Egypt: Video of extrajudicial executions offers glimpse of hidden abuses by military in North Sinai

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video Appears to Show Egyptian Soldiers Killing 

Unarmed Men in Sinai




Warning - Item Video shows Egyptian soldiers executing prisoners in Sinai might contain content that is not suitable for all ages.

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 A video has emerged that appears to show members of the Egyptian military shooting unarmed detainees to death at point-blank range in the Sinai Peninsula and staging the killings to look as if they had happened in combat.
The leaked video, which was posted on social media on Thursday, could undercut claims made by the Egyptian Army in December that the men were suspected terrorists who died in a fight with the military.
The video was released the same day that Defense Secretary Jim Mattis met in Egypt with its president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, to discuss improving their countries’ military relationship. It also comes after human rights groups accused the Egyptian military of killing up to 10 men in January in a staged counterterrorism raid in Sinai.
The three-minute video, which was released through a channel associated with the 




Muslim Brotherhood, appears to depict part of a raid that the Egyptian Army highlighted in a Facebook post on Dec. 6, 2016. That post included photos of three bloody men in a grassy area with rifles next to them. The post said they had been killed in a military raid on a terrorist base and an explosives storehouse.
Eight people were killed and four others were arrested, the military said on Facebook in December, as Egyptian armed forces “continued to tighten their security grip” in the Sinai Peninsula, where the country has waged a yearslong battle.
But the video shows no firefight and starts with soldiers mingling next to an armored truck in a sandy field scattered with bodies next to shrubs and grassy patches. But it does show the killing of at least three people. In one case, a soldier casually holds a rifle over a man on the ground and shoots him in the head. In another, soldiers escort a blindfolded man into the field, place him on his knees and shoot him multiple times in the head and upper body.
The pro-state Egyptian news site Youm7 called the video a fabrication carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in the country, and said the people in the video did not have Egyptian accents. An Egyptian military spokesman did not respond to a request for comment late Thursday.

 one point in the video, a man off camera tells a soldier in Arabic to shoot the captured men in a variety of places. “Don’t just do the head, O.K.? Don’t just do the head,” the person said.
In addition to the three men seen killed, the video shows two men lying on the ground who were apparently in the Facebook post. The same men included in the Facebook post in December were apparently also shown in a military video shared on YouTube in November for an operation that claimed to have killed eight terrorists “during clashes.”
Sarah Leah Whitson, the executive director of Human Rights Watch’s Middle East and North Africa Division, which released a report about the January killings, said the group was investigating the latest video.
“We have not yet verified the video, and are working on it,” Ms. Whitson said in an email. “But it accords closely with our findings about other summary executions in Sinai and Cairo.”
Mokhtar Awad, a militancy expert at George Washington University, said the video was unlikely to be widely discussed on Egyptian news media because of emergency laws enacted by Mr. Sisi last week after suicide attacks by the Islamic State on two Christians churches on Palm Sunday.
“The worst thing I’ve seen before is of soldiers beating a guy,” Mr. Awad said. “We’ve never seen video from Sinai or elsewhere showing an Egyptian serviceman killing someone in cold blood.”
Together with the accusations of extrajudicial executions in Sinai in January, Mr. Awad said, it suggested “a growing level of impunity” in parts of the Egyptian military, particularly in Sinai where local emergency laws have been in place for years.
“It is a significant problem, and something that needs to be seriously addressed,” he said. “Otherwise things could head in a very problematic direction, of this somehow becoming a new normal.”


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رمضان زمان و رمضان الان

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همممم أبدا من فين مش عارف بس عموما دلوقتي احنا فى



ىشهر رمضان 2016 و آخر 15 سنة فى حياتى مع رمضان 
بقيت احساس غريب كل علاقتي مع رمضان ذكريات الطفولة الجميلة (مش جميله ولا زفت)
بس رمضان كان ليه احساس مختلف من اول الأكلات و الحلويات و القرآن الكريم و الصلاة و محدش ش بيضيق 
حد. ديما العائله ملمومهفى بيت جدى
و طبعا رمضان من 15سنة كان بيجى فى وقت المدارس وكان مش مسموح السهر و لا متابعه التلفزيون إلا الفوازير و الف ليلة وليلة و شكرا طبعا كانت بزعل المهم و فى الصبح نروح المدرسه وكل واحد يطلع لسانه علشان متأكد انك صايم كس امكم مين سمح ليكم أنكم تفتشوا علينا💩
و كان ممكن نفطر فى نص اليوم وكان اكيد مفيش حد يشوفك حلو جدا لحد كده وكان ياما كان ان الإيمان بالله و الصلاة ما تظهرش غير فى رمضان بعد كده عرفت ان ده نفاق و كدب يعنى لم تعيش شهر كامل صيام و قرآن ودعاء و تيجى يوم الوقفة و أعربد بحجة أنه عيد سعيد و كده نفاق ده ولا مش نفاق😒
نرجع بقى دلوقتي رمضان بقى عادى جدا. وبقى اصعب انك تصوم فى المجتمع ده من اول ما تصحى لحد ما تنام و الناس بتاكل بعض و مسلسلات كله بنات تقريبا عريانة كأنهم.منتظرين طول السنة شهر رمضان علشان يتعرو ويفطرو الناس وبكده جو الإيمان انضرب
تيجى بقى إلى العائله ولمه الفطار بخ بخ ديه كمان الناس كله بقت مش مستحملين حتى الأطفال مش بيلعبوا بالفانوس زى زمان بسبب ارتفاع اسعارهم وكامان اختلاف التفكير يعنى من الاخر رمضان بقى مش رمضان لا فى إحساسه ولا فى اى حاجة يا ترى بتحسوا بكده انتم كمان! 

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Do you want know the ISIS ! so you must know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia

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DO you want know the ISIS ! so you must know the History of  Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia



BEIRUT -- The dramatic arrival of Da'ish (ISIS) on the stage of Iraq has shocked many in the West. Many have been perplexed -- and horrified -- by its violence and its evident magnetism for Sunni youth. But more than this, they find Saudi Arabia's ambivalence in the face of this manifestation both troubling and inexplicable, wondering, "Don't the Saudis understand that ISIS threatens them, too?"

It appears -- even now -- that Saudi Arabia's ruling elite is divided. Some applaud that ISIS is fighting Iranian Shiite "fire" with Sunni "fire"; that a new Sunni state is taking shape at the very heart of what they regard as a historical Sunni patrimony; and they are drawn by Da'ish's strict Salafist ideology.













Other Saudis are more fearful, and recall the history of the revolt against Abd-al Aziz by the Wahhabist Ikhwan (Disclaimer: this Ikhwan has nothing to do with the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan -- please note, all further references hereafter are to the Wahhabist Ikhwan, and not to the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan), but which nearly imploded Wahhabism and the al-Saud in the late 1920s.

Many Saudis are deeply disturbed by the radical doctrines of Da'ish (ISIS) -- and are beginning to question some aspects of Saudi Arabia's direction and discourse.
THE SAUDI DUALITY
Saudi Arabia's internal discord and tensions over ISIS can only be understood by grasping the inherent (and persisting) duality that lies at the core of the Kingdom's doctrinal makeup and its historical origins.
One dominant strand to the Saudi identity pertains directly to Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (the founder of Wahhabism), and the use to which his radical, exclusionist puritanism was put by Ibn Saud. (The latter was then no more than a minor leader -- amongst many -- of continually sparring and raiding Bedouin tribes in the baking and desperately poor deserts of the Nejd.)
The second strand to this perplexing duality, relates precisely to King Abd-al Aziz's subsequent shift towards statehood in the 1920s: his curbing of Ikhwani violence (in order to have diplomatic standing as a nation-state with Britain and America); his institutionalization of the original Wahhabist impulse -- and the subsequent seizing of the opportunely surging petrodollar spigot in the 1970s, to channel the volatile Ikhwani current away from home towards export -- by diffusing a cultural revolution, rather than violent revolution throughout the Muslim world.
But this "cultural revolution" was no docile reformism. It was a revolution based on Abd al-Wahhab's Jacobin-like hatred for the putrescence and deviationism that he perceived all about him -- hence his call to purge Islam of all its heresies and idolatries.
MUSLIM IMPOSTORS
The American author and journalist, Steven Coll, has written how this austere and censorious disciple of the 14th century scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, Abd al-Wahhab, despised "the decorous, arty, tobacco smoking, hashish imbibing, drum pounding Egyptian and Ottoman nobility who travelled across Arabia to pray at Mecca."
In Abd al-Wahhab's view, these were not Muslims; they were imposters masquerading as Muslims. Nor, indeed, did he find the behavior of local Bedouin Arabs much better. They aggravated Abd al-Wahhab by their honoring of saints, by their erecting of tombstones, and their "superstition" (e.g. revering graves or places that were deemed particularly imbued with the divine).
All this behavior, Abd al-Wahhab denounced as bida -- forbidden by God.
Like Taymiyyah before him, Abd al-Wahhab believed that the period of the Prophet Muhammad's stay in Medina was the ideal of Muslim society (the "best of times"), to which all Muslims should aspire to emulate (this, essentially, is Salafism).
Taymiyyah had declared war on Shi'ism, Sufism and Greek philosophy. He spoke out, too against visiting the grave of the prophet and the celebration of his birthday, declaring that all such behavior represented mere imitation of the Christian worship of Jesus as God (i.e. idolatry). Abd al-Wahhab assimilated all this earlier teaching, stating that "any doubt or hesitation" on the part of a believer in respect to his or her acknowledging this particular interpretation of Islam should "deprive a man of immunity of his property and his life."
One of the main tenets of Abd al-Wahhab's doctrine has become the key idea oftakfir. Under the takfiri doctrine, Abd al-Wahhab and his followers could deem fellow Muslims infidels should they engage in activities that in any way could be said to encroach on the sovereignty of the absolute Authority (that is, the King). Abd al-Wahhab denounced all Muslims who honored the dead, saints, or angels. He held that such sentiments detracted from the complete subservience one must feel towards God, and only God. Wahhabi Islam thus bans any prayer to saints and dead loved ones, pilgrimages to tombs and special mosques, religious festivals celebrating saints, the honoring of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad's birthday, and even prohibits the use of gravestones when burying the dead.

"Those who would not conform to this view should be killed, their wives and daughters violated, and their possessions confiscated, he wrote. "

Abd al-Wahhab demanded conformity -- a conformity that was to be demonstrated in physical and tangible ways. He argued that all Muslims must individually pledge their allegiance to a single Muslim leader (a Caliph, if there were one). Those who would not conform to this view should be killed, their wives and daughters violated, and their possessions confiscated, he wrote. The list of apostates meriting death included the Shiite, Sufis and other Muslim denominations, whom Abd al-Wahhab did not consider to be Muslim at all.


There is nothing here that separates Wahhabism from ISIS. The rift would emerge only later: from the subsequent institutionalization of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab's doctrine of "One Ruler, One Authority, One Mosque" -- these three pillars being taken respectively to refer to the Saudi king, the absolute authority of official Wahhabism, and its control of "the word" (i.e. the mosque).


It is this rift -- the ISIS denial of these three pillars on which the whole of Sunni authority presently rests -- makes ISIS, which in all other respects conforms to Wahhabism, a deep threat to Saudi Arabia.


BRIEF HISTORY 1741- 1818


Abd al-Wahhab's advocacy of these ultra radical views inevitably led to his expulsion from his own town -- and in 1741, after some wanderings, he found refuge under the protection of Ibn Saud and his tribe. What Ibn Saud perceived in Abd al-Wahhab's novel teaching was the means to overturn Arab tradition and convention. It was a path to seizing power.

"Their strategy -- like that of ISIS today -- was to bring the peoples whom they conquered into submission. They aimed to instill fear. "



Ibn Saud's clan, seizing on Abd al-Wahhab's doctrine, now could do what they always did, which was raiding neighboring villages and robbing them of their possessions. Only now they were doing it not within the ambit of Arab tradition, but rather under the banner of jihad. Ibn Saud and Abd al-Wahhab also reintroduced the idea of martyrdom in the name of jihad, as it granted those martyred immediate entry into paradise.


In the beginning, they conquered a few local communities and imposed their rule over them. (The conquered inhabitants were given a limited choice: conversion to Wahhabism or death.) By 1790, the Alliance controlled most of the Arabian Peninsula and repeatedly raided Medina, Syria and Iraq.


Their strategy -- like that of ISIS today -- was to bring the peoples whom they conquered into submission. They aimed to instill fear. In 1801, the Allies attacked the Holy City of Karbala in Iraq. They massacred thousands of Shiites, including women and children. Many Shiite shrines were destroyed, including the shrine of Imam Hussein, the murdered grandson of Prophet Muhammad.


A British official, Lieutenant Francis Warden, observing the situation at the time, wrote: "They pillaged the whole of it [Karbala], and plundered the Tomb of Hussein... slaying in the course of the day, with circumstances of peculiar cruelty, above five thousand of the inhabitants ..."


Osman Ibn Bishr Najdi, the historian of the first Saudi state, wrote that Ibn Saud committed a massacre in Karbala in 1801. He proudly documented that massacre saying, "we took Karbala and slaughtered and took its people (as slaves), then praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, and we do not apologize for that and say: 'And to the unbelievers: the same treatment.'"


In 1803, Abdul Aziz then entered the Holy City of Mecca, which surrendered under the impact of terror and panic (the same fate was to befall Medina, too). Abd al-Wahhab's followers demolished historical monuments and all the tombs and shrines in their midst. By the end, they had destroyed centuries of Islamic architecture near the Grand Mosque.


But in November of 1803, a Shiite assassin killed King Abdul Aziz (taking revenge for the massacre at Karbala). His son, Saud bin Abd al Aziz, succeeded him and continued the conquest of Arabia. Ottoman rulers, however, could no longer just sit back and watch as their empire was devoured piece by piece. In 1812, the Ottoman army, composed of Egyptians, pushed the Alliance out from Medina, Jeddah and Mecca. In 1814, Saud bin Abd al Aziz died of fever. His unfortunate son Abdullah bin Saud, however, was taken by the Ottomans to Istanbul, where he was gruesomely executed (a visitor to Istanbul reported seeing him having been humiliated in the streets of Istanbul for three days, then hanged and beheaded, his severed head fired from a canon, and his heart cut out and impaled on his body).


In 1815, Wahhabi forces were crushed by the Egyptians (acting on the Ottoman's behalf) in a decisive battle. In 1818, the Ottomans captured and destroyed the Wahhabi capital of Dariyah. The first Saudi state was no more. The few remaining Wahhabis withdrew into the desert to regroup, and there they remained, quiescent for most of the 19th century.


HISTORY RETURNS WITH ISIS


It is not hard to understand how the founding of the Islamic State by ISIS in contemporary Iraq might resonate amongst those who recall this history. Indeed, the ethos of 18th century Wahhabism did not just wither in Nejd, but it roared back into life when the Ottoman Empire collapsed amongst the chaos of World War I.




The Al Saud -- in this 20th century renaissance -- were led by the laconic and politically astute Abd-al Aziz, who, on uniting the fractious Bedouin tribes, launched the Saudi "Ikhwan" in the spirit of Abd-al Wahhab's and Ibn Saud's earlier fighting proselytisers.


The Ikhwan was a reincarnation of the early, fierce, semi-independent vanguard movement of committed armed Wahhabist "moralists" who almost had succeeded in seizing Arabia by the early 1800s. In the same manner as earlier, the Ikhwan again succeeded in capturing Mecca, Medina and Jeddah between 1914 and 1926. Abd-al Aziz, however, began to feel his wider interests to be threatened by the revolutionary "Jacobinism" exhibited by the Ikhwan. The Ikhwan revolted -- leading to a civil war that lasted until the 1930s, when the King had them put down: he machine-gunned them.


For this king, (Abd-al Aziz), the simple verities of previous decades were eroding. Oil was being discovered in the peninsular. Britain and America were courting Abd-al Aziz, but still were inclined to support Sharif Husain as the only legitimate ruler of Arabia. The Saudis needed to develop a more sophisticated diplomatic posture.


So Wahhabism was forcefully changed from a movement of revolutionary jihad and theological takfiri purification, to a movement of conservative social, political, theological, and religious da'wa (Islamic call) and to justifying the institution that upholds loyalty to the royal Saudi family and the King's absolute power.


OIL WEALTH SPREAD WAHHABISM


With the advent of the oil bonanza -- as the French scholar, Giles Kepel writes, Saudi goals were to "reach out and spread Wahhabism across the Muslim world ... to "Wahhabise" Islam, thereby reducing the "multitude of voices within the religion" to a "single creed" -- a movement which would transcend national divisions. Billions of dollars were -- and continue to be -- invested in this manifestation of soft power.




It was this heady mix of billion dollar soft power projection -- and the Saudi willingness to manage Sunni Islam both to further America's interests, as it concomitantly embedded Wahhabism educationally, socially and culturally throughout the lands of Islam -- that brought into being a western policy dependency on Saudi Arabia, a dependency that has endured since Abd-al Aziz's meeting with Roosevelt on a U.S. warship (returning the president from the Yalta Conference) until today.


Westerners looked at the Kingdom and their gaze was taken by the wealth; by the apparent modernization; by the professed leadership of the Islamic world. They chose to presume that the Kingdom was bending to the imperatives of modern life -- and that the management of Sunni Islam would bend the Kingdom, too, to modern life.

"On the one hand, ISIS is deeply Wahhabist. On the other hand, it is ultra radical in a different way. It could be seen essentially as a corrective movement to contemporary Wahhabism."


But the Saudi Ikhwan approach to Islam did not die in the 1930s. It retreated, but it maintained its hold over parts of the system -- hence the duality that we observe today in the Saudi attitude towards ISIS.
On the one hand, ISIS is deeply Wahhabist. On the other hand, it is ultra radical in a different way. It could be seen essentially as a corrective movement to contemporary Wahhabism.
ISIS is a "post-Medina" movement: it looks to the actions of the first two Caliphs, rather than the Prophet Muhammad himself, as a source of emulation, and it forcefully denies the Saudis' claim of authority to rule.
As the Saudi monarchy blossomed in the oil age into an ever more inflated institution, the appeal of the Ikhwan message gained ground (despite King Faisal's modernization campaign). The "Ikhwan approach" enjoyed -- and still enjoys -- the support of many prominent men and women and sheikhs. In a sense, Osama bin Laden was precisely the representative of a late flowering of this Ikhwani approach.
Today, ISIS' undermining of the legitimacy of the King's legitimacy is not seen to be problematic, but rather a return to the true origins of the Saudi-Wahhab project.
In the collaborative management of the region by the Saudis and the West in pursuit of the many western projects (countering socialism, Ba'athism, Nasserism, Soviet and Iranian influence), western politicians have highlighted their chosen reading of Saudi Arabia (wealth, modernization and influence), but they chose to ignore the Wahhabist impulse.
After all, the more radical Islamist movements were perceived by Western intelligence services as being more effective in toppling the USSR in Afghanistan -- and in combatting out-of-favor Middle Eastern leaders and states.


Why should we be surprised then, that from Prince Bandar's Saudi-Western mandate to manage the insurgency in Syria against President Assad should have emerged a neo-Ikhwan type of violent, fear-inducing vanguard movement: ISIS? And why should we be surprised -- knowing a little about Wahhabism -- that "moderate" insurgents in Syria would become rarer than a mythical unicorn? Why should we have imagined that radical Wahhabism would create moderates? Or why could we imagine that a doctrine of "One leader, One authority, One mosque: submit to it, or be killed" could ever ultimately lead to moderation or tolerance?

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The Paris attacks its A declaration of war against Europe

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#UPDATE 11-17-2015

NEW statement form ISIS about Paris attacks




بيان عن غزوة #باريس المباركة على فرنسا الصليبية

Communiqué sur l’attaque bénie de #Paris contre la France croisée.




VIDEO FORM ISIS
video





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#UPDATE 11-19-2015





After the night of terror in Paris, "Islamic State" has claimed responsibility for the attacks that cost more than 120 lives. Not only France, but Europe must now take action, DW's Alexander Kudascheff writes.
Frankreich Trauer
November 13, 2015 is a day that will surely live in infamy. It was a black Friday for France, for Europe, for the West.
The terrorist attack - more precisely, the perfectly coordinated terrorist attacks throughout one of the most beautiful cities in the world, Paris - was a declaration of war by "Islamic State." A declaration of war by Islamic jihadism on all of us here in Europe. On our way of life, on our political, human and social understanding of freedom.



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The attack was a knife wound in the heart of Europeans. It wounded our understanding of ourselves, and how we want to live. The terror was a murderous stab against the French state, which could not protect its citizens, despite its new and extensive monitoring capabilities.
The killings were also an attack on the political landscape of France. A slide to right-wing or ultra-right positions is now certain. France will isolate itself, and will make plans to withdraw from globalization. The political winner of the nightmare of November 13 will be the National Front in France. And the hapless and unpopular President Francois Hollande will be the main loser.
This "Black Friday" will change Europe, even though no one yet knows where the "IS" assassins came from. Were they from the banlieues? From the suburbs of French cities, where parallel societies of rootless young people with a Muslim background have long been a reality, where - as a book by the Algerian writer Sansal describes it - "men with long beards call the shots" and the rejection of the French and Western lifestyle is total?
Or did the terrorists come from Syria or Iraq, either as returning fighters or posing as refugees? This would only add fuel to the fire of the European, and especially the German, debate on migration.
Friday, November 13 was a day of powerlessness.
It will remain a day that hangs like a nightmare over the French and the Europeans. A day of dejection, helplessness, and probably also aimless rage.
But it is also a day on which the open, liberal societies of this old continent must say with pride: We will not change our way of life. And it is also a day on which we must realize, coolly and rationally: Whoever intends to tackle the causes of migration will have to fight both Assad and "IS."
There can be no other response to "IS' "declaration of war against the West - and not just the West.
Unfortunately, DW is unable to accept comments at this time

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#ISIS affiliate claims responsibility for #Cairo bombing that National Security Gov.left 29 injured

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A massive car bomb National Security Gov claimed by Islamic State militants ripped into a national security building in a working class residential neighborhood in Cairo early Thursday, wounding at least 29 people and blowing the facades off nearby buildings according to Egyptian state media..




The blast, which went off around 2 a.m., demolished a wall in front of the government building, smashed its structure and left gaping holes exposing its offices. Of those hurt, 11 were police and soldiers. No deaths were reported.

Glass from blown-out windows littered the surrounding streets in the Shubra el-Kheima neighborhood, at the northern entrance to the capital.

Ambulances and fire trucks rushed to the scene, which was flooded with water from pipes broken by what authorities said were high explosives. The explosion could be heard and felt across the city. State news agency MENA reported the casualties hours later.


صرح مسئول مركز الإعلام الأمنى بوزارة الداخلية بوقوع إنفجار بمحيط مبنى الأمن الوطنى بدائرة قسم أول شبرا الخيمة فى الساعات...
Posted by ‎الصفحة الرسمية لوزارة الداخلية‎ on Wednesday, August 19, 2015
Emergency aid chief Ahmed al-Ansari said the wounded were evacuated to nearby hospitals. Wrecked cars stood around the building, as security forces carrying assault rifles patrolled the streets and set up roadblocks to ward off hysterical residents. A crater marked the blast's apparent position, while a car engine sat where it landed on the other side of street.





The Islamic State group claimed responsibility for the car bombing, saying on its Al-Bayan radio station that "soldiers of the caliphate" had carried it out. A statement issued by their affiliate in Egypt and circulated by supporters online said it was to avenge the execution of six convicted militants in May.




A similar statement emerged last month following a bombing outside the Italian Consulate in Cairo.
Egypt has seen a surge of assaults on security forces since the 2013 military overthrow of Islamist president Mohammed Morsi. Previous large-scale attacks have been claimed by an Islamic State affiliate based in the northern Sinai Peninsula.
Inside his ruined clinic next door to the security building, plastic surgeon Gawad Mahmoud lamented Egypt's troubles since the military ousted Morsi, the country's first freely elected president, amid massive protests against his divisive yearlong rule.
"We were here painting the office, and then it went off. It was like an earthquake, it blew the doors off and smashed all the windows in," he said. "The explosion sounded professional, it wasn't small-time. We are not living in a normal state here."
Access to the area was highly restricted, even in the minutes following the blast, with dozens of policemen, plainclothes and uniformed, discouraging any approach. At the site, press credentials of the few foreign journalists who managed to arrive were checked repeatedly by authorities.
Egypt has been wracked by a wave of attacks since President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi overthrew Morsi and launched a heavy crackdown against his supporters and dissent in general.
Last weekend, he decreed a new anti-terrorism law presented amid a wave of violence and killings this summer. The far-reaching new law sets a sweeping definition for who can face a harsh set of punishments. Journalists can be fined for reporting that contradicts Defense Ministry statements.
Egypt has lacked a legislature for three years, and since being elected a little over a year ago, el-Sissi has single-handedly passed dozens of laws.



A group affiliated with the Islamic State in Egypt "Not Sinai Province" but rather "Egypt Province".
In a statement released on affiliated-IS social media, the group claimed its responsibility for the attack targetting the State security building which is believed to be an old abandoned one already.
The group claiming that it bombed the building to avenge for their brothers in "Arab Sharkas" cell.
The Arab Sharkas cell was located in Qalubiya governorate as well.




The Cabinet approved the draft anti-terrorism law last month, two days after a car bomb in an upscale Cairo neighborhood killed the country's prosecutor general, Hisham Barakat.
On the day it was approved by ministers, Islamic militants launched a multi-pronged attack attempting to seize a northern Sinai town, hitting the military with suicide attacks and battling soldiers for hours.

The violence has largely been confined to the restive northern part of the Sinai Peninsula, but Cairo and other parts of the mainland have been rocked by a series of mostly small-scale explosions targeting police.
A huge truck bomb in January 2014 targeting Cairo's security headquarters killed four people and damaged a nearby museum dedicated to Islamic arts and history.
A month earlier, a car bomb tore through a security headquarters in the Nile Delta city of Mansoura, killing 16 people, nearly all policemen. Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, as the Sinai outfit was known before it pledged allegiance to the IS group last year, claimed responsibility.

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