not just a local issue, and perhaps they found in Yemen the atmosphere to spread because of the economic situation and the spread of poverty and unemployment.”
He also said that what Al-Houthi group and most of the Southern Movement are demanding for the National Dialogue is in total within the national unity of Yemen, and stressed that most of the Yemeni people are supportive to the Yemeni unity, even if they disagreed on the shape of the political system of the country.

3/12/2013

#yemen On Location Video: Yemeni cyclists fight for a chance to race

Yemen's national cycling team battles prejudice and conflict in the hope of competing abroad.

 








2/27/2013

ما وراء الأفكار المسبقة عن الحجاب

ما وراء الأفكار المسبقة عن الحجاب

ما وراء الأفكار المسبقة عن الحجاب
© بشرى المتوكل

تعمل اليمنية بشرى المتوكل منذ عشر سنوات عبر الفن الفوتوغرافي على تمثيل النساء المحجبات، فتحارب الأفكار المسبقة التي يمتلكها الغرب عن الحجاب وتقاوم في نفس الوقت التطرف الإسلامي في الدول العربية. 

 

تذكر بشرى المتوكل أنها قرأت هذه الجملة التي جعلت منها شعارها، على شبكات التواصل الاجتماعي "إذا كان للمرأة حق التعري فلماذا ليس لها الحق في التحجب؟". وتعتبر بشرى وهي في 44 من عمرها رائدة التصوير الفوتوغرافي في اليمن، وتحترف هذا الفن منذ أكثر من عشر سنوات تقارب تمثيل النساء وكيف تحولن إلى أشياء في العالمين الإسلامي والغربي.
وجعلت بشرى المتوكل من الحجاب حجر الزاوية لعملها. وكانت الفنانة في بداياتها ترغب في تفادي هذا الموضوع الذي "تم تداوله مرارا". لكن الفكرة فرضت نفسها عليها تدريجيا خلال إقامتها في الولايات المتحدة لمتابعة دراستها، وبعد اعتداءات 11 سبتمبر/أيلول 2001. فحين كانت ردود الفعل العنيفة والمناهضة للإسلام على أوجها في أمريكا حينها، شاهدت بشرى امرأة تتحجب بعلم الولايات المتحدة. فقالت بشرى لفرانس 24 إنها "ردة فعل على المعاملة السيئة التي تعرض لها العرب والمسلمون بعد هذه الاعتداءات الرهيبة".
فالتقطت وقتها بشرى المتوكل صورتها الأولى واتخذ عملها الفني منحى سياسيا لم تحد عنه فيما بعد. فمنذ ذلك الوقت تفضح صورها الفوتوغرافية الأفكار المسبقة التي يمتلكها الغرب عن الحجاب وكذلك مواقف الإسلام الراديكالي في العالم العربي.

أعلام
تندد الفنانة بمنع القانون الفرنسي النساء من ارتداء النقاب في الأماكن العمومية "لا أحد يملك الحق في فرض الحجاب، ولا يجدر أن يكون لأحد الحق في منعك من لبسك" بشرى المتوكل
الحجاب بمختلف أوجهه
وتقترح بشرى بديلا عن الزاوية الرومنطيقية أو النظرة المشوهة عن المسلمين والتي غالبا ما يقع الغرب في شراكها، حريصة في نفس الوقت على تفادي الرؤية المستشرقة... وترتدي بشرى الحجاب في اليمن "لأسباب ثقافية أكثر منها دينية" وتنزعه حين تسافر. وتعمل الفنانة على التعبير عن مختلف الفوارق والخلفيات التي يحملها الحجاب في طياته.
فتقول بشرى المتوكل "أريد أن أعبر عن الجمال وعن الإرادة وعن الغموض والفائدة والخطر والسياسة والخوف والدين والجانب الثقافي". لذلك تعمد إلى تنويع كل الصيغ والتركيبات حول الحجاب بمختلف القراءات من وسيلة إغراء وحتى أشكاله القسرية. فتتنقل بشرى في إخراجها بين الحجاب التقليدي اليمني الأنيق بألوانه المتنوعة و"الفنية بطبعها"، مرورا بالعباءة السوداء وهي زي مستورد من الخليج تتحول فيه النساء شيئا فشيئا إلى أشباح.
سلسلة حجاب : أم وابنتها والدمية
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الحجاب سلطة مضادة بين أيدي النساء
وترفض بشرى المتوكل الفكرة السائدة عند البعض الذي يرى في الحجاب وسيلة قمعية. فتندد بها كرؤية عبثية وضيقة تحكم على الحجاب من منطلق ثقافي محدود في حين تتجاوز في اليمن مثلا مظاهر التمييز الجنسي قضية قطعة من القماش، وتقول "رغم التحسن الواضح المسجل في العشرين سنة الماضية، تظل أغلب النساء محدودات المستوى التعليمي وعرضة للتمييز". وتضيف بشرى المتوكل "توجد أشكال قمع أكبر من الحجاب، على غرار أن تحرم المرأة من التعليم وأن تزوج غصبا عنها وأن ينزع منها أبناؤها وأن لا تملك أي حق أمام القانون!".
وتؤكد بشرى أن ارتداء الحجاب حين يكون اختياريا يمكن أن يمثل وسيلة للتحكم في الذات وفرض الإرادة في مواجهة الرجال وسط مجتمع محافظ. فتوضح "حين تقرر المرأة تغطية رأسها وشعرها ووجهها، فهي تستولي على القرار حيث لا تترك لأي كان فرصة مشاهدة ما لا تريد أن تظهره".
وتذهب بشرى إلى اعتبار الحجاب مطلبا نسائيا، فترى فيه سلطة مضادة في عالم تخضع فيه النساء لديكتاتورية الجمال والعراء المبالغ فيه المفروض على أجسادهن. فتقول "يمارس على النساء في البلدان الغربية ضغط حتى يظهرن دائما شابات وجميلات ونحيفات، وهي صناعة بملايين الدولارات تساهم في إدخال التوتر على حياتهن. أليس ذلك أحد أشكال القمع باسم الحرية؟". وتندد بشرى المتوكل بالقانون الفرنسي الذي يمنع منذ 2011 ارتداء البرقع في الأماكن العامة، فتعتبره "مسا بحرية النساء".
سلسلة فلة
تعمد بشرى المتوكل وهي أم لأربعة بنات في سلسلة فلة إلى صياغة نسخة مسلمة من دمية باربي الشهيرة وإلى إرساخها في محيط عربي معاصر. بشرى المتوكل
ماذا لو تحجب الرجال؟
من جهة أخرى تعترف بشرى بأن الحجاب يمكن أن يكون وجها من وجوه القمع حين تجبر المرأة على ارتدائه. وفي مجموعة "حجاب"، تغطي بشرى أما وابنتها ودميتها تدريجيا بدءا بوشاح خفيف ووصولا إلى النقاب وتماهي الشخصيات مع الديكور حتى الاضمحلال. فتغيب النساء عن الرؤية وتختفي الفوارق بينهن.
وتضيف الفنانة "في بعض الأحيان لا أفهم ما تقوله النساء اللواتي يرتدين النقاب فالكل متشابهات وحين نخاطب إحداهن لا نعرف هوية من نخاطب!". فعمدت بشرى إلى قلب الأدوار وتصورت عالما يتحجب فيه الرجال وتلبس فيه النساء ثيابا مخصصة عادة للرجال في الشرق الأوسط. والهدف كذلك من عملها، بالإضافة إلى التفكير في توزيع الأدوار داخل المجتمع، هو إظهار وجوه الشبه بين الأزياء في إطار ثقافة "يدعى فيها الرجال أيضا إلى اعتماد البساطة في لباسهم".
وتعزز بشرى المتوكل موقفها قائلة "لا أريد أن أغذي الكليشيهات السلبية بشأن المحجبات والتي تعتبرهن ضعيفات ومقموعات وجاهلات ومتخلفات". فهي تعمل كفنانة وكامرأة وكمتحجبة من حين لحين، على إثبات عكس ذلك عبر صور تتلاعب بالنواميس والجنس والثقافات وتخلط فيها بذكاء دائما السياسية بروح الفكاهة.
ماذا لو...
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