‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات Democracy. إظهار كافة الرسائل
‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات Democracy. إظهار كافة الرسائل

1/13/2015

دول مين و دول مين 18+ free speech or free Insult!18


كراهية و عنصرية حتى النخاع ارهاب حرية الفكر 
دية مش اول كرتون لكن 
ة التانى دلوقتى كل الى عملتة انى قلبتة بس مش اكتر ركز بقى شوية فى صورة الوش و العمة!! هاة شايف اية ايوة عضو >كرى بس كدة 

اة مش اول مرة رسولك الكريم يترسم كرتون وسخ وانت بتتفرج على عرب ايدول و تقعد تحت البطانية وتدفى طيزك
الاخ مسلم ,سلفى , اخوانى,علمانى , ملحد
المهم تخاليك كول ومش ارهابى فى فكرك او داعشى اوعى اة لحسن تتلسع فى طيزك 
ومالة!!! بس حريتك تنتهى لم تدخل على حريتى فى معتقد و ايمانى وعدم احترامك وجهالك و المعرصينن يقولو حرية الراى والتعبير لا دة اسمة حرية الوقاحة  و الوساخة بلا حدود 
لية دلوقتى فرنسا تعمل كدة و مين المستفيد!!
يا ترى الاسلام استفد حاجة ! لا 
المسحيين استفدوا حاجة !! لا
الصهاينة اول مستفيد

 او خاليك فى صافيناز و الشلة و اوعى تفكر و تفتح عينك  

 انت جاى تستفز 3 مليار مسلم فى العالم فى الوقت الى الاسلام بتحارب حتى فى الدول العربية وانهيار اقوى دول عربية و تقسيم
سيكس بيكو جديد على حسبالبشرية كلة كل علشان خاطر عيونة!! كلهم فى خدمتة و سكوتك اكبر خدمة لية كل بيلعب دورة وبيجهز  
لية وبيخدمة كويس بعلم او بدون علم 

فرنسا هتبعت كل اسطولة البحرى الاسبوع الى جاى على سواحل سوريا لضرب وانهاء سوريا بالكامل!!
فرنسا بتاخد من ثارة من الدولة العثمانية وصلاح الدين  اية لسة الكلام مش واضح يا بهوات بجد  
قادريين ينسوة و هو عهد عليهم فى كل حرب صليبية انه تكون مدخلهم من سوريا من اول حرب صليبية لحد دلوقتى دور ف اقوى 

االادوار ديما فى مثلث الحروب الصليبية


 لو حرية تعبير كانا شوفنا مرة واحد فرنسا او الالمانية تعمل كارتون ضد الصهاينة 

و فى نفس الوقت و العالم كل مشغول فى داعش و كرتون فرنسا القدس بيتضيع اكتر و عرفت العالم اننا مسلمين و عرب ارهابيين !

 مكملين يا اولاد القحبة طول ما لسة فين نفس

مجموعة المنافقيين
و للتدوينة باقى ,,,,,,,,,

6/27/2013

#30June Get ready for A revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood #Tamarod



 Tamarod ,the rebellious mother movement of the upcoming 30 June protests launched today the 30 June Front. That front is an attempt to have a political cover for the protests despite the founders of that front made it clear in a press conference that they do not represent all revolutionaries or political powers.
Now the 30 June Front presented a roadmap for Egypt after Mohamed Morsi as Tamarod believes that it is going to oust him on 30 June through petitions. The 6 months transitional period roadmap is as follows after getting rid from MB and Morsi :

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  • To appoint an independent Prime minister that represents 25 Revolution.
  • To assign this prime minister with all the executive powers of the president and he will head a technocrat government whose main mission is to fix economy and adopt social justice policies.
  • To assign the head of supreme constitutional court with the President’s protocol missions.
  • To dissolve the Shura council and to suspend the current constitution.
  • To form a new constituent assembly in order to draft a new constitution.
  • To have presidential elections by the end of the 6 months followed by parliamentary elections monitored by judges and surpervised internationally. 
  • The National defense council is responsible for national security.
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    It is worth to mention that the boys and girls of Tamarod have met with Heikal, the old fox twice in the past two weeks. Politically speaking this roadmap is perfect or rather was perfect for Egypt on 12 February 2011 if people were honest in having true democracy. There is one missing detail is how to reach this roadmap already.
    Now there are too many players with other roadmaps and agendas.
    The 30 June Front is founded by a number of revolutionary and political activists like Israa Abdel Fatah, Amr Salah, Mohamed Abdel Aziz, Ahmed Harara , Khaled El Belshy and other others.
    The press conference was attended by many of the famous faces from activists like Ahmed Harara, Karima El Khafny, Hossam Eissa , Khaled Dawood , Hossam Mounis, Mazhar Shahin and Nour El Huda Zaki.
    Here are couple of photos I took from the press conference.

    6/24/2013

    #Egypt’s countdown to #June30 #Tamarod

    What began as a humble attempt to translate countrywide discontent with the way President Mohamed Morsi has governed Egypt, the Tamarod -- or "Rebel" campaign -- has mobilized millions of Egyptians for a protest that promises to be epic on the anniversary of Morsi's inauguration. Although opposition forces initially kept the signature drive that demands Morsi's removal from office and early elections at arms length, nearly all of the relevant players in Egypt's transitional drama now recognize the campaign's significance and potential to affect change. Movement within the political opposition, including coordination meetings with the campaign and youth groups for a post-Morsi transition plan, suggests a fundamental belief that the June 30 protests could realize Tamarod's goal of replacing the president.

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    Islamists who support Morsi's government, primarily from the Muslim Brotherhood, responded with a counter-signature drive of their own called Tagarrod -- or "Impartiality" -- to reiterate their faith (no pun intended) in the political system and the elections that brought him to power. Supportive Islamist groups have also called for a June 21 protest against violence. However, the counter-campaign's attempt to balance the scales only seems to accentuate the country's deeply divided polity. The Muslim Brotherhood and other pro-Morsi supporters have repeatedly vilified the Tamarod movement and some have gone as far as labeling those who turn out to protest on June 30 as traitors or unbelievers. Calmer heads within the Islamist movement have taken a more centrist position. The ultraconservative Salafi al-Nour Party has surprisingly demonstrated one of the most level headed attitudes with its promise to refrain from participating in protests, but urging the Muslim Brotherhood and the government to make concessions to opposition forces to diffuse the volatile situation. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh's Strong Egypt Party fell on the side of peaceful protests but stood firm against calls for a military coup to replace Morsi.
    The revolutionary fervor and scathing vitriol between the two groups has gone beyond talking heads exchanging barbs in the Egyptian media. A number of violent incidents, not the least of which involved an arson attack by unknown assailants on one of the Tamarod offices in Cairo on June 7, and hours of clashes between Muslim Brotherhood and Tamarod campaigners in Alexandria on June 12, have heightened tensions between opposing ideologies in the days leading up to the planned mass demonstration and worried government security forces. The clashes involving attacks on Tamarod have prompted Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim to publicize its security plans for June 30, but interestingly confusing messages have come out of the ministry. Initial statements indicated a police withdrawal from demonstration areas but Ibrahim subsequently announced his commitment to protecting all citizens on June 30. Outraged Islamists called for Ibrahim to be held accountable for his initial refusal to protect Muslim Brotherhood headquarters and private property.
    Other rumblings within the Morsi administration also indicate some fear within the government that impending protests may shake the foundations of the current system. Morsi reached out to the National Salvation Front for yet another national dialogue in an effort to subdue the rising tide but without suitable guarantees that any negotiations would lead to binding decisions, opposition leaders declined. Instead, Morsi met with the Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights and Reformation, an independent multi-party coalition of Muslim scholars that includes Salafi and Muslim scholars whose deputy chief threatened the opposition with counter-rallies on June 30. Tamarod members have taken a similar hardline stance, demanding nothing short of the formation of a presidential council and a technocratic government with an eye toward Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) President Manar al-Beheiry to replace Morsi.
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    The scene is certainly set for what could possibly be a game-changing display of popular outrage. To hear either side of the political chasm talk of June 30, one might think an Egyptian Armageddon is right around the corner, with both sides bracing for an outbreak of violence. It is distinctly possible -- even probable -- that protests could come to blows. In past confrontations, it took little to provoke competing political forces into a street battle. Today, not only are the Ultras (the hardcore soccer fans who regularly clash with police) a factor, Black Bloc anarchists are also planning to join the protests adding to an already volatile mix, despite promises of nonviolent protests. "Popular committees" formed to prevent violence are just as likely to instigate as they are to prevent fights from breaking out. Even ordinary citizens, fed up with the dire economic conditions and a deteriorating quality of life, may have little patience for Islamists who may goad them into throwing the first punch. Some Egyptians who see no political or legal avenue through which to channel their disapproval have even admitted hopes of a confrontation to spark the army's intervention and another round of revolutionary change. In this highly charged political climate, all it takes is one angry reaction to ensnare an entire country.
    Hopes of such clashes ousting Morsi, however, run into some heady challenges. The Tamarod campaign managed to surpass its goal of 15 million signatures calling for Morsi's resignation and snap elections. It rekindled the revolutionary flame sparked by its cross-party and youthful energy and captured the imagination of the silent majority in Egypt, but falls short of a legal avenue to realize a change in leadership. Currently, the constitution allows only a few ways by which to remove the president (articles 150 through 152): if the president falls ill or can no longer perform his duty; if he is charged with high treason and is subsequently impeached by at least two-thirds of the House of Representatives: if he puts his own presidency up to popular referendum: or if he voluntarily resigns. Anti-Islamist activists who argue that the constitution -- by virtue of the highly flawed process of its formation -- lacks the legitimacy to set appropriate standards for a post-revolution Egypt may be right, but neither opposition forces nor the judiciary have yet blatantly crossed the ambiguous legal boundaries that have guided (or misguided) it through its transition. The irony of Tamarod's support for the SCC's president to unconstitutionally lead the country is not lost on those paying attention. The judiciary, in particular, has remained conspicuously silent on the issue. However, judging by the SCC decision to allow the Shura Council to continue operating until a new parliament is elected, despite the court's ruling to invalidate the council, suggests its unwillingness to rock the boat.
    With all of Egypt's dramatic twists and turns over the past two years, those who claim to know what will happen on June 30 will find themselves either wrong or lucky. The number of variables that factor into any one event outstrip the imagination every time. The truth is, no one can claim with any degree of certainty what might change after June 30, but Tamarod has certainly revealed how the deep polarization affecting Egyptian society at large might run deeper than previously imagined. It has tapped into a disaffected population that lost all faith in Morsi or that elections under his leadership could be free and fair. It has garnered the support of millions of Egyptians by avoiding the partisan politics that many citizens have come to abhor. Lastly, it has called on the aid of the army and the judiciary, the two institutions with the most support in Egypt, to lead the country to a new beginning. June 30 may amount to nothing more than a mass protest, but Morsi would be wise to take the advice of fellow Islamists, abandon the confrontational stance toward his detractors, and build the consensus that Egypt desperately lacks sooner rather than later. The countdown begins.
    Tarek Radwan is the associate director for research at the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center. He previously reported on the Middle East with Human Rights Watch's MENA division and served as a Human Rights Officer for the United Nations/African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur. Mr. Radwan specializes in Egypt, with a focus on civil society, human rights, the constitution, and judicial issue

    4/22/2013

    Arab Spring Time in Saudi Cyberspace



    Not more than two years ago, the concept of reform in Saudi Arabia would have been as much an oxymoron as business ethics or airline cuisine. In recent months, however, the Arab Spring’s uncertain winds of change have finally begun to sweep into the world’s last forbidden kingdom. Finding themselves alone in a crowd (of revolution) in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia’s monarchs are quickly realizing that their secret police and petrodollars may be no match for their citizens’ technology-driven empowerment.
    On March 1, Saudi security forces cracked down on a woman-led protest in the city of Buraidah, known as the nerve center of Saudi Arabia’s ultraconservative Wahabbist ideology. Over 160 people, mostly women and children, were arrested after erecting a tent camp to pressure the government to free their imprisoned husbands whom they claim have been detained for years without visitation or access to legal counsel. The Saudi government claims that the detainees are part of a “deviant group,” a term given to suspected Al Qaeda sympathizers or Islamist political opposition groups across the Gulf.
    News of the arrests spread like wildfire. Protests in support of the Buraidah women were called for by activists from the Shiite minority in the Eastern Province and liberal reformists in Riyadh and Jidda. The mobilization of Saudi conservatives, liberals and minorities against the government’s repressive policies bore a dangerous resemblance to the red-green alliances that toppled governments from Cairo to Tunis. While turnout at the demonstrations was limited due to the government’s ban on political gatherings, the Saudi Twittersphere was teeming with anger.
    Two weeks later, the government-sponsored Arab News daily published a cover story condemning what it deemed “abusive” actions by Saudi Twitter users. The story mentioned that the authorities were mulling over a plan to link Twitter accounts with their users’ identification numbers. Soon after, the story was pulled from the online version of the newspaper without explanation.
    For one of the most Internet-privy societies on the planet, any move to link Twitter accounts with personal ID numbers would result in a mass exodus to other online forums that are not monitored. Saudi Arabia ranks number one in the world for Twitter users per-capita, with an estimated 51 percent of all Saudi Internet users maintaining an account with the social media network. Analysts suggest that any such move would result in a 60 percent reduction of Twitter usage in the country — a true window onto how many Saudis are voicing dissent against their government.
    Still, on March 31, the Saudi Communications and Information Technology Commission instructed Skype, WhatsApp and Viber to comply with local regulations or risk being shut down. These applications are Internet-based communications services that are both free of charge and not subject to the kingdom’s telecommunications regulations.
    The Saudi government has a strong interest in limiting social media and online communications services. Protests are being increasingly organized through use of the WhatsApp messaging application. Political dissidents are able to use Skype to communicate with human rights organizations and foreign media networks without fear of government monitoring. Some government employees and those with ties to the royal family have begun to exploit Twitter to disseminate information regarding corruption in the kingdom.
    The Saudi government is, however, becoming increasingly hesitant about limiting social media and other communications because of the potential for a political backlash. Freedom of speech and communication were a hallmark demand of popular uprisings elsewhere in the Arab world, with attempts to cut online activity serving to fuel discontent rather than mitigate unrest. Saudi Arabia is already a favorite target for civil rights activists across the globe, and a ban on social media would only add to a long list of reasons for further divestment and isolation campaigns.
    As an alternative, the Saudi government has begun encouraging loyalists to condemn and pursue those suspected of online dissent rather than close the outlets altogether. In recent weeks, a Shura Council member filed a lawsuit against a critical Twitter user, while the government-appointed imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca dedicated his Friday sermon on April 5 to condemning the social network, calling it a “threat to national unity.”
    As the government remains confounded by its inability to control online dissent, there is no doubt that the rising tide of anger across Saudi cyberspace has begun to spill over into physical reality. Unwillingly, the government has been forced to wrestle with undertaking previously unimaginable reforms with regard to women’s rights and employment opportunities for millions of young, educated citizens. With social media as their vehicle, Saudis are threatening to take control of their country’s destiny for the first time in history, and there may be nothing their government can do about it.

    4/13/2013

    سقوط الدولة المصرية: غياب قواعد اللعبة السياسية

    من ساعة 25 يناير 2011 لم أرى أي فصيل سياسي في مصر يتحدث عن وضع قواد أساسية و واضحة و بسيطة تكون أساس إعادة بناء النظام السياسي في مصر.
     
    القواعد دي غير تقديمها، كان لازم يبقى عليها إجماع... تكون مجموعة مبادئ لا يتنازع عليها أي فصيل سياسي: ليبرالي، إسلامي/ديني، يساري، إلخ
    من الأمثلة في التاريخ هو إعلان الإستقلال الأمريكي. كان إعلان إستقلال لكنه كان إعلان مبادئ. الإعلان كان لا يزيد على صفحة وحدة.
    الوقت بين إعلان الإستقلال لحد وضع الدستور الأمريكي كان 11 سنة!في هذه الأثناء كان إعلان الإستقلال ومبادئه هم قواعد اللعبة السياسية في امريكا.
    الليبرالية لايمكنها تقديم أي حلول لولم يكن هناك قواعد واضحة حتى وإن كانت أقل من المستوى لئن اللمنهج الليبرالي يعتمد على البناء و التصحيح.
     
     
     
     
    لكن مصر في السنتين إلي فاتوا و بالذات الفترة الأخيرة تفتقد لأي معالم واضحة و مطبقة تعطي ضمانات و تطمينات لكل الأطراف السياسية.
     
     
    و الأسباب معروفة... فالإخوان تغطرسوا و ابعدوا الأخر و شكلوا قواعد اللعبة و غيروها على أهوائهم كما تطورت الأحداث.
     
    هم كدة فاكرين انهم على طريق النجاح... لكن اللي مش فهمينه إنه لا يمكنهم تحقيق حتى اهدافهم الضيقة من غير قواعد واضحة مطبقة بحياد على الجميع.
     
    و عشان كدة اسلوبهم و منهجهم لن يخلق إلا نظام مهلهل ساقط كالوضع في باكستان.
     
    ما يحدث في مصر هو انها ما بقتش دولة قانون... لكنها دولة ساقطة... Failed State... أو على طريقها لذلك.